United States v. Anthony Alardin, No. 10-1856 (8th Cir. 2010)
Annotate this CaseCourt Description: Criminal case - criminal law. District court did not err in denying defendant's motion for a certificate setting aside his 1983 conviction under the Federal Youth Corrections Act as he did not receive an early unconditional discharge from his original term of probation or from his subsequent two-year probation-revocation sentence.
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United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT ___________ No. 10-1856 ___________ United States of America, Appellee, v. Anthony Alardin, Appellant. * * * Appeal from the United States * District Court for the * Eastern District of Arkansas. * * [UNPUBLISHED] * * ___________ Submitted: August 26, 2010 Filed: September 1, 2010 ___________ Before BYE, BOWMAN, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges. ___________ PER CURIAM. Anthony Alardin appeals from the order of the District Court1 denying his motion for a certificate setting aside his 1983 criminal conviction under the Federal Youth Corrections Act (FYCA), 18 U.S.C. § 5021 (1982) (repealed 1984). We grant Alardin's motion to file a supplemental brief. After carefully considering the parties' arguments and reviewing the record, we conclude that the District Court properly denied Alardin's motion because he did not receive an early unconditional discharge from his original term of probation or from his subsequent two-year probation1 The Honorable James M. Moody, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas. revocation sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 5021(a) (requiring the issuance of a certificate setting aside a FYCA conviction upon the Parole Commission's unconditional discharge of the committed youth offender before the expiration "of the maximum sentence imposed upon him" (emphasis added)); id. § 5021(b) (requiring the issuance of a certificate setting aside a FYCA conviction when a youth offender has been placed on probation and the court grants him an unconditional discharge from probation before "the expiration of the maximum period of probation theretofore fixed by the court" (emphasis added)); Tuten v. United States, 460 U.S. 660, 666 (1983) (noting that the set-aside provision in § 5021(b) applies only to youth offenders discharged before their original probationary terms have expired). Accordingly, we affirm the District Court. ______________________________ -2-
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