Harris v. Mills, No. 07-2283 (2d Cir. 2009)

Annotate this Case

Download PDF

07-2283-cv Harris v. Mills 1 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 2 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 3 August Term, 2008 4 (Argued: February 2, 2009 Decided: July 9, 2009) 5 Docket No. 07-2283-cv 6 ------------------------------------- 7 MONROE S. HARRIS, B.S., D.O., 8 Plaintiff-Appellant, 9 - v. - 10 11 RICHARD P. MILLS, Commissioner of Education, MERRYL H. TISCH, Regent Chancellor, DAVID A. PATERSON, Governor, 12 Defendants-Appellees, 13 NEW YORK STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, 14 Defendant.* 15 ------------------------------------- 16 17 Before: 18 SACK and PARKER, Circuit Judges, and COTE, District Judge.** Appeal from a judgment of the United States District 19 Court for the Southern District of New York (Victor Marrero, 20 Judge). 21 dismiss the plaintiff's pro se amended complaint. The district court granted the defendants' motion to We conclude * The Clerk of the Court is respectfully directed to amend the official caption to conform to this one. David A. Paterson and Merryl H. Tisch are substituted for George E. Pataki and Robert M. Bennett, respectively, pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2). ** The Honorable Denise Cote, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation. 1 that the plaintiff's claims are legally insufficient, even when 2 liberally construed, although we disagree with the district 3 court's decision to base that conclusion in part on the theory 4 that the plaintiff's claims under Title II of the Americans with 5 Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act cannot be asserted 6 against individuals in their official capacity. 7 Affirmed. 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 DOUGLAS G. WADLER (Kenneth Joel Haber, of counsel), Law Office of Kenneth Joel Haber, P.C., Rockville, MD, for Appellant. MARION R. BUCHBINDER, Assistant Solicitor General (Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General, Michael S. Belohlavek, Senior Counsel, Andrew M. Cuomo, Attorney General of the State of New York, of counsel), New York, NY, for Appellees. SACK, Circuit Judge: Monroe S. Harris appeals from a judgment of the United 22 States District Court for the Southern District of New York 23 (Victor Marrero, Judge). 24 state of New York as a doctor of osteopathic medicine; his 25 medical license was revoked because he was found to have 26 committed fraud and engaged in improper medical practices. 27 issue is the New York State Education Department's denial of 28 Harris's petition to reinstate his license. 29 action pro se pursuant to, inter alia, Title II of the Americans 30 with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq., the 31 Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 et seq., and 42 Harris was formerly licensed by the 2 At Harris brought this 1 U.S.C. § 1983. 2 reasonable accommodation for his cognitive disabilities and 3 unconstitutionally deprived of due process of law. 4 He claims to have been illegally denied a The district court granted the individual defendants' 5 motion to dismiss the ADA and Rehabilitation Act accommodation 6 claims because the court concluded that those statutes do not 7 provide for individual liability. 8 dismissed the Rehabilitation Act claim and the remaining claims 9 for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The district court also 10 Although we disagree with some of the district court's reasoning, 11 we agree with it that the plaintiff's claims are legally 12 insufficient, even when read with the lenity that must attend the 13 review of pro se pleadings. 14 We therefore affirm the judgment. BACKGROUND 15 16 This appeal is but the latest chapter in a litigation 17 arising out of the 1999 revocation of Harris's license to 18 practice medicine by the New York State Board for Professional 19 Medical Conduct (the "Board"). 20 The Revocation of the License 21 The Board revoked Harris's license to practice 22 osteopathic medicine in part because it found, after an 23 investigation and a hearing, that Harris had committed 24 "fraudulent practice" and had made false statements when he 25 submitted applications for reappointment to three different 26 hospitals. See Harris v. N.Y. State Dep't of Health, 202 F. 3 1 Supp. 2d 143, 148-49 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) ("Harris I"). Harris had 2 asserted in the applications that he was not at the time a 3 subject of disciplinary action, even though he was in fact then 4 under investigation by the Bureau of Controlled Substances of the 5 New York State Department of Health for allegations of illegally 6 storing and dispensing controlled substances. 7 He also failed to disclose his previous misconduct in two other 8 reappointment applications and failed to disclose, in an 9 application to the New York State Education Department for See id. at 148.1 10 renewal of his medical license, that his practice privileges at a 11 hospital had been terminated. 