US v. Stacy Delk, No. 14-4557 (4th Cir. 2014)

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UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 14-4557 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. STACY DUNCAN DELK, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Aiken. Margaret B. Seymour, Senior District Judge. (1:09-cr-01022-MBS-1) Submitted: December 16, 2014 Decided: December 18, 2014 Before WILKINSON and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. James P. Rogers, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. John C. Potterfield, Assistant United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM: Stacy Duncan Delk appeals the sentence of three months of imprisonment followed by twelve months of supervised release imposed by the district court upon revocation of his probation. On appeal, counsel California, 386 has U.S. filed 738 a brief (1967), pursuant stating that to Anders there are v. no meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning whether Delk’s sentence is plainly unreasonable. Delk was advised of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief, but has not filed a brief. Finding no error, we affirm. Upon a finding of a probation violation, the district court may revoke probation and resentence the defendant to any sentence within the statutory maximum for the original offense. 18 U.S.C. § 3565(a) (2012); United States v. Schaefer, 120 F.3d 505, 507 (4th Cir. 1997). The district court has broad discretion to impose a sentence after revoking a defendant’s probation. See United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 439 (4th Cir. 2006). concerning Thus, we assume “a deferential appellate posture issues discretion.” “We of fact and the exercise of [that] Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). review probation revocation sentences, like supervised release revocation sentences, to determine if they are plainly unreasonable.” United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007). In conducting our review, “we first 2 decide whether the sentence is unreasonable.” at 438. In doing so, “we follow generally the procedural and substantive sentences. considerations” employed in reviewing original Id. A the Crudup, 461 F.3d revocation district contained in court Chapter sentence has 7 of is procedurally considered the the Sentencing reasonable policy if statements Guidelines and the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors, id. at 439, and has adequately explained the chosen sentence. United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010). A sentence is substantively reasonable if the court states a proper basis for concluding that the defendant should receive imposed, up to the applicable statutory maximum. F.3d at 440. the sentence Crudup, 461 Only if we find a sentence to be procedurally or substantively unreasonable will we consider whether the sentence is “plainly” unreasonable. Applying our Id. at 439. deferential standard of review, we conclude that Delk’s sentence is not unreasonable, much less plainly so. Given the facts of this case, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its broad discretion in sentencing Delk. In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. therefore affirm the district court’s 3 judgment. This We court requires that counsel inform Delk, in writing, of his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Delk requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Delk. legal before We dispense with oral argument because the facts and conclusions this court are adequately and argument presented would not in aid the the materials decisional process. AFFIRMED 4