Balbuena v. Sullivan, No. 12-16414 (9th Cir. 2020)
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The Ninth Circuit filed an amended opinion, denied a petition for rehearing, and denied on behalf of the court a petition for rehearing en banc, in appeals arising from the district court's denial of petitioner's habeas corpus petition and his motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) for relief from judgment. Petitioner argues that the state court's admission of his confession violated his due process rights because it was the involuntary product of coercion, and that his Rule 60(b) motion was a proper motion to amend his habeas petition and not a disguised second or successive petition subject to 28 U.S.C. 2244.
Considering the petition under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) framework and applying a highly deferential standard, the panel held that the state court's conclusion that petitioner's confession was voluntary was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. In this case, the state court did not unreasonably conclude that petitioner was sixteen years old and considered his age, experience, and maturity as part of the totality of the circumstances of his confession. Furthermore, the state did not unreasonably conclude that the circumstances of his interview were not coercive. The panel also held that, because petitioner asserted a new claim in his Rule 60(b) motion despite the district court's previously adjudicating his habeas petition on the merits, the district court properly denied that motion as an unauthorized second or successive petition.
Court Description: Habeas Corpus. The panel filed an amended opinion, denied a petition for rehearing, and denied on behalf of the court a petition for rehearing en banc, in appeals arising from the district court’s denial of (1) Alexander Balbuena’s habeas corpus petition in which he argued that the admission of his confession violated his due process rights because the statements were the involuntary product of coercion; and (2) his motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) for relief from judgment to allow him to amend his habeas petition to add a new claim that the admission of his confession violated his Miranda rights. Applying AEDPA’s deferential standards of federal habeas review, and affirming the denial of the petition, the panel held that the state court’s conclusion that Balbuena’s BALBUENA V. SULLIVAN 3 confession was voluntary was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. The panel wrote that the state court did not unreasonably conclude that Balbuena was sixteen years old and considered his age, experience, and maturity as part of the totality of the circumstances of his confession. The panel considered Balbuena’s arguments regarding the adequacy of his Miranda warnings as part of the totality of the circumstances relevant to his Fourteenth Amendment claim rather than as a separate Sixth Amendment claim, and concluded that the state court’s determination that Balbuena was advised of his Miranda rights was not objectively unreasonable. The panel wrote that the state court did not unreasonably conclude that the circumstances of the interview, which included the detectives’ limited references to Balbuena’s unborn child, use of “alternative scenarios,” and implied officers of leniency were not coercive. The panel wrote that a video recording of the interview refutes Balbuena’s argument that those tactics overbore his will and rendered his confession involuntary. The panel held that the district court properly denied Balbuena’s Rule 60(b) motion as an unauthorized second or successive petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). Balbuena argued that the district court should have considered his Rule 60(b) motion as a motion to amend his habeas petition because he filed it while his appeal from the denial of his habeas petition remained pending before this court and that his claim therefore was not “fully adjudicated.” The panel wrote that a Rule 60(b) motion that asserts a new claim is a disguised habeas corpus petition that is subject to the requirements of § 2244(b), and that because Balbuena neither sought nor obtained authorization from this court to file a second or successive habeas petition, the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider his new claim. 4 BALBUENA V. SULLIVAN The panel rejected Balbuena’s contention that even if his Rule 60(b) motion is a disguised habeas petition, it is not a second or successive petition under § 2244(b) because the denial of his initial petition was pending on appeal. Concurring in the result, Judge W. Fletcher agreed that the state court did not unreasonably conclude that Balbuena’s confession was voluntary. He also agreed that Beaty v. Schriro, 554 F.3d 780, 783 n.1 (9th Cir. 2009), requires the panel to hold that Balbuena’s Rule 60(b) motion was a second or successive habeas petition, even though it was filed while an appeal on his initial habeas petition was awaiting adjudication in this court. He wrote separately to register his disagreement with Beaty and to urge the Supreme Court to recognize the circuit split and to adopt the rule stated in Ching v. United States, 298 F.3d 174, 178 (2d Cir. 2002), and United States v. Santarelli, 929 F.3d 95, 104– 05 (3d Cir. 2019).
This opinion or order relates to an opinion or order originally issued on August 17, 2020.
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