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Martha Anglin v. Ceres Gulf, Incorporated, et al, No. 12-20259 (5th Cir. 2012)Annotate this Case
This opinion or order relates to an opinion or order originally issued on November 15, 2012.
Case: 12-20259 Document: 00512088080 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/18/2012 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS United States Court of Appeals FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Fifth Circuit FILED December 18, 2012 No. 12-20259 Summary Calendar Lyle W. Cayce Clerk MARTHA L. ANGLIN, Plaintiff-Appellant v. CERES GULF INC; INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN'S ASSOCIATION, 1351; SOUTH ATLANTIC AND GULF COAST DISTRICT EXECUTIVE BOARD, INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN S ASSOCIATION; WEST GULF MARITIME ASSOCIATION, Defendants-Appellees Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas ON PETITION FOR REHEARING Before REAVLEY, JOLLY, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:* Plaintiff-Appellant s petition for panel rehearing is GRANTED in light of this Court s recent decision in Ibarra v. United Parcel Service, 695 F.3d 354 (5th Cir. 2012). We withdraw our prior ruling with respect to Defendants-Appellees * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4. Case: 12-20259 Document: 00512088080 Page: 2 Date Filed: 12/18/2012 No. 12-20259 Ceres Gulf and West Gulf Maritime Association, and we now REVERSE that part of the district court s judgment. In Ibarra, this Court held that in order for a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) to clearly and unmistakably waive a union member s right to a judicial forum for statutory discrimination claims, that CBA must specifically identify the relevant statute or otherwise state that statutory discrimination claims shall be subject to the [CBA s] grievance procedure. 695 F.3d at 358. The CBA at issue here does not specifically identify the relevant statute, Title VII, nor does the CBA state that statutory discrimination claims shall be subject to its grievance and arbitration procedure. Therefore, in light of Ibarra, the CBA on its own cannot bar Anglin s standing to file suit under Title VII against Ceres and WGMA. There remains a factual question as to whether a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) entered into between the Union and WGMA is binding on Anglin. The MOU specifically identifies Title VII, indicating inter alia that complaints brought under that statute are subject to the CBA s grievance and arbitration provisions. Thus, if the MOU is binding on Anglin, the MOU and CBA together would appear to satisfy this Court s requirements in Ibarra. However, Anglin has testified that the MOU was rejected by local union members and that its provisions were voluntary. Her testimony appears to be uncontroverted. Further, the copy of the MOU provided in the trial record was never executed. In its Opinion on Motions for Summary Judgment, the district court discussed this question only in passing. REVERSED IN PART and REMANDED. 2