United States v. Richardson, No. 19-412 (2d Cir. 2020)

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Justia Opinion Summary

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for distribution and possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance. The court held that the district court did not procedurally err by applying the career offender sentencing enhancement pursuant to USSG 4B1.1 because defendant's prior convictions of conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 846, and attempted criminal possession of a controlled substance in violation of N.Y. Penal Law 220.16(1), qualify as controlled substance offenses, as defined in
USSG 4B1.2(b). The court also held that the district court did not substantively err in sentencing defendant, because it properly considered his criminal history and accounted for his need for mental health and substance abuse treatment.

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19 412 cr United States v. Richardson In the United States Court of Appeals FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT AUGUST TERM 2019 No. 19 412 cr UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee, v. KOLONGI RICHARDSON, Defendant Appellant. On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York SUBMITTED: FEBRUARY 3, 2020 DECIDED: MAY 5, 2020 Before: WALKER, CHIN, and MENASHI, Circuit Judges. Defendant Appellant Kolongi Richardson challenges the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his sentence, imposed upon his conviction for distribution and possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The district court (Suddaby, C.J.) did not commit procedural error by applying the career offender sentencing enhancement of United States Sentencing Guidelines § 4B1.1 because Richardson s prior convictions of conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846, and attempted criminal possession of a controlled substance in violation of N.Y. Penal Law § 220.16(1), qualify as controlled substance offenses, as defined in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b). Nor did the district court commit substantive error because it properly considered Richardson s criminal history and adequately accounted for his need for mental health and substance abuse treatment when it imposed the sentence. We reject Richardson s arguments and AFFIRM the judgment. Rajit S. Dosanjh, Assistant United States Attorney (Nicolas Commandeur, Assistant United States Attorney, on the brief), for Grant C. Jaquith, United States Attorney for the Northern District of New York, Syracuse, New York, for Appellee. Melissa A. Tuohey, Assistant Federal Public Defender, for Lisa A. Peebles, Federal Public Defender, Syracuse, New York, for Defendant Appellant. MENASHI, Circuit Judge: Kolongi Richardson appeals a judgment, entered February 5, 2019, following a guilty plea, sentencing him principally to 210 months imprisonment for distribution and possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). On appeal, Richardson challenges the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his sentence. 2 Richardson argues that (1) the district court erred procedurally when it determined that his prior convictions for conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance and attempted criminal sale of a controlled substance qualify as controlled substance offenses under the career offender guideline, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b), and (2) the sentence was substantively unreasonable because the court assigned too much weight to his criminal history and did not adequately account for his need for mental health and substance abuse treatment. We reject Richardson s arguments and affirm the judgment below. FACTS On September 21, 2018, Richardson pleaded guilty to distribution and possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). At sentencing, the district court concluded that Richardson qualified for the career offender enhancement of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 and sentenced him principally to 210 months imprisonment. The Sentencing Guidelines provide for such an enhancement where, inter alia, the instant offense of conviction is a felony that is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense and the defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. The district court found that Richardson met both criteria his conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) was a felony controlled substance offense, and he had two prior felony controlled substance offense convictions. In 2005, Richardson was convicted of conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute cocaine and cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846, and in 2012, Richardson was convicted of attempted criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree in violation of N.Y. Penal Law ( N.Y.P.L. ) § 220.16(1). The 3 district court imposed an additional six year term of supervised release that included mandatory participation in mental health and substance abuse programs. DISCUSSION This court review[s] the procedural and substantive reasonableness of a sentence under a deferential abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Yilmaz, 910 F.3d 686, 688 (2d Cir. 2018) (per curiam). The procedural inquiry focuses primarily on the sentencing court s compliance with its statutory obligation to consider the factors detailed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), while the substantive inquiry assesses the length of the sentence imposed in light of the § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Castillo, 896 F.3d 141, 148 (2d Cir. 2018). A sentence is substantively unreasonable if it is manifestly unjust or shock[s] the conscience. United States v. Rigas (Rigas II), 583 F.3d 108, 122 24 (2d Cir. 2009). We will set aside a district court s substantive determination only in exceptional cases where the trial court s decision cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions. United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 189 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc) (quoting United States v. Rigas (Rigas I), 490 F.3d 208, 238 (2d Cir. 2007)) (emphasis omitted). When the defendant has preserved a claim that the district court erred in its application of the sentencing guidelines, [w]e review issues of law de novo, issues of fact under the clearly erroneous standard, [and] mixed questions of law and fact either de novo or under the clearly erroneous standard depending on whether the question is predominantly legal or factual. United States v. Selioutsky, 409 F.3d 114, 119 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted). 4 I A controlled substance offense is an offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that prohibits the manufacture, import, export, distribution, or dispensing of a controlled substance ... with intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2. Application Note 1 to § 4B1.2 further defines controlled substance offense to include the offenses of aiding and abetting, conspiring, and attempting to commit such offenses. