United States v. Johnson, No. 12-4176 (4th Cir. 2013)
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Defendant conditionally plead guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's denial of his motion to suppress various statements he made to the police and evidence recovered from his home. The court concluded that the district court's finding - that defendant's registration tag was bent - was not clearly erroneous and that the traffic stop was reasonable. The court concluded that Missouri v. Seibert was inapplicable in this case because the court held that no interrogation had occurred before plaintiff was Mirandized. The officers did not conduct an unwarned custodial interrogation on these facts when a detective asked "what do you mean" after plaintiff voluntarily proffered information. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.
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PUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 12-4176 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. ERIC JOHNSON, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. Catherine C. Blake, District Judge. (1:10-cr-00716-CCB-1) Argued: September 17, 2013 Decided: October 29, 2013 Before WILKINSON, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Duncan wrote the opinion, in which Judge Wilkinson and Judge Agee joined. ARGUED: Thomas Edward Sarachan, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant. Debra Lynn Dwyer, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, Baltimore, Maryland, Lauren E. Case, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. DUNCAN, Circuit Judge: Eric Johnson entered a conditional plea of guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment. He appeals the district court s denial of his motion to suppress various statements he made to the police and evidence recovered from his home. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. I. On April 13, 2010, three members of the Baltimore City Police Department's Violent Crime Impact Section patrolled the Cold Spring area of Baltimore, Maryland, a neighborhood known for its high incidence of crime. According to one of the officers, Detective Jonathan Mackensen, this unit often stops motorists in such areas for minor offenses in the hope that these encounters will lead them to information about more serious crimes. That night, the officers spotted a red GMC Jimmy weaving in and out of traffic and displaying a bent and illegible temporary registration tag. The officers pulled the vehicle over and approached the car. Detective Damian Krauss asked the driver, Johnson, for his license and registration. Johnson handed Detective Krauss the 2 vehicle s registration card and a Maryland identification card, but stated that he did not have a driver s license. At that point, Detective Krauss detected a faint odor of marijuana and discreetly communicated his suspicion to the other officers by sniffing his nose in the air. He then asked Johnson if the officers could search his vehicle. Johnson consented to the in search. Detective The Mackensen officers came something in his mouth. found to nothing suspect that the Johnson vehicle was but hiding Detective Mackensen told Johnson to spit it out and out came two small bags of marijuana. J.A. 117. Johnson was then arrested, handcuffed, and placed in the back of the officers unmarked car. Miranda rights at that time. 436 (1966). The officers He was not informed of his See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. waited for Johnson's father, registered owner of the vehicle, to come and retrieve it. the They then left for the police station with Johnson in the back seat. Johnson was never cited for the license plate violation. While en route to the station, however, Johnson volunteered the following: I can help you out, I don t want to go back to jail, I ve got information for you. J.A. 122. Detective Mackensen replied, what do you mean?, and Johnson responded, I can get you a gun. Id. Detective Mackensen then gave Johnson a verbal Miranda warning and another officer, Sergeant 3 Brian Hopkins, advised Johnson not to say any more until they reached the station. Upon his arrival at the station, Johnson was taken to an interview room. He was read a second Miranda warning and signed an Explanation and Waiver of Rights form. the waiver, the officers returned to After Johnson signed the discussion of the firearm that Johnson had initiated on the way to the police station. At that point Johnson weapon was in his home. the officers that the He described the weapon and where in the house it could be found. form. told Johnson signed a Consent to Search The officers then travelled with Johnson to his house and recovered the weapon from Johnson s bedroom closet. Johnson remained in custody and was eventually charged in federal court with being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Johnson moved to suppress the weapon and other tangible evidence recovered in the search of his home, and to suppress his statements to the police. The district court held a hearing on these motions at which Johnson, his wife, Detective Krauss, Detective Mackensen, and Sergeant Hopkins testified. Johnson and the officers Johnson s license plate testified that was in getting in plates before he