Court Description: Per Curiam - Before Loken, Grasz, Stras, Circuit Judges] Criminal case - Sentencing. Defendant's within-Guidelines range sentence was not substantively unreasonable; the court acknowledged defendant's mitigating factors and explained how they, along with the aggravating the factors, affected its sentencing decision; the court's weighing of these factors was not an abuse of its discretion; district courts are permitted, but not required, to disagree with guidelines provisions on policy grounds, and the district court did not err in rejecting defendant's policy-grounds objections to application of the career-offender enhancement.
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United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit ___________________________ No. 18-1179 ___________________________ United States of America Plaintiff - Appellee v. Dante Rhodes Defendant - Appellant ____________ Appeal from United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa - Dubuque ____________ Submitted: January 14, 2019 Filed: April 12, 2019 [Unpublished] ____________ Before LOKEN, GRASZ, and STRAS, Circuit Judges. ____________ PER CURIAM. Dante Rhodes robbed a bank and then led law enforcement on a high-speed car chase. After he pleaded guilty to bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), the district court1 sentenced him to 108 months in prison, a within-Guidelines-range sentence that he claims is substantively unreasonable. We affirm. The district court did not abuse its discretion in setting Rhodes’s sentence. See United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461–62 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc). A sentence within the advisory range is entitled to a “presumption of reasonableness.” United States v. Deegan, 605 F.3d 625, 634 (8th Cir. 2010). In considering the statutory sentencing factors, the court noted that Rhodes “put[] the teller in significant fear” during the robbery, an innocent bystander was injured during the ensuing car chase, and the arresting officers had to tase Rhodes to “br[ing him] under control.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (listing the factors the court must consider, including “the nature and circumstances of the offense”); see also United States v. Meadows, 866 F.3d 913, 920 (8th Cir. 2017). The court was entitled to stress these case-specific facts in imposing a 108-month sentence. Rhodes responds that the district court’s emphasis of these facts came at the expense of others, such as his struggles with drug addiction. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The record shows, however, that the court acknowledged the mitigating factors he raised and explained how they, along with several aggravating factors, influenced its decision. The court was permitted to weigh some factors more heavily than others in exercising its discretion. See United States v. Ryser, 883 F.3d 1018, 1022 (8th Cir. 2018). Rhodes further complains that the district court should have disagreed on policy grounds with the Guidelines’ career-offender enhancement. See U.S.S.G. §§ 4B1.1–.2. Courts certainly are permitted to impose shorter sentences because of policy disagreements with the Guidelines. But, as we have repeatedly held, they are not required to do so. See United States v. Sharkey, 895 F.3d 1077, 1082 (8th Cir. 1 The Honorable Leonard T. Strand, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa. -2- 2018) (per curiam); United States v. Keys, 785 F.3d 1240, 1243–44 (8th Cir. 2015). Here, the court did more than enough when it specifically considered and rejected his argument. See United States v. Bowie, 618 F.3d 802, 811 (8th Cir. 2010) (affirming even though “the district court [did not] address explicitly” a policy-based request for a downward variance). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. ______________________________ -3-
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