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 cmt. n.1. A Prior to his conviction in this case, Richardson was twice convicted of felonies relating to drug trafficking conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846 and attempted criminal possession of a controlled substance in violation of N.Y.P.L. § 220.16(1). As Application Note 1 interprets § 4B1.2(b), these prior felony convictions qualify as controlled substance offenses. Nevertheless, Richardson argues that these convictions are not controlled substance offenses under § 4B1.2(b), properly understood, because Application Note 1 impermissibly expands the guideline s definition of controlled substance offense to include inchoate offenses. According to Richardson, the text of § 4B1.2(b) does not bear that interpretation. See Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38 (1993) ( [C]ommentary in the Guidelines Manual that interprets or explains a guideline is authoritative unless it ... is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, that guideline. ). This argument is foreclosed by our decision in United States v. Tabb, 949 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2020). In that case, this court concluded that United States v. Jackson, 60 F.3d 128 (2d Cir. 1995), 5 which upheld the authority of the Sentencing Commission to adopt Application Note 1, precludes any further argument that Application Note 1 improperly conflicts with the guideline text. Tabb, 949 F.3d at 87. While Jackson focused on the consistency of Application Note 1 with the authorizing statute rather than the guideline, this court concluded that there is no way to reconcile Jackson s holding with a challenge such as Richardson s. Id. Regardless of the scope of Jackson s holding, Richardson s argument cannot prevail because Application Note 1 is not inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of § 4B1.2. Stinson, 508 U.S. at 38. Section 4B1.2 defines controlled substance offense as an offense under federal or state law that prohibits the manufacture, import, export, distribution, or dispensing of a controlled substance. To prohibit means, among other things, to prevent [or] hinder. Prohibit, Oxford English Dictionary (online ed. 2020); see also United States v. Lange, 862 F.3d 1290, 1295 (11th Cir. 2017). The Sentencing Commission adopted an interpretation of § 4B1.2 that is not inconsistent with the guideline when it concluded that an offense that forbids aiding and abetting, conspiring, and attempting to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense a controlled substance is an offense that prohibits those activities. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 cmt. n.1. A ban on attempting to distribute a controlled substance, for example, hinders the distribution of the controlled substance. See Lange, 862 F.3d at 1295. This conclusion accords with the majority of circuits that have addressed this question, 1 and it See United States v. Adams, 934 F.3d 720, 729 (7th Cir. 2019) (concluding that Application Note 1 s inclusion of conspiracy d[oes] not conflict with the text of the Guideline itself ); United States v. Crum, 934 F.3d 963, 966 (9th Cir. 2019); United States v. Mendoza Figueroa, 65 F.3d 691, 694 (8th Cir. 1995) 1 6 underlies the decision in Tabb that the purported distinction between Jackson s holding that the Sentencing Commission had the authority to include inchoate offenses within the definition of controlled substance offense and the conclusion that Application Note 1 is not inconsistent with the guideline is without substance. 949 F.3d at 87. B Richardson also argues that his conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 846 cannot serve as a predicate offense under Application Note 1 because Section 846 narcotics conspiracy has no overt act requirement. This argument also contradicts our holdings in Tabb and Jackson. See Tabb, 949 F.3d at 88 ( The text and structure of Application Note 1 demonstrate that it was intended to include Section 846 narcotics conspiracy. ); Jackson, 60 F.3d at 133 ( [D]rug conspiracy convictions pursuant to 21 U.S.C. [§] 846 ... qualify as controlled substance offenses. ) (citing United States v. Whitaker, 938 F.2d 1551, 1553 54 (2d Cir. 1991) (per curiam)). Accordingly, the district court (en banc) (concluding that Application Note 1 is a reasonable interpretation of the career offender guidelines ); United States v. Smith, 54 F.3d 690, 693 (11th Cir. 1995); United States v. Piper, 35 F.3d 611, 617 (1st Cir. 1994) (concluding that Application Note 1 comports sufficiently with the letter, spirit, and aim of the guideline to bring it within the broad sphere of the Sentencing Commission s interpretive discretion ); United States v. Hightower, 25 F.3d 182, 187 (3d Cir. 1994). But see United States v. Havis, 927 F.3d 382, 386 87 (6th Cir. 2019) (en banc) ( The text of § 4B1.2(b) controls, and it makes clear that attempt crimes do not qualify as controlled substance offenses. ); United States v. Winstead, 890 F.3d 1082, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 2018) ( Section 4B1.2(b) presents a very detailed definition of controlled substance offense that clearly excludes inchoate offenses. ). 7 did not err when it applied the career offender sentencing enhancement. II Richardson also challenges the substantive reasonableness of his sentence, arguing that the court assigned too much weight to his criminal history and did not adequately account for his need for mental health and substance abuse treatment. We conclude that Richardson s sentence is not substantively unreasonable because it is not manifestly unjust and does not shock the conscience. Rigas II, 583 F.3d at 122 24. The district court imposed a within Guidelines sentence after considering the § 3553(a) factors, including Richardson s personal and criminal history and the need for the sentence imposed. The district court observed that while Richardson had experienced terrible family trouble as well as mental health and substance abuse challenges, his past criminal conduct including drug trafficking, an escape from federal prison, and illegal gun possession was serious and persisted despite repeated intervention by law enforcement. J. App x 128 34. In light of these circumstances, the district court s decision to sentence Richardson to 210 months imprisonment fell well within the range of permissible decisions. See United States v. Thavaraja, 740 F.3d 253, 259 (2d Cir. 2014). Accordingly, we conclude that Richardson s sentence is substantively reasonable. CONCLUSION We AFFIRM the district court s judgment because Richardson s sentence was both procedurally and substantively reasonable. 8
Primary Holding
Defendant's prior convictions of conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 846, and attempted criminal possession of a controlled substance in violation of N.Y. Penal Law 220.16(1), qualify as controlled substance offenses, as defined in
USSG 4B1.2(b).

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