the testified night the the he habit car 4 about was of the state stopped. checking because he his lived of Johnson license in a neighborhood testified in that which he temporary followed noticed nothing wrong. tags his were usual often routine stolen. that night He and Johnson also stated that there were two plastic tabs at the bottom of the tag that were designed to keep it sturdy and straight. J.A. 237. The officers, on the other hand, testified that the tag was bent in such a way that it could not be read at a distance. Detective Krauss and Sergeant Hopkins testified that the tag was bent up from the bottom while Detective Mackensen testified that it had been folded over at the top. J.A. 106. All three were also asked, however, to demonstrate using a piece of cardboard how the tag was bent. The district court observed that all three officers folded the cardboard so that it curved up from the bottom. All three officers testified that they stopped Johnson s vehicle after they noticed that the tag was bent and illegible. The district court found that the tag had indeed been bent and rendered illegible. It concluded that the officers had probable cause to stop Johnson s vehicle on that ground. The district court went on to find that Detective Mackensen s asking Johnson what do you mean? in response to Johnson's voluntary statement was not the functional equivalent of an interrogation and, therefore, was not a Miranda violation. The district court concluded that 5 Johnson was subsequently apprised of his Miranda rights and waived them voluntarily by signing the Waiver of Rights form. It also found that voluntarily consented to the officers search of his home. district court consequently denied Johnson s he The motions to suppress. Johnson entered into a plea agreement with the government, preserving his right to appeal the district court s decision on the motions to suppress. He conditionally pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment. This appeal followed. II. Johnson argues that the district court erred in concluding that the officers had probable cause to stop his vehicle, and he argues that Detective Mackensen s question, what do you mean?, constituted an unwarned custodial interrogation in violation of Miranda. We consider each in turn. A. We first consider Johnson s contention that the officers initial traffic stop was unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. and, thus, an illegal He argues that the district court s contrary conclusion rests on both an erroneous factual finding--that Johnson s registration tag was bent--and an error of law--that the stop was reasonable even if the officers used the bent tag merely as a pretext to make the stop. 6 We review the district court s factual finding for clear error, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. United States v. Hamlin, 319 F.3d 666, 671 (4th Cir. 2003). We review the court s legal conclusion de novo. Id. 1. Johnson contends that the district court erred found that Johnson s tag was bent and illegible. when it Under the clear-error standard, [a] factual finding by the district court may be reversed only if, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and committed. firm conviction that a mistake has been Walton v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 160, 173 74 (4th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous. 574 (1985). Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, This is all the more true when the district court s finding was based upon its assessment of witnesses credibility. See United States v. Springer, 715 F.3d 535, 545 (4th Cir. 2013). At the suppression hearing, Johnson and the officers provided conflicting testimony about the state of the tag on Johnson s vehicle. In the face of such a conflict, the district 7 court s decision to credit the officers testimony over Johnson s is a paradigmatic credibility determination which we do not disturb lightly. See id. Johnson argues that the officers testimony was belied by the fact that they did not seize the tag, photograph it, or issue a citation. But we find the officers failure to take these steps much less illuminating than Johnson suggests. The scent of marijuana emanating from Johnson s vehicle gave the officers reason to investigate a more serious violation than an illegible tag almost immediately after the officers stopped him. Johnson likewise seeks to impeach the officers' credibility by pointing out the inconsistency of their testimony about how the tag was differed, bent. their But although physical their demonstrations verbal descriptions were consistent. Moreover, the officers were unanimous on the general proposition that the tag was bent and illegible at a distance. Johnson therefore presents nothing more than a competing version of the facts, a version that the district court was free not to credit. compatible which with followed At two from officers credibility. conclude that the the least, permissible the district the evidence views, court s the presented choice assessment is between of the On the basis of this record we cannot district court s erroneous. 