United States v. Coonce, No. 14-2800 (8th Cir. 2019)
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The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment sentencing defendant to death for his role in murdering an inmate. The court affirmed the district court's decision not to hold an Atkins hearing and not to consider whether defendant satisfied the other factors for intellectual disability, regardless of whether he waived his arguments, because defendant did not show the condition onset before he was 18; there was no Miranda error by admitting evidence at trial of defendant's refusal to submit to an IQ test; there was no error in refusing to instruct the jury on defendant's brain damage mitigating factor; any error in admitting incriminating statements made to the government's psychiatrist was invited and the court will not reverse on that basis; footprint evidence and forensic blood evidence was properly admitted; the district court correctly exercised its discretion when it refused to instruct the jury that defendant's rebuttal evidence was a mitigating factor; and the district court did not err by admitting evidence of the BOP's administrative policies and costs for future dangerousness.
The court also held that there was no error in defendant's court-imposed absence during certain jury ministerial matters; the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting BOP reports; the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting different versions of defendant's prior kidnapping and rape offenses; the district court did not err in submitting future dangerousness to the jury; the district court did not abuse its discretion during voir dire on mental health issues; and the court rejected defendant's remaining claims regarding lack of individualized voir dire, separate capital sentencing proceedings, standard for weighing factors, and arbitrariness arguments.
Court Description: Grasz, Author, with Gruender and Kelly, Circuit Judges] Criminal case - Criminal law and sentencing. Federal Death Penalty. Defendant did not meet the "mentally retarded" exception to the Federal Death Penalty Act (FDPA) because he did not show the condition onset before he was 18; the district court did not err, therefore, in deciding not to hold an Atkins hearing or consider whether defendant met the other factors for intellectual disability; admission of evidence that defendant refused to submit to an IQ test did not violate his Fifth Amendment due process rights; the court did not err in rejecting his request for an instruction that said "if any of you find the factual existence of a mitigating factor you may not ignore that factor or give it zero weight;" because the government conceded mental damage it was not precluded from making arguments about weight so long as it avoided impermissible nexus arguments; the district court's order on the scope of defendant's examination by the government's psychiatrist complied with Fed. R. Crim. p. 12.2, and his argument that the court erred in admitting his statements is foreclosed by the doctrine of invited error; no error in admitting footprint and forensic blood evidence at sentencing; some summary of the allegations supporting a jury finding of future dangerousness is necessary in capital sentencing proceedings to prevent an open-ended inquiry on the jury's perception of future dangerousness rather than an inquiry on the government's evidence, and the court's comments were not improper; while the district court made a mistake in deviating from the model instruction on future dangerousness, the error was not plain or reversible error; no error in admitting evidence of the Bureau of Prison's administrative policies and costs as part of the government's case on future dangerousness; claim that the court's giving of certain instructions to the jury outside of defendant's presence violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights rejected as the court's discussions with the jury concerned ministerial matters and were not a trial stage for purposes of Fed. R. Crim. P. 43; admission at sentencing of defendant's BOP conduct record did not violate his Confrontation Clause rights, and the records possessed sufficient indicia of reliability to be admitted; government's repeated use of defendant's prior convictions for rape and kidnapping was not unfairly prejudicial; use of the convictions in support of multiple aggravating factors was permitted under this court's precedents; future dangerousness is properly submitted as an aggravated factor; the district court's limits on voir dire on bias issues was within its broad discretion; the court was not required to conduct individualized voir dire; the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant's request for a sentencing proceeding separate from that of his co-defendant in the murder prosecution; a capital sentencing jury does not need to weigh factors using a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard as the weighing component of the FDPA is not an elemental fact; argument that defendant was arbitrarily sentenced based on the geography of the district rejected; argument that the FDPA is arbitrary rejected.
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