Court Description: Per Curiam. Before Gruender, Murphy, and Kelly, Circuit Judges] Habeas Case - motion to vacate. The denial of relief under 28 U.S.C. sec. 2255 is vacated, as the collateral review waiver in the plea agreement is unenforceable because, during the plea hearing,the district court neither informed Silk of the terms of the waiver, nor determined that he understood the terms. On remand, the district court should determine if other procedural hurdles preclude consideration on the merits or whether Silk's two prior qualifying convictions were final.
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit ___________________________ No. 16-4428 ___________________________ Samuel Bryce Silk, Jr. lllllllllllllllllllllPetitioner - Appellant v. United States of America lllllllllllllllllllllRespondent - Appellee ____________ Appeal from United States District Court for the District of North Dakota - Bismarck ____________ Submitted: February 22, 2018 Filed: February 23, 2018 [Unpublished] ____________ Before GRUENDER, MURPHY, and KELLY, Circuit Judges. ____________ PER CURIAM. Samuel Bryce Silk, Jr. appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 after it sua sponte enforced a collateral review waiver in his plea agreement. Silk’s motion raises one claim: that he could not, as a matter of law, have committed the crime to which he pleaded guilty, domestic assault as a habitual offender, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 117. Upon de novo review, we conclude that the collateral review waiver is unenforceable because, during the plea hearing, the district court neither informed Silk of the terms of the waiver, nor determined that he understood its terms. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(N); United States v. Boneshirt, 662 F.3d 509, 516 (8th Cir. 2011). We therefore vacate the denial of Silk’s § 2255 motion, and remand the case to the district court for further consideration. We leave for the district court to determine in the first instance: (1) whether any other procedural hurdles preclude consideration of Silk’s claim on the merits; and (2) if not, whether Silk had at least two prior qualifying convictions that were “final” on July 12, 2014, when the events underlying this case occurred. See 18 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1) (requiring, as relevant, that a defendant’s prior convictions be both “final” and “against a spouse or intimate partner”); see also United States v. Wroblewski, 816 F.3d 1021, 1024–25 (8th Cir. 2016); United States v. Frook, 616 F.3d 773, 774–76 (8th Cir. 2006). Finally, we note that Silk attacks the validity of his conviction, and his currently scheduled release date is May 11, 2018. We are confident the district court will act expeditiously. Mandate to issue forthwith. ______________________________ -2-
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