8 finding was clearly 2. Johnson concluding also that reasonable. argues the that bent the tag district rendered court the erred traffic in stop He contends that the bent tag was not the officers true motive for stopping the vehicle, evidenced, in particular, by the fact that the officers did not pursue the matter further once the stop had been made. A traffic stop is reasonable, and therefore not a violation of the Fourth Amendment, if it is justified by probable cause or reasonable suspicion. United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 337 (4th Cir. 2008). standard is violation, met, This is an objective standard. therefore, regardless of stopping the vehicle. when their officers true, observe subjective Id. a The traffic motives for Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 13 (1996) ( [O]nly an undiscerning reader would regard [our] cases as endorsing the principle that ulterior motives can invalidate police conduct that is justifiable on the basis of probable cause to believe that a violation of law has occurred. ); Branch, 537 F.3d at 337. Johnson, however, relies on United States v. Tibbetts, 396 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir. 2005), in which the Tenth Circuit held that when police completely ignore the purported reason justifying the initial traffic stop, a court may consider that failure when evaluating the objective reasonableness of the stop under the 9 Fourth Amendment. contemplate Id. at 1139. that there may be Tibbetts therefore appears to a situation where, although officers have observed a traffic violation, a resulting traffic stop might nonetheless be held objectively unreasonable if the officers did not proceed to investigate the predicate violation. Johnson argues that his traffic stop is just such a situation. But to the extent that Tibbetts provides for such an outcome it is incompatible with our precedent, for we have held that [o]bserving justification vehicle. for a a traffic police violation officer to provides detain the sufficient offending Branch, 537 F.3d at 335; see also United States v. Digiovanni, 650 F.3d 498, 506 (4th Cir. 2011). Thus, it is not relevant whether the officers proceed to take further action on the predicate traffic violation. Maryland law requires that a vehicle s registration tags be clearly legible. having found Md. Code Ann. Transp. § 13-411(c). that Johnson s license plate was Therefore, illegible the night he was stopped, the district court properly concluded that the stop was reasonable. Regardless of their true motives, and whether they pursued the traffic violation, it was reasonable for the officers, who had observed the illegible tags, to stop Johnson s vehicle. 10 B. We next examine Johnson s Miranda challenge. There can be no doubt that Johnson, handcuffed and seated in the back of a police car, was in custody at the time of his exchange with the officer. what The issue is whether Detective Mackensen s question, do you mean?, after Johnson voluntarily proffered information, constituted a custodial interrogation. The seminal case in this area is Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980). In that case, officers had arrested Innis for his suspected robbery of a taxicab driver. and he invoked his right to counsel. Innis was Mirandized But before he could consult with an attorney, Innis overheard officers discussing a sawed-off shotgun which had been used in the robbery but not recovered, and the risk it might pose to nearby school children. In response, Innis interrupted and led officers to the weapon. Id. at 293 95. At trial, however, Innis argued that the officers' conversation constituted a custodial interrogation in violation of Innis's consulted a lawyer. right to remain silent rules functional only he had Id. at 298. The Supreme Court ultimately disagreed. Miranda until apply equivalent of to police an It held that the conduct that interrogation--that is the is, any conduct that the police should know [is] reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. 11 Id. at 299 301. The brief remarks that passed between the officers, the court held, did not meet that requirement. Id. at 302. While the facts of Innis led the Court to emphasize the possibility of a Miranda interrogation without express questioning, it made clear that the opposite is also possible. There are questions that are not reasonably likely to elicit incriminating responses just as there are declarative statements or actions that are. * The Miranda analysis does not turn on the form of an officer s articulation. Moreover, Innis illustrates that a question might not be classified as an interrogation even if the question subjectively exerted a coercive effect on a suspect. Id. at 302 03. The suspect s subjective experience of the questioning is relevant only to the extent that it should have been anticipated by the officers such that they should have known that the suspect was reasonably likely to incriminate himself in response. * Id. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson-Forsythe, 498 F. App'x 224, 226 (4th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (no interrogation when officers asked a suspect whether she was staying at a particular hotel); United States v. Rhodes, 779 F.2d 1019, 1032 (4th Cir. 1985) (no interrogation when, during a search of a suspect s home, the suspect informed officers that he could not take a spiral notebook and officers asked why); Papile v. Hernandez, 697 F. Supp. 626, 629 n.2, 631 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (no interrogation when suspect volunteered I want to make a deal and officers asked what kind of deal? ); Turner v. Sullivan, 661 F. Supp. 535, 537-38 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (no interrogation when suspect volunteered my leg is hurting and officers asked what happened to you? ), aff'd, 842 F.2d 1288 (2d Cir. 1988). 