JOSE SALGADO-FRANCO V. LORETTA E. LYNCH, No. 13-74364 (9th Cir. 2016)
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED DEC 19 2016 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT JOSE JESUS SALGADO-FRANCO, Petitioner, v. No. U.S. COURT OF APPEALS 13-74364 Agency No. A075-090-469 MEMORANDUM* LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted December 14, 2016** San Francisco, California Before: HAWKINS, BERZON, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges. Jose Jesus Salgado-Franco, a Mexican citizen, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision dismissing his appeal and affirming the Immigration Judge’s denial of his request for cancellation of removal. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review de novo * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). legal determinations regarding an individual’s eligibility for cancellation of removal, Montero–Martinez v. Ashcroft, 277 F.3d 1137, 1145 (9th Cir. 2002), and we review factual findings for substantial evidence, Ali v. Holder, 637 F.3d 1025, 1028–29 (9th Cir. 2011). We deny Salgado-Franco’s petition for review. 1. The BIA properly determined that Salgado-Franco was ineligible for cancellation of removal because his deportation was previously suspended. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(c)(6). Although Salgado-Franco argues that he had obtained suspension of deportation relief as a derivative of his mother’s application, reasonable and substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that SalgadoFranco received this relief independent of his mother’s claim. The record shows that Salgado-Franco had completed his own application for suspension of deportation. In his application, Salgado-Franco described the extreme hardship that he would personally suffer if deported to Mexico; the hardship described was not necessarily dependent on the success of his mother’s application. Because SalgadoFranco previously received suspension of deportation relief, under § 1229b(c)(6), he is not eligible for cancellation of removal. See Garcia-Jimenez v. Gonzales, 488 F.3d 1082, 1085 (9th Cir. 2007). 2. We lack jurisdiction to review Salgado-Franco’s contention that he 2 remains eligible for cancellation of removal because he was granted suspension of deportation relief after September 30, 1996, because he failed to exhaust this claim before the BIA. Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 2004). PETITION DENIED. 3
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