US v. Hope Jackson-Forsythe, No. 12-4425 (4th Cir. 2012)
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UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 12-4425 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. HOPE LANITA JACKSON-FORSYTHE, Defendant - Appellant. No. 12-4430 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. EDWARDO MANUELL FORSYTHE, Defendant - Appellant. Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Huntington. Robert C. Chambers, District Judge. (3:11-cr-00202-2; 3:11-cr-00202-1) Submitted: November 20, 2012 Decided: November 29, 2012 Before WILKINSON, WYNN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Louie T. Price, HOLROYD & YOST, Charleston, West Virginia; John A. Proctor, PROCTOR LAW OFFICES, PLLC, Huntington, West Virginia, for Appellants. R. Booth Goodwin, II, United States Attorney, R. Gregory McVey, Assistant United States Attorney, Huntington, West Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 2 PER CURIAM: Hope Lanita Jackson-Forsythe ( Hope ) and Edwardo Manuell Forsythe appeal their convictions, entered pursuant to their conditional guilty pleas to an indictment charging them each with one count of possession with intent to distribute oxycodone and oxymorphone, and aiding and abetting each other in that offense, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2006) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). On appeal, their district court s denial of evidence obtained from their Appellants joint vehicle and challenge motion their to the suppress hotel room. Finding no error, we affirm. In considering the district court s denial of a motion to suppress, [w]e review the district court s legal determinations de novo and its factual determinations for clear error. 2010). United States v. Kelly, 592 F.3d 586, 589 (4th Cir. When the district court has denied a suppression motion, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. Id. We particularly defer to a district court s credibility determinations, for it is the role of the district court to observe witnesses and weigh their credibility during a pre-trial motion to suppress. F.3d 210, 232 (4th Cir. United States v. Abu Ali, 528 2008) omitted). 3 (internal quotation marks Appellants first challenge the traffic stop and evidence seized during the subsequent search of their vehicle. Consistent with conduct brief a reasonable, afoot. the Fourth Amendment, investigatory articulable stop suspicion a when that the officer officer criminal may has activity a is Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)). requires police an officer to have a Reasonable suspicion particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing based on the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). Officers may draw on training their own experience and specialized to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that might well elude an untrained person. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). With the above standards in mind, and upon review of the record, we conclude that the totality of the circumstances demonstrates that the officers had reasonable suspicion to believe that a drug transaction had occurred in Appellants vehicle, justifying the traffic stop. Turning to the vehicle search and seizure of evidence, Appellants contend that the warrantless search of Hope s purse, which was inside the vehicle, and her subsequent non-Mirandized questioning ran afoul of the Constitution. 4 Appellants ignore that [t]here is a well-established exception to [the warrant] requirement . . exception, [i]f . a for car automobile is readily searches. mobile this probable and Under cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment . . . permits police to search the vehicle without more. Kelly, 592 F.3d at 589 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996) (citation omitted)). Moreover, it is well settled that a positive alert from a drug detection dog, in and of itself, provides probable cause to search a vehicle. 1 States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 340 n.2 (4th United Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, once the canine positively of alerted to the presence drugs in the vehicle, officers had probable cause to search the passenger compartment, including Hope s purse. See Kelly, 592 F.3d at 589-90 ( [O]nce police have probable cause, they may search every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search. ) (quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982) (citation omitted)). Appellants next contend that the police violated Hope s Miranda 2 rights by questioning her following the vehicle 1 Appellants do not challenge the canine sniff of the vehicle, nor do they dispute that the canine positively indicated the presence of drugs in the vehicle. 2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 5 search. [T]he Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent, which includes any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. Rhode Island (footnote omitted). v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980) We conclude that the detective s simple inquiry as to whether Appellants were staying at a particular hotel cannot be construed as reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. Thus, we conclude that Hope s statement was not elicited in violation of her Miranda rights. Finally, hotel room and Appellants the challenge seizure of the search evidence found of their therein. Appellants fruit of the poisonous tree argument is meritless in light of our resolution of their challenges to the vehicle search and seizure and Hope s questioning. Appellants second argument, that police illegally searched their hotel room and seized items prior to issuance of the search warrant, also is meritless. Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment subject only to a few established and well-delineated exceptions. Bush, 404 F.3d 263, 275 (4th Cir. 6 2005) specifically United States v. (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978)). The independent source doctrine and the inevitable discovery doctrine are two distinct exceptions to the exclusionary rule. 3 See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443-44 (1984) (discussing doctrines). discovery doctrine allows admission of The inevitable evidence [i]f the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means. Id. at 444. Even if police illegally searched Appellants hotel room and seized evidence prior to the issuance of the search warrant, the district court properly found that the evidence inevitably would have been lawfully discovered and seized during execution of the search warrant, which Appellants concede was valid. Thus, this claim is meritless. Accordingly, we affirm the district court s judgments. We dispense contentions with are oral argument adequately because presented in the facts and the materials legal before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED 3 While the district apparent that the court doctrine to find that the Thus, we need not consider source doctrine. court discuss both doctrines, it is relied on the inevitable discovery hotel room evidence was admissible. the applicability of the independent 7
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