12 See id. The Board also found that Harris had provided negligent 13 and incompetent medical care. 14 inappropriately prescribed diet pills to one patient and had 15 prescribed to another patient a drug contraindicated for that 16 patient's heart condition. 17 that Harris had failed to maintain records adequately. 18 He had, for example, See id. at 149. The Board also found See id. The Board's revocation was affirmed by the State 19 Administrative Review Board. See id. at 150. 20 initiated a proceeding pursuant to Article 78 of the New York 21 Civil Practice Law and Rules, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7801 et seq., in 22 the New York State Supreme Court, Appellate Division. 23 Appellate Division confirmed the Administrative Review Board's 1 Harris then The That investigation resulted in a formal acknowledgment of wrongdoing by Harris. See Harris I, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 148. 4 1 decision and dismissed the petition. Harris v. Novello, 276 2 A.D.2d 848, 714 N.Y.S.2d 365 (3d Dep't 2000). 3 Thereafter, Harris brought a lawsuit against the New 4 York State Department of Health ("DOH") in the district court. 5 In it, he challenged the Board's revocation of his license, 6 "alleg[ing] that DOH refused to acknowledge evidence of his 7 learning disabilities and revoked his medical license without 8 considering or offering him reasonable means to accommodate those 9 disabilities," in violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation 10 Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, and Title II of the ADA. Harris I, 11 202 F. Supp. 2d at 164. 12 procedures" in violation of the Due Process Clause of the 13 Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. He also alleged "deficiencies in DOH's Id. 14 The district court granted DOH's motion to dismiss in 15 light of the prior state proceedings, concluding that "Harris's 16 efforts to relitigate . . . the revocation of his medical license 17 are barred by application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine." 18 at 165; see D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 19 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). 20 also concluded that the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims against 21 the state agency were barred by operation of the Eleventh 22 Amendment, Harris I, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 173-74, and that the due 23 process claim against the DOH was barred because that agency is 24 not a "person" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and 25 because the Eleventh Amendment precluded the due process claim 26 insofar as it sought money damages, id. at 178. 5 Id. The court 1 The Petition for Restoration 2 In February 2002, Harris applied to the New York Board 3 of Regents, seeking to restore his license to practice medicine.2 4 After meeting with Harris, a "Peer Committee" issued a report 5 recommending that the Education Department deny his application. 6 On June 7, 2004, the Education Department's Committee on the 7 Professions met with Harris. 8 following the Peer Committee's recommendation. 9 Regents affirmed. 10 It subsequently issued a report The Board of Harris does not assert that he made any further attempt to obtain review from New York state courts. 11 Harris brought this action pro se against the Education 12 Department pursuant to the ADA, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation 13 Act, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 14 action sua sponte. 15 Supp. 2d 530, 535-36 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) ("Harris II"). 16 observed that Harris's complaint was, in large part, an attempt 17 to relitigate matters the court had already resolved in Harris I. 18 Id. at 532. 19 petition to restore his medical license," id., the court 20 dismissed the ADA and Section 1983 claims against the state 21 agency on sovereign immunity grounds, id. at 532-34. 22 concluded that the state's sovereign immunity had been waived for 23 the purposes of Harris's Rehabilitation Act claim. The district court dismissed the Harris v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep't, 419 F. The court Insofar as the complaint "related to [Harris's] 2 The court Id. at 534. That body of the Education Department has jurisdiction to "restore a license" of a "former licensee found guilty of professional misconduct." N.Y. Educ. Law § 6511. 6 1 But the court observed that the complaint failed to make clear 2 what sort of "accommodation" Harris was denied, and the court 3 therefore dismissed the Rehabilitation Act claim "with leave to 4 amend to more fully articulate what reasonable accommodation 5 [Harris] requested and how the alleged failure to accommodate 6 resulted in the State's discriminatory refusal to restore his 7 medical license." Id. at 535. 8 The Amended Complaint 9 Harris, continuing to act pro se, filed an amended 10 complaint -- the complaint at issue on this appeal -- against the 11 Commissioner of Education, the Regent Chancellor, and the 12 Governor of the State of New York.3 13 declaratory, and monetary relief under the ADA; the 14 Rehabilitation Act; Section 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1988; the First, 15 Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 16 Constitution; and also pursuant to his assertion that the 17 decision to deny the reinstatement petition was "[a]rbitrary and 18 capricious" inasmuch as the defendants failed to follow their own 19 procedural rules. 