US v. Demani Bosket, No. 08-4890 (4th Cir. 2009)

Annotate this Case

Download PDF

UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 08-4890 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff Appellee, v. DEMANI JAWARA BOSKET, Defendant Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Anderson. G. Ross Anderson, Jr., Senior District Judge. (8:07-cr-01362-GRA-1) Submitted: October 30, 2009 Decided: December 15, 2009 Before MICHAEL, SHEDD, and AGEE, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Robert Sneed, ROB SNEED LAW FIRM, LLC, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellant. W. Walter Wilkins, United States Attorney, A. Lance Crick, Assistant United States Attorney, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM: Demani Jawara Bosket appeals his jury conviction for possessing a firearm and ammunition after having been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006). On appeal, he contends the district court erred by informing the jury that he had elected not to testify, by using the term felon, and by commenting on specific evidence in its instructions, and that the errors were cumulatively prejudicial. We affirm. Because Bosket raises these issues for the first time on appeal, our review is for plain error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States v. Reid, 523 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 663 (2008). To establish plain error, Bosket must show that an error occurred, that the error was plain, and that the error affected his substantial rights. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993). See Even if he makes this threshold showing, the decision whether to correct the error is within our sound discretion. Id. at 735-36. Bosket first contends that the district court plainly erred when it informed the jury that he had elected not to testify or to offer any evidence, and that consequently, they would be moving into the final phases of the trial. The court had previously instructed the jury that Bosket had no burden to prove his innocence or to present any evidence; he had the right 2 to remain silent; and they were prohibited from using the fact that he may not testify against him. reminded the jury that the burden was The court subsequently on the Government to persuade them beyond a reasonable doubt that Bosket was guilty, and Bosket had no obligation to offer any evidence. Bosket contends that the district court s comment regarding his decision not to testify was a violation of his right not to incriminate himself under the Fifth Amendment. disagree. We The district court did not instruct the jury that Bosket s silence was evidence of guilt, but in fact instructed them that the decision not to testify could not be used against him. Because the district court did not adversely comment on Bosket s silence, there was no plain error. See Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 338-39 (1978). Bosket next contends the district court s references to the term felon constituted plain error in violation of the Rules of Evidence and his right to a fair trial. He argues there was an obvious danger that the jury would convict [him] because he was a convicted felon. We find no plain error. As we have observed, the term crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is commonly referred to as a felony. United States v. Milton, 52 F.3d 78, 79 n.1 (4th Cir. 1995). Moreover, we have held that in a felon-in possession case such as this, the district court must 3 instruct the jury that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that at the time the defendant possessed the firearm he had a qualifying previous felony conviction, that is a prior conviction for an offense imprisonment exceeding one year. punishable Id. at 81. by a term of Therefore, while a defendant who stipulates to the existence of a prior felony conviction may exclude evidence concerning the nature of the felony conviction, he may not exclude evidence concerning the Id. at 81 n.7. existence of the felony conviction. In this case, Bosket stipulated that he was a person who has been convicted for a crime(s) punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year for purposes of Title 18, United States Code, Section 922(g)(1). the jury convicted that of the a Government crime The district court instructed had punishable to by prove a term Bosket of had been imprisonment exceeding one year ; that this was the definition of a felon under federal law, convicted of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year ; and that Bosket had stipulated he has been previously convicted of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year, and therefore, he is in fact a felon under federal law. The court also instructed them that the law prohibited any person who had been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year from possessing any type of weapon or ammunition. 4 Finally, the court gave a limiting instruction that the fact that Bosket had admitted he was a felon by previous conviction should not be considered by the jury in deciding whether he possessed the weapon in this case, and he was presumed innocent until proven guilty. We find no plain error in the court s instructions. Bosket next on specific commented contends the evidence district when court charging improperly the jury. District courts are necessarily vested with a great deal of discretion in constructing the specific form and content of jury instructions. Hardin v. Ski Venture, Inc., 50 F.3d 1291, 1293 (4th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). So long as the charge is accurate on the law and does not confuse or mislead the jury, it is not erroneous. Id. at 1294. Jury instructions should be drawn with reference to the particular facts of the case on trial, because abstract instructions that are not adjusted to the facts of a particular case may confuse the jury. States v. Holley, 502 F.2d 273, 276 (4th Cir. 1974). factual situations obviously call for different United Different degrees of particularity, id. at 277, and the choice of generality versus specificity in the charge is a discretion of the trial courts. matter left to the sound Hardin, 50 F.3d at 1295. Bosket first complains that the district court used the term road stop rather than law enforcement s sweeping checkpoint when giving an instruction on the proof required 5 concerning the date of the offense, which occurred at a traffic checkpoint. As noted by the Government, the Supreme Court has used a similar term, i.e., roadblock, when referring to traffic See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, checkpoints. 38 (2000). We find no plain error in the charge. Bosket also complains about the district court s charge that the jury had to decide whether the Government had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that he tossed the pistol in evidence to the ground while he was running away from police, contending it implied he possessed the firearm and corroborated the account of Government witnesses. The district court had explained that Bosket s mere presence was insufficient to prove he possessed the firearm, and its charge concerning what the Government must prove was not confusing or misleading. Bosket contends that cumulatively prejudicial. the district court s Finally, errors were Because we find no plain error, we conclude Bosket cannot show any prejudice. We therefore affirm the district court s judgment. dispense with oral argument because the facts and We legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED 6

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.