US v. Robert Finch, No. 12-4784 (4th Cir. 2013)

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UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 12-4784 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. ROBERT FINCH, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Aiken. Margaret B. Seymour, District Judge. (1:11-cr-00644-MBS-1) Submitted: February 14, 2013 Decided: February 28, 2013 Before DUNCAN, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Katherine E. Evatt, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Kimberly H. Albro, Research & Writing Specialist, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. William N. Nettles, United States Attorney, Jamie Lea Schoen, Assistant United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM: Robert Finch appeals the life term of supervised release, to include substance abuse and mental health treatment, imposed on remand for resentencing for failing to register as a sex offender pursuant to the Sex Offender Notification Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2250 (2006). A term reasonableness. of supervised Registration We affirm. release is United States v. Preston, 2013 WL 431951, at *12 (9th Cir. 2013). and reviewed F.3d for , , Finch first argues that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the district court failed to explain its imposition of the term of supervised release. We disagree. A district court must provide an individualized assessment of its selected sentence; failure to do so constitutes procedural error. 564 F.3d 325, sufficient so 328-29 long meaningful review. (4th Cir. 2011). explanation to (4th as it Cir. United States v. Carter, 2009). permits this The court explanation to conduct is a United States v. Bell, 667 F.3d 431, 442 The district court here provided sufficient permit meaningful appellate review. We thus conclude that the sentence is procedurally reasonable. Finch next asserts that the sentence is substantively unreasonable because it subjects him to the possibility of substance abuse treatment and mental health treatment for life. Because [d]istrict courts have 2 broad latitude to impose conditions on supervised release, we review those conditions for abuse of discretion. United States v. Armel, 585 F.3d 182, 186 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). district court may impose any condition that related to the applicable sentencing factors. is The reasonably Id. at 186. The conditions must not, however, involve[] [a] greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3583(d)(2) (West 2000 & Supp. 2012); United States v. Dotson, 324 F.3d 256, 260-61 (4th Cir. 2003). We conclude that, contrary to Finch s arguments, both conditions are reasonably related to the applicable sentencing factors and neither involves a greater deprivation of liberty than that which is reasonably necessary. Thus, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court s judgment subjecting Finch to a life term of supervised release, including the conditions that he participate in substance abuse treatment and mental health treatment, as directed. Accordingly, we affirm. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED 3