Solomon v. Deputy U.S. Marshal Thomas, No. 13-1635 (8th Cir. 2015)
Annotate this CaseSolomon was convicted of violating supervised release and was allowed to voluntarily surrender himself. Solomon absconded after writing a letter, stating his hope that Hendren, then Chief Judge of the Western District of Arkansas, "dies of a slow and painful disease." He sent the letter to Hendren's chambers and a newspaper, which published it. Solomon was apprehended. U.S. Marshal Jones, accompanied by a guard, drove him to Arkansas. According to Solomon's pro se complaint they, "said [he]'d 'pay for writing that type of letter.'" Solomon was transferred to the Benton County Criminal Detention Center (BCCDC). Solomon claimed, while driving him to the BCCDC, the Marshals said that BCCDC "was like going to hell … for their abusive handling practices" and that "they were going to make sure [he] was punished for that letter." Later, Solomon alleged that he was hit by Marshal Cory Thomas; that he "was handcuffed in the middle of the night . . . and a dark cloth was slipped over [his] head and he was . . . carried . . . into another room and given a 'blanket-party' by the deputies." Solomon filed a pro se “Bivens” action. The Eighth Circuit affirmed denial of a motion to dismiss, finding that Jones and Thomas were not entitled to qualified immunity against Solomon's excessive force claim
Court Description: Smith, Author, with Bye and Beam, Circuit Judges] Prisoner case - Prisoner Civil Rights. For the court's prior opinion in the matter, see Solomon v. Petray, 699 F.3d 1034 (8th Cir. 2012). Defendants were not entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity on plaintiff's claim that they arranged for local jail officials to beat him in retaliation for a letter he wrote the district judge who had sentenced him, as plaintiff alleged he had engaged in protected expression, had suffered an adverse action and had pleaded sufficient facts that would allow a reasonable jury to find a causal connection between the expression and the adverse action; his claims against a Deputy Marshal for striking him similarly alleged retaliation for a protected activity and the Deputy Marshal was not entitled to qualified immunity on that claim; defendant Jones was not entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff's conspiracy claim as there was evidence to support a jury's reasonable inference that Jones entered into an agreement with local jail authorities to deprive plaintiff of his constitutional right to be free from excessive force.
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