US v. Nancy Dyal, No. 12-4908 (4th Cir. 2013)
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 12-4908 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. NANCY ELIZABETH DYAL, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Columbia. Cameron McGowan Currie, District Judge. (3:09-cr-01169-CMC-1) Submitted: May 8, 2013 Decided: May 21, 2013 Before WILKINSON, GREGORY, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. H. Wesley Kirkland, Jr., KIRKLAND & RUSH, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. William N. Nettles, United States Attorney, Nathan S. Williams, Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM: Nancy Elizabeth Dyal appeals her nine-month, below- Guidelines sentence imposed following remand for convictions of conspiracy to violate the Animal Welfare Act and to engage in an illegal gambling conducting an illegal gambling business and aiding and abetting the same. On appeal, by Dyal business argues (1) and two that counts the of district court erred sentencing her to an active term of incarceration when the court sentenced her co-defendants, Wayne and Sheri Hutto, to terms of probation; and (2) that her sentence is greater than necessary to comply with the purposes set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2006). Finding no error, we affirm. This court reviews a sentence, whether inside, just outside, or significantly outside the Guidelines range[,] under a deferential States, 552 abuse-of-discretion U.S. consideration of 38, 41 both standard. (2007). the procedural reasonableness of the sentence. procedural reasonableness, factors, whether factors. Id. the at court court When and United requires substantive In determining examines, considered reviewing v. review Id. at 51. this district 49-51. This Gall a among the other § 3553(a) sentence for substantive reasonableness, this court examines the totality of the circumstances, including the extent of any variance from the Guidelines range. Id. at 51. 2 If the sentence is below the properly calculated Guidelines that the this sentence court is applies a presumption on reasonable. United States v. Susi, 674 F.3d 278, 289 (4th Cir. 2012). appeal range, substantively Such a presumption is rebutted only if the defendant shows that the sentence is unreasonable when measured against the § 3553(a) factors. F.3d 375, 379 (4th United States v. Montes-Pineda, 445 Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). One of the factors a court must consider when imposing a sentence is the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). This court has recognized, however, that this sentencing factor is aimed primarily at eliminating national sentencing inequity, not differences between the sentences of co-defendants. United States v. Withers, 100 F.3d 1142, 1149 (4th Cir. 1996); see also United States v. Simmons, 501 F.3d 620, 623-24 (6th Cir. 2007) (collecting cases). Moreover, a district court[] ha[s] extremely broad discretion when determining the weight to be given each of the § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Jeffery, 631 F.3d 669, 679 (4th Cir. 2011). Here, although not obligated to do so, the district court took into account the disparity between Dyal s sentence and the Huttos sentences but found that the disparity was not 3 unwarranted due to Wayne Hutto s terminal illness and Sheri Hutto s role as his primary caregiver. See Simmons, 501 F.3d at 624 (giving sentencing court discretion to consider sentencing discrepancies between co-defendants). Moreover, we conclude that the court gave due consideration to the other § 3553(a) factors and Dyal s own unique circumstances when imposing her below-Guidelines sentence. See United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009) ( When rendering a sentence, the district court must make an individualized assessment based on the facts presented. (internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not err by sentencing Dyal to an active term of incarceration when her codefendants were sentenced to terms of probation. Moreover, Dyal contends that a term of probation would better serve overcome the the appellate her sentence. F.3d at purposes of § 3553(a)(2), presumption of but she reasonableness fails to afforded See Susi, 674 F.3d at 289; Montes-Pineda, 445 379. The district court carefully considered the § 3553(a) factors and determined that, while Dyal had a fairly significant history variance. and role in the physical Thus, we offense, her infirmities conclude that lack of warranted Dyal s prior criminal the downward carefully crafted sentence was not greater than necessary to accomplish the goals of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). 4 Accordingly, we affirm the district court s judgment. We dispense contentions with are oral argument adequately because presented in the facts and the materials legal before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED 5
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
