Patrice Tavernier v. Health Management Associates, No. 12-1541 (4th Cir. 2012)

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UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 12-1541 PATRICE L. TAVERNIER, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. HEALTH MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATES, INC.; CHESTER HMA, LLC, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Rock Hill. Margaret B. Seymour, Chief District Judge. (0:10-cv-01753-MBS) Submitted: November 7, 2012 Decided: December 10, 2012 Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and THACKER, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Lovic A. Brooks, III, BROOKS LAW FIRM, LLC, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. Jeffrey A. Lehrer, FORD & HARRISON LLP, Spartanburg, South Carolina, for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM: Patrice Tavernier appeals the district court s order adopting the magistrate judge s recommendation and entering summary judgment in favor of Health Management Associates, Inc., ( HMA ) on Tavernier s Although the district employment court discrimination disposed of several claims. species of discrimination claims raised by Tavernier, Tavernier challenges only the conduct entry of violated summary the judgment Age on her Discrimination claim in that HMA s Employment Act ( ADEA ), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 621-34 (West 2008 & Supp. 2012). We affirm. We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, drawing reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. United States v. Bergbauer, 602 F.3d 569, 574 (4th Cir. 2010). To withstand a summary judgment motion, the nonmoving party must produce competent evidence sufficient to reveal the existence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Power See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 2002). Neither conclusory allegations, speculative scaffolding of one inference upon another, nor the production of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of a nonmovant s case suffices to forestall summary judgment. Cir. 1985). Id.; Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213, 214 (4th Instead, we will uphold the district court s grant 2 of summary judgment unless we find that a reasonable jury could return a verdict presented. for the nonmoving party on the evidence See EEOC v. Cent. Wholesalers, Inc., 573 F.3d 167, 174-75 (4th Cir. 2009). The employee s forbids action employment ADEA against age. 29 an employer an U.S.C.A. to employee take an because § 623(a)(1); Hill adverse of v. the Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 283 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc). pursuant to A the plaintiff ADEA bringing must prove a disparate-treatment that age was not suit merely a motivating factor of the challenged adverse employment action but was in fact its but-for cause. Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 180 (2009). either present employer s direct or impermissible familiar burden-shifting Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., To do so, the plaintiff may circumstantial motivation framework or evidence proceed established in Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 807 (1973). of the under the McDonnell Gross, 557 U.S. at 175 n.2; Hill, 354 F.3d at 284. Tavernier, who claims that HMA forced her to retire as the CEO of a hospital because of her age, trains the bulk of her appellate arguments upon the district court s application of the McDonnell Douglas scheme to her claims. See Hill, 354 F.3d at 285 (detailing the applicable framework). Despite Tavernier s assertions HMA otherwise, we conclude 3 that articulated a legitimate, age-neutral reason for Tavernier s separation from HMA s employ: namely, the desire of Tavernier s supervisor to fashion a symbiosis between Tavernier s apparent retirement plans and the hospital s need for a change in leadership, due to Tavernier s poor performance as CEO. The record likewise convinces us that the evidence, even viewed in the light most favorable to Tavernier, fails to demonstrate that HMA s stated age-neutral rationale is pretextual.1 See Gross, 557 U.S. at 177-78 (burden of proof on plaintiff to show discrimination); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000) (burden on plaintiff to show pretext). fundamental Contrary to Tavernier s repeated assertions, the issue in this appeal is not whether Tavernier voluntarily accepted the retirement offer or actually wanted to retire as early as she did. discriminating on grounds differentiating for reasons An employer is liable only for that that are are improper, mistaken. not for Holland v. Washington Homes, Inc., 487 F.3d 208, 217 (4th Cir. 2007). As a result, ultimately, it is the perception of the decisionmaker 1 Given our conclusion that Tavernier s evidence clearly failed to demonstrate that HMA s conduct was pretextual for age discrimination, we need not address the parties contentions with respect to whether Tavernier established a prima facie case of age discrimination. 4 which is relevant. Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). In our view, the record evidence permits only the conclusion that Tavernier s supervisor actually believed even if erroneously that Tavernier was a poor performer and was a good candidate for early retirement, supervisor acted on that belief. 369, 386 (4th Cir.), cert. and that Tavernier s See Bonds v. Leavitt, 629 F.3d denied, 132 S. Ct. 398 (2011); DeJarnette v. Corning, Inc., 133 F.3d 293, 299 (4th Cir. 1998) ( [I]t is not our province to decide whether the reason was wise, fair, or even correct, ultimately, so long as it truly was the reason. ). Because there is nothing in the record to suggest that HMA s stated rationale for offering Tavernier a strong financial incentive to accept an early retirement buyout was false, whether Tavernier HMA s motives tinctured by age bias. has for failed to put instigating into her genuine separation issue were See Gross, 557 U.S. at 177-78.2 Tavernier also contends that the district court erred in failing to hold HMA to the burden of proof allocated to it under 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (2006). 2 We see no such error. In Notwithstanding Tavernier s heavy reliance upon Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 990 F.2d 1217 (11th Cir. 1993), we note that Tavernier s circumstances are clearly distinguishable from those at issue in Clark. 5 particular, § 623(f) does not, as Tavernier supposes, impose a burden of proof upon an employer to explain its action absent a showing that the employer s conduct was otherwise prohibited by the ADEA. Id. Instead, § 623(f) is a limited affirmative defense available to employers whose conduct is shown to be agedifferential. See EEOC v. Minn. Dep t of Corrs., 648 F.3d 910, 913 (8th Cir. 2011). Contrary to Tavernier s assertions, even an involuntary early retirement is not necessarily a violation of the ADEA; the statute prohibits employers actions coercive or otherwise only when they are undertaken because of the employee s age. Gross, 557 U.S. at 180. In arguing that HMA must meet the burden imposed by § 623(f) where her evidence has failed to generate a genuine dispute over HMA s motivations, Tavernier is placing the cart well before the horse. See id.; Abrahamson v. Bd. of Educ. of Wappingers Falls Cent. Sch. Dist., 374 F.3d 66, 73 (2d Cir. 2004); Stokes v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 206 F.3d 420, 426 (4th Cir. 2000). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. legal before We dispense with oral argument because the facts and contentions this court are adequately and argument presented will not in aid the the material decisional process. AFFIRMED 6

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