US v. Gregory Horn, No. 13-4888 (4th Cir. 2014)

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UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 13-4888 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. GREGORY STEVEN HORN, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. James K. Bredar, District Judge. (1:12-cr-00138-JKB-1) Submitted: November 20, 2014 Decided: December 9, 2014 Before AGEE, KEENAN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, Joanna Silver, Appellate Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Rachel Miller Yasser, Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM: Gregory conspiracy to Steven commit Horn armed pled bank guilty robbery, to in one count violation of of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012), and one count of armed bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (d), (f) (2012). On the armed bank robbery conviction, the district court sentenced Horn to 216 months imprisonment — a significant upward variance from his advisory Guidelines range of 100 to 125 months. On appeal, Horn challenges his the substantive reasonableness of sentence. * Finding no error, we affirm. We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence under a applies “deferential to any abuse-of-discretion sentence, whether inside, significantly outside the Guidelines range.” standard[, just which] outside, or United States v. Rivera-Santana, 668 F.3d 95, 100-01 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). Where the sentencing court imposed a variant to factors, sentence “we pursuant consider the whether * 18 the U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing court (2012) acted Horn has filed a motion for leave to file a pro se supplemental brief, along with that brief. Because Horn is represented by counsel who has filed a merits brief, Horn is not entitled to file a pro se supplemental brief, and we therefore deny his motion. See United States v. Penniegraft, 641 F.3d 566, 569 n.1 (4th Cir. 2011) (denying motion to file pro se supplemental brief because defendant was represented by counsel). 2 reasonably both with respect to its decision to impose such a sentence and with respect to the extent of the divergence from the sentencing range.” United States v. Washington, 743 F.3d 938, 944 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). In conducting this review, we are mindful that “[t]he sentencing judge is in a superior position to find facts and judge their import under § 3553(a) in the individual case.” States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007) (internal Gall v. United quotation marks omitted). Based on our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that substantively reasonable. Horn’s above-Guidelines sentence is The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that a variance was justified by the § 3553(a) factors, including the severity of Horn’s offense, the compelling need to protect the public, and the need to afford adequate deterrence where a nine-year sentence for a previous armed bank robbery instant offenses. 743 F.3d at failed to deter Horn from committing the See § 3553(a)(2)(A)-(C): see also Washington, 945 (approving reasonableness of sentence approximately one-and-a-half times above high end of Guidelines range where variance was based on need to protect public and deter defendant). While Horn argues that his 216-month sentence is substantively unreasonable in light of his difficult upbringing 3 and the circumstances surrounding his decision to commit the armed bank robbery, his argument essentially asks us substitute our judgment for that of the district court. to While we might — or might not — have weighed the § 3553(a) factors differently had we imposed sentence in the first instance, we defer to the district court’s decision that a 216-month sentence achieved the purposes of sentencing in Horn’s case. States v. Evans, 526 F.3d 155, 160 (4th Cir. See United 2008) (“[A]n appellate court must defer to the trial court and can reverse a sentence only if it is unreasonable, even if the sentence would not have been the choice of the appellate court.”). We supplemental redaction, dispense therefore brief, and with contentions are deny affirm oral deny the Horn’s as unnecessary district argument adequately motion in file Horn’s court’s because expressed to the the a pro motion for judgment. facts se We and legal materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED 4