United States v. Corrigan, No. 20-1682 (8th Cir. 2021)
Annotate this Case
Justia Opinion Summary
Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Eighth Circuit US Court of Appeals?
Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More ›
You already receive new opinion summaries from Eighth Circuit US Court of Appeals. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here.
The Eighth Circuit dismissed defendant's appeal of his mandatory-minimum sentence of 60 months in prison. The court concluded that, no matter what it decides, defendant's sentence cannot get any shorter. The court explained that any live controversy over the relevant enhancement ended the moment the district court gave defendant a 60-month prison sentence. At that point, enhancements and reductions no longer mattered because a decreased offense level could not drive his sentence any lower.
Court Description: [Stras, Author, with Smith, Chief Judge, and Arnold, Circuit Judge] Criminal case - Sentencing. Defendant cannot appeal the imposition of an enhancement when, no matter what this court decides, his sentence cannot get shorter because he was sentenced to the mandatory minimum; the issue he raises is moot, and the appeal is dismissed.
Download PDF
United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit ___________________________ No. 20-1682 ___________________________ United States of America Plaintiff - Appellee v. Brett Allan Corrigan, Jr. Defendant - Appellant ____________ Appeal from United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa - Central ____________ Submitted: February 15, 2021 Filed: July 27, 2021 ____________ Before SMITH, Chief Judge, ARNOLD and STRAS, Circuit Judges. ____________ STRAS, Circuit Judge. Brett Corrigan, Jr. received a mandatory-minimum sentence of 60 months in prison. The question presented here is simple: can Corrigan appeal an enhancement when, no matter what we decide, his sentence cannot get any shorter? We conclude that the answer is no, so we dismiss his appeal. Based on his involvement in a large-scale drug-trafficking operation, Corrigan pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute at least 100 kilograms of a mixture or substance containing marijuana. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(vii), 846. At sentencing, the district court1 gave him a two-level enhancement for possessing a dangerous weapon, which yielded an advisory range of 60 to 71 months in prison. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1); United States v. Peters, 524 F.3d 905, 907 (8th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). The quirk here is that the sentence he received, 60 months in prison, is also the mandatory minimum. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(vii). As may be evident by now, nothing we do here will affect Corrigan’s sentence, meaning that we lack the ability to “provide . . . any effectual relief.” Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, 141 S. Ct. 792, 796 (2021). Win or lose, it makes no difference—his sentence will remain 60 months because of the mandatory minimum. In jurisdictional terms, Corrigan “‘lack[s] a cognizable interest in the outcome,’” which means that there is no longer “a [live] case or controversy under Article III.” Brazil v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 892 F.3d 957, 959 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 91 (2013)). In fact, any live controversy over the enhancement ended the moment the district court gave him a 60-month prison sentence. At that point, enhancements and reductions no longer mattered because a decreased offense level could not drive his sentence any lower. See Peters, 524 F.3d at 907 (explaining that the Sentencing Guidelines “set[] the bottom of the guidelines range at the statutory mandatory minimum when it would otherwise be below the mandatory minimum”). Corrigan himself recognizes the problem when he admits in his brief that “the application of the weapon enhancement may not affect the length of [his] prison sentence.” In short, as far as the length of the sentence is concerned, the issue Corrigan has raised The Honorable Rebecca Goodgame Ebinger, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Iowa. 1 -2- is moot. See United States v. Williams, 216 F.3d 611, 615 (7th Cir. 2000) (concluding that a sentencing challenge was moot in similar circumstances); United States v. Thornton, 444 F.3d 1163, 1168 (9th Cir. 2006) (same); United States v. Payton, 405 F.3d 1168, 1172 (10th Cir. 2005) (same). Corrigan makes a halfhearted attempt to keep the controversy alive by suggesting that the enhancement could have the collateral consequence of making him ineligible for in-prison drug treatment. See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998) (discussing the collateral-consequences exception to mootness). Even assuming that this sort of collateral consequence would be enough to overcome mootness, we have nothing more than speculative statements from counsel on this point. Cf. Exeter Bancorporation, Inc. v. Kemper Sec. Grp., Inc., 58 F.3d 1306, 1312 n.5 (8th Cir. 1995) (“[S]tatements of counsel are not evidence . . . .” (alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted)). And speculation alone does not allow us to “retain[] jurisdiction over a moot case.” McCarthy v. Ozark Sch. Dist., 359 F.3d 1029, 1036 (8th Cir. 2004). ______________________________ -3-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
