United States v. Braddy, No. 21-50185 (5th Cir. 2021)

Annotate this Case

After defendant pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute cocaine and methamphetamine, the district court sentenced him to 10 years imprisonment and a 5-year term of supervised release. The written judgment listed ten statutorily mandated conditions of supervised release, as well as seventeen conditions from a district-wide standing order that the district court did not mention at sentencing.

The parties agree that the district court's judgment conflicts with the Fifth Circuit's decision in United States v. Diggles, 957 F.3d 551, 559 (5th Cir. 2020) (en banc). Diggles held that supervised-release conditions imposed by statute need not be pronounced orally at sentencing because any objection to them would be futile, but that discretionary conditions must be orally pronounced in the defendant’s presence at sentencing so that he has an opportunity to object. The court agreed with the parties that defendant did not have an opportunity to object to the seventeen conditions mentioned in the district court's standing order but unmentioned at sentencing. The court concluded that limited remand would be appropriate, granted the government's motion to do so, and denied as moot the government's alternative unopposed motion for extension to file its brief upon the denial of remand.

The court issued a subsequent related opinion or order on June 9, 2022.

Download PDF

United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit FILED United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit ___________ August 26, 2021 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk No. 21-50185 ___________ United States of America, Plaintiff—Appellee, versus Marshall Lee Braddy, Defendant—Appellant. ______________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. 5:19-CR-264-7 ______________________________ Before Elrod, Oldham, and Wilson, Circuit Judges. Andrew S. Oldham, Circuit Judge: Marshall Lee Braddy pled guilty to conspiring to distribute cocaine and methamphetamine. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(b)(1)(B). The district court sentenced Braddy to 10 years imprisonment and a 5-year term of supervised release. The written judgment listed ten statutorily mandated conditions of supervised release. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3013(a)(2)(A), 3583(d), 3664(k). The written judgment also included seventeen conditions from a district-wide standing order that the district court did not mention at sentencing. No. 21-50185 The parties agree that the district court’s judgment conflicts with our decision in United States v. Diggles, 957 F.3d 551, 559 (5th Cir. 2020) (en banc). There we held that supervised-release conditions imposed by statute need not be pronounced orally at sentencing because any objection to them would be futile. Id. at 557. But “discretionary” conditions must be orally pronounced in the defendant’s presence at sentencing so that he has an opportunity to object. Id. at 557–59. We agree with the parties that Braddy did not have an opportunity to object to the seventeen conditions mentioned in the district court’s standing order but unmentioned at sentencing. We therefore find error under Diggles. The only question is what to do about that error. In some cases, we have remanded solely for the district court to conform the judgment to the oral pronouncement by striking the unpronounced discretionary conditions. See, e.g., United States v. Omigie, 977 F.3d 397, 407 (5th Cir. 2020). In other cases, we have remanded for resentencing when the defendant established a Diggles error. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, No. 20-40210, 2021 WL 1157621, at *3 (5th Cir. Mar. 25, 2021). And in still other cases involving nonDiggles-based variances between the oral pronouncement and the written judgment, we’ve ordered limited remands that allow the district court to choose whether to conform the previous judgment or to resentence the defendant under a new judgment. See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 973 F.3d 414, 419–21 (5th Cir. 2020). Here, we think the limited remand makes sense. The district court should have discretion either to strike the unpronounced condition or to give the defendant the opportunity to object to it at a new sentencing hearing. Either of those remedies can cure the Diggles problem. The first cures it by removing the condition. The second cures it by ensuring that the defendant is present in the courtroom for an oral pronouncement of his sentence with a full opportunity to object to any and every discretionary part of that sentence. 2 No. 21-50185 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Appellee’s motion for a limited remand to the district court is GRANTED for the district court, within sixty days, either to vacate the challenged conditions of supervised release or to hold a new sentencing hearing to conform with the requirements of Diggles. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Appellee’s alternative unopposed motion for an extension of fourteen (14) days to file its brief upon the denial of remand is DENIED AS MOOT. 3

Primary Holding

The Fifth Circuit, in light of United States v. Diggles, agreed with the parties that defendant did not have an opportunity to object to the seventeen conditions mentioned in the district court's standing order but unmentioned at sentencing.

Disclaimer: Justia Annotations is a forum for attorneys to summarize, comment on, and analyze case law published on our site. Justia makes no guarantees or warranties that the annotations are accurate or reflect the current state of law, and no annotation is intended to be, nor should it be construed as, legal advice. Contacting Justia or any attorney through this site, via web form, email, or otherwise, does not create an attorney-client relationship.

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.