US v. William Cox, No. 14-4334 (4th Cir. 2014)

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UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 14-4334 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. WILLIAM ANDREW COX, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Columbia. Cameron McGowan Currie, Senior District Judge. (3:13-cr-00478-CMC-1) Submitted: December 17, 2014 Before MOTZ and Circuit Judge. DUNCAN, Circuit Decided: Judges, December 19, 2014 and DAVIS, Senior Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Kimberly H. Albro, Research & Writing Specialist, FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER’S OFFICE, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. William N. Nettles, United States Attorney, William K. Witherspoon, Assistant United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM: William Andrew Cox appeals his conviction pursuant to a guilty plea violation (2012). of to 18 dealing U.S.C. in §§ firearms without 922(a)(1)(A), a 923(a), license, in 924(a)(1)(D) Cox argues that the district court erred by failing to sua sponte hold a competency hearing and by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. We affirm. Cox first argues that the district court should have ordered a competency condition. sponte hearing sua sponte due to Cox’s mental A district court must order a competency hearing sua “if there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may presently be suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense.” 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a) (2012). To show error in failing to order a competency hearing, “the defendant must establish that the trial court ignored facts raising a bona fide doubt regarding [his] competency.” United States v. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 263, 291 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). Our review of the record establishes that Cox was capable of understanding the nature and consequences of properly in his own defense. district court did not abuse the proceedings and assisting Accordingly, we conclude that the its 2 discretion in declining to order a competency hearing sua sponte. See United States v. Bernard, (stating 708 F.3d 583, 592 (4th Cir.) standard of review), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 617 (2013). Cox also challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. A defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea. Bowman, 348 F.3d 408, 413 (4th Cir. United States v. 2003). Rather, the defendant bears the burden of “show[ing] a fair and just reason for . . . withdrawal.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B); see United States v. Moore, 931 F.2d 245, 248 (4th Cir. 1991) (discussing six factors courts consider in making such determination); see also United States v. Sparks, 67 F.3d 1145, 1154 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that only first, second, and fourth Moore factors can justify withdrawal and that other factors can merely support presumption against it). Here, Cox presented only his own testimony in support of withdrawal, and the district court found that testimony determination. lacking in credibility. We defer to this See, e.g., United States v. McGee, 736 F.3d 263, 270-71 (4th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1572 (2014). Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Cox’s motion to withdraw his plea. See United States v. Nicholson, 676 F.3d 376, 383 (4th Cir. 2012) (stating standard of review). 3 Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. legal before We dispense with oral argument because the facts and contentions this court are adequately and argument presented would not in aid the the materials decisional process. AFFIRMED 4