US v. Boaz Bratton-Bey, No. 12-4618 (4th Cir. 2013)

Annotate this Case

Download PDF

UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 12-4618 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. BOAZ SALMON BRATTON-BEY, a/k/a Moadian Bratton-Bey, a/k/a Azariah Bratton, a/k/a Keith Banks, Defendant - Appellant. No. 12-4620 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. MOADIAN ELAM BRATTON-BEY, a/k/a Boaz Bratton-Bey, a/k/a Modian Elam, a/k/a Jason Smith, a/k/a Joshua Builder, a/k/a Yarachmiel Messing, a/k/a Malik Jones, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. Benson Everett Legg, Senior District Judge. (1:10-cr-00580-BEL-2, 1:10-cr-00580-BEL-1) Submitted: June 21, 2013 Decided: Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and AGEE, Circuit Judges. August 1, 2013 Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, Baltimore, Maryland, Sapna Mirchandani, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant Boaz Bratton-Bey. Marc Resnick, Washington, D.C., for Appellant Moadian Bratton-Bey. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Tamera L. Fine, Assistant United States Attorney, Justin S. Herring, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 2 PER CURIAM: Moadian Bratton-Bey and Boaz Bratton-Bey (collectively the Bratton-Beys) along with seventeen co-defendants, were charged in a 49-count indictment of crimes growing out of a credit card fraud conspiracy. agreements, to one Both Bratton-Beys pled guilty, without plea count each of bank fraud conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349, access device fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1029, and aggravated identity theft in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A. The district court sentenced Moadian Bratton-Bey to 120 months imprisonment, and Boaz Bratton-Bey to 102 months imprisonment. In these consolidated appeals, the Bratton-Beys challenge their sentences on multiple grounds. We review a sentence under an abuse of discretion standard for procedural and substantive reasonableness. States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Gall v. United We first ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error. Id. If, and only if, we find the sentence procedurally reasonable can we consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed. United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51). In assessing whether a sentencing court properly calculated the Guidelines sentencing range, we review the court s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. 514 F.3d 377, 387 (4th Cir. 2008). 3 United States v. Osborne, With these standards in mind, we turn to the first issue, which is raised by both Bratton-Beys: the district court s asserted error in determining that they were responsible for intended losses of more than $2.5 million but not more than $7 million, resulting § 2B1.1(b)(1). in an 18-level enhancement under We review for clear error the district court s factual determination of the amount of loss attributable to [a defendant], mindful that the court need only make a reasonable estimate of the loss. United States v. Cloud, 680 F.3d 396, 409 (4th Cir.) (construing § 2B1.1 cmt. n. 3(C)), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. reversal 218 only (2012). if we are This deferential left with the standard definite conviction that a mistake has been committed. v. Stevenson, 396 F.3d 538, 542 (4th Cir. requires and firm United States 2005) (quoting Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985)). The Bratton-Beys contend calculation had three defects: that the district court s loss (1) use of the aggregate credit limits of all the fraudulent cards as a proxy for the intended loss amount; (2) reliance on the government s loss spreadsheet, which assertedly lacked sufficient data for a meaningful challenge to the loss amount; and (3) attribution to them of a loss amount more than ten times the amount attributed to their co-defendants who entered into written plea agreements. Even if the Bratton-Beys are 4 correct that the district court committed the calculation errors, such procedural error is harmless when (1) the appellate court has knowledge that the district court would have reached the same result even if it had decided the guidelines issue the other way, and (2) the sentence would be reasonable even if the guidelines issue had been decided in the defendant's favor. United States v. Savillon Matute, 636 F.3d 119, 123 (4th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). It is clear Such is the case here. from the record that regardless of the Guidelines, the district court would have imposed the challenged sentences, and that sentencing both Guidelines range, those sentences Bratton-Beys, and after considered are reasonable. the court arguments For calculated for and in the against various enhancements, it concluded that the Guidelines sentences would be wrong in this case. the sentencing guidelines JA 951. do not As the court explained, provide a great deal of assistance in determining what the sentence should be because . . . the guideline sentence is an unreasonable sentence. 831; see also JA 964-967. The court then significantly departed downward from the recommended Guidelines sentence. any Guidelines JA calculation error is also Moreover, harmless and the sentence reasonable given that the district court independently justified the sentence under the § 3553(a) factors. States v. Grubbs, 585 F.3d 793, 804 05 (4th Cir. 2009) 5 See United We therefore decline to disturb the Bratton-Beys sentences on this basis. Bratton-Beys erroneously For other the common imposed a U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a). same reasons, argument, four-level we that also the reject the court enhancement sentencing district under Accordingly, we turn to the issues unique to each defendant. Moadian argues that the district court erred in attributing the entire loss amount to him. He asserts that his incarceration in January 2010 severed his participation in the conspiracy and so the court erred in attributing losses accrued during that incarceration. The difficulty with this argument is that, once established, a conspiracy is presumed to continue unless or until the defendant shows that . . . he withdrew from it. United States v. Walker, 796 F.2d 43, 49 (4th Cir. 1986). [M]ere cessation of activity in furtherance of the conspiracy is insufficient. Id. at 49. To establish withdrawal, a defendant must prove [a]ffirmative acts inconsistent with the object of the conspiracy and communicated in a manner reasonably calculated to reach [his] co-conspirators. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 464-65 (1978); see also Smith v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 714, 718-21 (2013). Moadian failed to identify any affirmative act inconsistent with the object of the conspiracy or prove that he communicated his withdrawal in a manner reasonably calculated to reach his co6 conspirators. Accordingly, this challenge to his sentence also fails. Boaz argues that the district court imposed a procedurally and substantively account for the defendants. He unreasonable culpability asserts sentence of that because Boaz the it relative court should failed to his co- to have imposed proportionally equal sentences relative to each [defendant s] guideline range to arrive at a reasonable sentence for each. His contention clearly fails. is not procedurally As explained above, the sentence unreasonable. Nor was the sentence substantively unreasonable. After calculating Boaz s Guidelines range to be 235-293 months, the district court varied downward from the low end of this range by more than 11 years to a 102 month sentence. length of a below-Guidelines sentence presumption of reasonableness. 278, 289 (4th Cir. 2012). is entitled The to a United States v. Susi, 674 F.3d Moreover, when a district court imposes a variance sentence, we may take into account the degree of the variance when considering the sentence s reasonableness. See United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 268 (4th Cir. 2008). The record reveals that the district court appropriately considered Boaz s culpability relative to Moadian and others in selecting the 102-month sentence. See JA 990-92. On the one hand, the court noted that Boaz played a lesser leadership role 7 than Moadian and that although the Guidelines placed Boaz in Criminal History Category II, based on his convictions Boaz really looks like a [Category] I . . . in terms of the general scheme of things. Id. 990-91. On the other hand, the court noted the seriousness of the offense, the number of individuals victimized, and the ease with which this crime can be committed. Id. 992. The aggravating court factors and plainly weighed decided that the the 102 month served the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole. 51 (2007). mitigating and sentence Gall, 552 U.S. at In doing so, the court did not err. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district facts court. and materials legal before We dispense with oral argument contentions are adequately the and argument court because presented would not the in the aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED 8

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.