USA v. Lamar Chapman, III, No. 22-3259 (7th Cir. 2023)
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NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604 Submitted March 2, 2023* Decided March 6, 2023 Before FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 22-3259 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Nos. 09 CR 741 & 10 CR 642 LAMAR C. CHAPMAN, III, Defendant-Appellant. Elaine E. Bucklo, Judge. ORDER Lamar Chapman has been convicted of financial crimes. His most recent conviction and sentence were affirmed by United States v. Thomas, 763 F.3d 689 (7th Cir. 2014). After his release from prison, he asked the district court to terminate his three-year term of supervised release. The judge declined, observing that Chapman’s long-term pattern of criminality—including crimes committed while on pretrial release and supervised release from earlier sentences—implies a substantial risk of recidivism. The judge added * After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is unnecessary. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); Cir. R. 34(f). No. 22-3259 Page 2 that Chapman, far from expressing remorse, continues to insist that he did nothing wrong, which implies that Chapman feels free to resume his criminal conduct. Appellate review of a district judge’s decision not to terminate supervised release is deferential, United States v. Lowe, 632 F.3d 996, 997 (7th Cir. 2011), and we do not see any abuse of discretion by the district judge. Indeed, Chapman does not try to show an abuse. Instead his appellate brief, laden with invective, maintains that the federal judiciary persecutes people (like himself) who have done nothing wrong. He accuses of misconduct in office (indeed, of crimes) almost everyone who has had anything to do with his prosecutions and convictions. Chapman’s brief demonstrates that the district court was right to label him recalcitrant and unrepentant. Chapman’s further contention that the district judge should have disqualified herself is mistaken. Adverse rulings, based on the record of the case, do not demonstrate bias. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994). Nothing calls Judge Bucklo’s performance into question. AFFIRMED
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