United States v. Harrison, No. 09-2907 (2d Cir. 2010)
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09-2907-cr United States v. Harrison 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT August Term, 2009 (Argued: May 19, 2010 Decided: May 26, 2010) Docket No. 09-2907-cr - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee, - v.JONATHAN HARRISON, Defendant-Appellant. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x Before: JACOBS, Chief Judge, MINER and WESLEY, Circuit Judges. Defendant-appellant Jonathan Harrison appeals the 30 judgment of the United States District Court for the 31 Northern District of New York (Mordue, C.J.) convicting him 32 of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base 33 (crack). 34 the drugs, arguing that the officers found them only after 35 unreasonably protracting an otherwise lawful traffic stop. He appeals the denial of his motion to suppress 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 We affirm. KENNETH M. MOYNIHAN, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for Appellant. PAUL D. SILVER (Ransom P. Reynolds, III, on the brief), United States Attorney s Office for the Northern District of New York, for Richard S. Hartunian, United States Attorney for the Northern District of New York, Albany, New York, for Appellee. PER CURIAM: Defendant-appellant Jonathan Harrison appeals the 19 judgment of the United States District Court for the 20 Northern District of New York (Mordue, C.J.) convicting him 21 of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base 22 (crack). 23 the drugs, arguing that the officers found them only after 24 unreasonably protracting an otherwise lawful traffic stop. He appeals the denial of his motion to suppress 25 26 I 27 Harrison was a backseat passenger in a car that was 28 stopped on the night of November 2, 2006, because a license 29 plate light was out. 30 McBride was the front passenger, and Lamar Watson was in the Marcos Villegas was driving, Ronisha 2 1 back with Harrison. Villegas pulled over to the highway 2 shoulder. 3 Trooper Joseph Krywalski approached the passenger side, 4 asked for the driver s license and registration, and ordered 5 Villegas to step around to the back. 6 Krywalski recognized him from two prior traffic stops in 7 which Krywalski found drugs in Villegas s car (marijuana on 8 the first stop, marijuana and cocaine on the second). 9 Standing at the back of the car, Krywalski asked To avoid being hit by traffic, New York State As Villegas complied, 10 Villegas where he was going, why, and with whom. 11 responded that they were all returning to Utica from a 12 wedding rehearsal in Rochester. 13 the three passengers to see if they would corroborate 14 Villegas s account. 15 traveled alone to Rochester, visited friends, picked up 16 Harrison and Watson, and were returning together to Utica; 17 nothing special took them to Rochester. 18 Villegas Krywalski then went back to McBride said that she and Villegas had Krywalski queried Villegas again, who stuck to his 19 story, and refused consent to search the vehicle. 20 spoke (two to three minutes after the stop began), Trooper 21 Timothy Ryan arrived at the scene. 22 after that, Ryan shined his flashlight into the car and 3 As they Two to three minutes 1 spotted a marijuana cigarette on the floor next to McBride s 2 foot. 3 Watson and Harrison out of the car, and found a gun inside 4 the center console. 5 Harrison and Watson. 6 Krywalski arrested Villegas and McBride, ordered Krywalski directed the arrest of Everyone went to the police station. There, Krywalski 7 saw Harrison shake his right leg until a bag of crack fell 8 out of his pants. 9 Harrison was charged in federal court with possession 10 with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base 11 (crack), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A). 12 The district court denied Harrison s pre-trial motion to 13 suppress the crack as the result of an unlawful stop; the 14 jury convicted; and the district court sentenced him to 240 15 months imprisonment. 16 On appeal, Harrison concedes that the original traffic 17 stop was lawful, but he argues that Krywalski s questioning 18 as to the four individuals travels unreasonably prolonged 19 the stop and therefore resulted in an unlawful detention, 20 and that the drugs should have been suppressed as a result. 21 22 4 II 1 2 On an appeal from a district court s ruling on a 3 motion to suppress evidence, we review the court s factual 4 findings for clear error, viewing the evidence in the light 5 most favorable to the government. 6 legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. 7 Ivezaj, 568 F.3d 88, 96 (2d Cir. 2009). 8 9 The district court s United States v. The Fourth Amendment protects [t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . against 10 unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. 11 [T]he Fourth Amendment requires that an officer making a 12 traffic stop have probable cause or reasonable suspicion 13 that the person stopped has committed a traffic violation or 14 is otherwise engaged in or about to be engaged in criminal 15 activity. 16 Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks, brackets, and emphases 17 omitted); see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 18 809-10 (1996). United States v. Stewart, 551 F.3d 187, 191 (2d 19 It is conceded that the stop of Villegas s car was 20 lawful; it was predicated on a violation of New York Vehicle 21 & Traffic Law § 375(2)(a)(4) (requiring that motor vehicles 22 have a lamp illuminating the rear license plate). 5 However, 1 even a seizure that is lawful at its inception can violate 2 the Fourth Amendment if its manner of execution unreasonably 3 infringes interests protected by the Constitution. 4 Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005). 5 to a traffic stop, [a] seizure that is justified solely by 6 the interest in issuing a warning ticket to the driver can 7 become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time 8 reasonably required to complete that mission. 9 [a]n officer s inquiries into matters unrelated to the As applied Id. Still, 10 justification for the traffic stop . . . do not convert the 11 encounter into something other than a lawful seizure, so 12 long as those inquiries do not measurably extend the 13 duration of the stop. 14 788 (2009). 15 Arizona v. Johnson, 129 S. Ct. 781, The question is whether Krywalski s questions 16 measurably extend[ed] the duration of the stop such that 17 the stop, lawful at its inception, became unconstitutional. 18 Krywalski testified that he had all of the information 19 needed to issue the traffic ticket before he first 20 approached the people in the car to corroborate Villegas s 21 story. 22 was only five to six minutes, and the questions about the But the time elapsed between the stop and the arrest 6 1 passengers comings and goings were subsumed in that brief 2 interval. 3 prolong the stop so as to render it unconstitutional. 4 We hold that this additional questioning did not When a traffic stop is supported by probable cause, the 5 occupants of the car have no right to be released the 6 instant the steps to check license, registration, and 7 outstanding warrants, and to write a ticket, had been 8 completed. . . . [T]he fourth amendment does not require the 9 release of a person arrested on probable cause at the 10 earliest moment that step can be accomplished. What the 11 Constitution requires is that the entire process remain 12 reasonable. 13 (7th Cir. 2002) (in banc). 14 six minutes have been deemed tolerable. 15 States v. Turvin, 517 F.3d 1097, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 2008) 16 (holding that a 14-minute period of questioning was not 17 unlawful because officers do not need reasonable suspicion 18 to ask questions unrelated to the purpose of an initially 19 lawful stop [where the questioning] did not unreasonably 20 prolong the duration of the stop ); United States v. 21 Hernandez, 418 F.3d 1206, 1212 n.7 (11th Cir. 2005) ( Where 22 at its inception a traffic stop is a valid one for a United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947, 953-54 Longer intervals than five to 7 See, e.g., United 1 violation of the law, we doubt that a resultant seizure of 2 no more than seventeen minutes can ever be unconstitutional 3 on account of its duration: the detention is too short 4 . . . . 5 than the norm, we question whether the Fourth Amendment s 6 prohibition of unreasonable seizures is concerned with such 7 trifling amounts of time, when the seizure was caused at the 8 outset by an apparent violation of the law. 9 law does not concern itself. ). Even if seventeen minutes is some minutes longer Of trifles the 10 CONCLUSION 11 12 13 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court. 8
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