20 complaint, Harris seeks, inter alia, an order granting Harris's 21 application for reinstatement of his license, together with such 22 "accommodation[]s . . . as might be necessary," and additional 23 injunctive relief. 3 Harris requests injunctive, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 184-95. In the amended Id. ¶¶ a-b. The Education Department is no longer a defendant in this action. 7 1 The amended complaint alleges that in 1998, on the 2 advice of counsel and while his investigation by the Board was 3 ongoing, see id. ¶ 34, Harris was diagnosed with "learning 4 disabilities . . . i.e. disorder of written expression and 'rule 5 out' reading disorder and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity 6 Disorder," id. ¶ 7. 7 conditions, he has "difficulty with comprehending the written 8 word" and "a related problem with written expression." 9 Harris further alleges that it is possible for him to Harris alleges that as a result of those Id. ¶ 11. 10 "compensate" for these disabilities and, in theory, to "practice 11 medicine or law, or any other discipline." 12 asserts that that is just what he has done, obtaining degrees 13 from college and a school of osteopathic medicine "after 14 initially failing out of both" as a result of "various self 15 taught techniques and determination of will." 16 Id. ¶ 14. Harris Id. ¶¶ 15-16. Though it's not entirely clear from the pro se 17 pleadings, Harris appears also to allege that he made two 18 requests for accommodation from the Department of Education, both 19 of which were denied. 20 First, Harris apparently applied for "understanding of 21 the impact of [his] disabilities." 22 this regard, that "he could not have a fair medical license 23 restoration hearing . . . without reasonable accommodation of 24 understanding of LD & ADHD and it[]s past behavioral impact," id. 25 ¶ 25, and similarly that "[w]ithout understanding [the] impact of 26 [Harris's] impairment [the state officials] can not make a proper 8 Id. ¶ 22. Harris says, in 1 evaluation . . . of [his] rehabilitation," id. ¶ 37. 2 application for "understanding" relates to his demand for 3 reinstatement of his license. 4 Harris's Second, Harris says, he made and was denied a request 5 to read a written "explanation" before the Committee on the 6 Professions because his oral explanation before the Peer 7 Committee was thought by the Peer Committee to be "unfocused" and 8 "not clearly presented." 9 more organized and clearly presented" to do it in writing. Id. ¶¶ 43-44. 10 ¶ 44. 11 He "thought it would be Id. This sought-for accommodation relates to whether he received an adequate hearing. 12 The amended complaint also contests the judgment of the 13 Committee regarding the impact of Harris's alleged disability, in 14 part on the ground that the agency lacked expert testimony on the 15 subject, and in part because it failed to adequately 16 "acknowledge" evidence of his disability. 17 amended complaint asserts this as a separate basis for relief. 18 Id. ¶¶ 153-54. The Included in the amended complaint, too, is much 19 discussion in mitigation or denial of the actions for which 20 Harris's license was revoked, all of which is "not presented for 21 re[]litigation" but "to illustrate an understand[ing] [i.e., on 22 Harris's part] of the past issues and to prevent [their] 23 reoccurrence in the future ([i.e.,] rehabilitation)." 24 Id. ¶ 63. The district court granted the defendants' motion to 25 dismiss the amended complaint. Harris v. Mills, 478 F. Supp. 2d 26 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) ("Harris III"). 9 Harris's motion to 1 reconsider that decision, in part in light of his withdrawal of a 2 claim for damages relief, was denied by endorsed order. 3 Harris, represented by counsel, appeals. DISCUSSION 4 5 I. Standard of Review 6 We review de novo the grant of a motion to dismiss for 7 failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under 8 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 9 Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 524 F.3d 384, 392 (2d Cir. 2008), cert. City of New York v. 10 denied, 129 S. Ct. 1579 (2009). 11 sufficiency of the complaint, taking its factual allegations to 12 be true and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's 13 favor. 14 We consider the legal See id. In accordance with the Supreme Court's decision Bell 15 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), we apply a 16 "plausibility standard," which is guided by "[t]wo working 17 principles," Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). 18 First, although "a court must accept as true all of the 19 allegations contained in a complaint," that "tenet" "is 20 inapplicable to legal conclusions" and "[t]hreadbare recitals of 21 the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 22 statements, do not suffice." 