12 This test reflects a careful balancing of interests. Miranda, on one hand, counsels that meaningful enforcement of citizens Fifth Amendment right against requires a subjective approach. self-incrimination Miranda recognized that the interrogation environment might render that right illusory by subjugat[ing] the individual to the will of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457 (1966). his examiner. To guard against this danger requires a court to consider the police s actions from the suspect s point of view. On the other hand, however, the held police surely cannot be accountable unforeseeable results of their words or actions. for the Innis, 446 U.S. at 301 02. The suppression remedy for Miranda tightens the focus on foreseeability. violations further [T]he deterrent effect of suppression must be substantial and outweigh any harm to the justice system. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 147 (2009). suppress But to evidence due to a question s or comment s coercive effect on a suspect, when that effect could not reasonably have been deterrent effect at all. foreseen, would have no desirable The only lesson an officer might draw from such an outcome would be that he himself should remain silent until a Miranda warning could be administered, lest his blunder cause a criminal to go free. 13 See id. at 148. The question Innis instructs us to ask is whether Detective Mackensen should have known that the query what do you mean was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response or, in other words, whether he should reasonably have foreseen that result. question It was bears in reiteration response to that Johnson s Detective Mackensen s undisputedly voluntary statement, I can help you out, I don t want to go back to jail, I ve got information for you. J.A. 122. In the absence of facts suggesting otherwise, an officer would reasonably expect a defendant making such a proffer to be acting with some degree of self-interest. Here, the officers had every reason to believe at the outset that Johnson was doing precisely that. He was offering the officers something of value in the hope that it would keep him from going to prison. Given the purpose of the suggested bargain, a follow-up inquiry what do you mean? would not have seemed reasonably likely to elicit self-incriminating information, because Johnson s offering such information proposal. would The have query defeated would the reasonably information incriminating someone else. is exactly what Johnson did. very be purpose expected to of the elicit But incriminate himself He attempted to extricate himself from a misdemeanor by implicating himself in a felony. Johnson argues that, his professed motivations notwithstanding, Detective Mackensen should have known that to 14 ask what do you mean? could at least possibly have elicited an incriminating response. But this sets the bar too low. It is possible, of course, that a suspect in custody could implicate himself in a criminal act in response to any question or action no matter how innocuous. If possibility were the standard, therefore, an officer would risk suppression whenever he spoke within earshot of an unwarned suspect. But Miranda was intended to protect suspects from coercive police practices, not render officers mute. Innis itself solution. Its demonstrates facts confirm this that problem any as passing well as remark its might indeed carry some potential to elicit an incriminating response. And its holding confirms that more is needed to transform a question or comment into an interrogation--Innis possibility in favor of foreseeability. rejects See Innis, 446 U.S. at 303. In sum, Innis teaches that when the police have no reason to expect that a question will lead a suspect to incriminate himself, that question cannot constitute an interrogation under Miranda. Under such circumstances they cannot be blamed for failing to anticipate a suspect s incriminating response and the threat of suppression eliciting it. could not plausibly deter them from We therefore agree with the district court that 15 the officers did not conduct an unwarned custodial interrogation on these facts. There Missouri subsequent is v. therefore Seibert, Miranda voluntariness of no 542 warnings Johnson s need to U.S. 600 were later consider (2004), sufficient statements whether, the to to under officers ensure the the police. Seibert addressed a police protocol for custodial interrogation that calls for giving no warnings of the rights to silence and counsel until interrogation has produced a confession. 604. Id. at Because we hold that no interrogation had occurred before Johnson was Mirandized, Seibert is plainly inapplicable. III. For the foregoing reasons, the district court s decision denying Johnson s suppression motions is AFFIRMED. 16
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