23 states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss" 24 and "[d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim 25 for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires 26 the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common Id. 10 "Second, only a complaint that 1 sense." Id. at 1950. Even after Twombly, though, we remain 2 obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally. 3 v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (per 4 curiam); Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 191 5 (2d Cir. 2008); Boykin v. KeyCorp, 521 F.3d 202, 213-14, 216 (2d 6 Cir. 2008). See Erickson 7 II. The Accommodation Claims 8 The district court concluded that "the ADA does 9 not . . . provide for individual liability, either in the 10 individual's official or personal capacity." 11 Supp. 2d at 547. 12 the Rehabilitation Act. 13 Rehabilitation Act may not be brought against individuals, either 14 in their personal or official capacity, Harris's Rehabilitation 15 Act claim must also be dismissed."). 16 dismissed the Rehabilitation Act claim on the ground that fails 17 to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 18 548. 19 A. Individual Liability 20 Harris III, 478 F. It reached the same conclusion with respect to Id. at 547-48 ("Because claims under the The district court also See id. at As the defendants concede, the district court 21 incorrectly concluded that claims under Title II of the ADA and 22 the Rehabilitation Act cannot be asserted against individuals in 23 their official capacity. 24 261 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 936 (2004), we wrote: 25 26 27 We . . . cannot embrace the state defendant's statutory claim that an individual sued in his or her official capacity under the In Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 doctrine of Ex parte Young is not a "public entity" subject to liability under the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12132. The real party in interest in an official-capacity suit is the government entity. As a result, it is irrelevant whether the ADA would impose individual liability on the officer sued; since the suit is in effect against the "public entity," it falls within the express authorization of the ADA. 11 Id. at 288 (citation omitted). In other words, we concluded that 12 Title II and Rehabilitation Act suits for prospective injunctive 13 relief may, under the doctrine established by Ex parte Young, 209 14 U.S. 123 (1908), proceed against individual officers in their 15 official capacity, see Henrietta D., 331 F.3d at 289 ("[T]here is 16 no basis for holding that the ADA or Rehabilitation Act intended 17 to create the kind of comprehensive enforcement scheme that would 18 preclude prospective injunctive relief against a state official 19 in her official capacity."). 20 seeks prospective injunctive relief, then, it may be asserted 21 against the individual defendants here in their official 22 capacities.4 Insofar as the amended complaint 4 It appears Harris intended to amend the complaint further to limit his request to injunctive relief only. Four days after the district court's dismissal of the amended complaint, Harris sent a communication to the court requesting "[r]econsideration" of the court's "[d]ecision" for six reasons that had previously been argued, but also for a seventh: "Drop money damages." See Endorsed letter of Monroe Harris entitled "Reconsideration," Mar. 26, 2007 (Docket Entry 21). By endorsement, the district court construed the letter as a "request [for] reconsideration," and denied the request because the letter "provides no controlling facts or law that the court overlooked in its prior rulings on this matter that would alter the outcome of the Court's decision." Id. But the part of the application that sought to "[d]rop money damages" was, strictly speaking, not a motion that "renew[ed] arguments previously made," and therefore did not 12 1 The district court relied upon two cases to conclude 2 otherwise: Lennon v. NYC, 392 F. Supp. 2d 630, 640 (S.D.N.Y. 3 2005), which noted prior district court rulings that individually 4 named defendants cannot be held personally liable under the ADA, 5 and Hartnett v. Fielding Graduate Institute, 400 F. Supp. 2d 570, 6 575 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other 7 grounds, 198 Fed. Appx. 89 (2d Cir. 2006) (summary order), which 8 quoted a pre-Henrietta D. case, Menes v. CUNY, 92 F. Supp. 2d 9 294, 306 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), for the proposition that individuals 10 cannot "'be named in their official or representative capacities 11 as defendants in ADA or Rehabilitation Act suits.'" 12 478 F. Supp. 2d at 547. 13 post-Henrietta D. case that was relied upon by Lennon, Gentile v. 14 Town of Huntington, 288 F. Supp. 2d 316, 322 (E.D.N.Y. 2003), 15 hold that individual defendants cannot be sued in their official 16 capacities for prospective injunctive relief under the ADA or the 17 Rehabilitation Act, those holdings are contrary to Henrietta D., 18 by which we are of course bound. 19 B. Legal Sufficiency 20 21 Harris III, Insofar as Hartnett, Menes, and another We conclude, nonetheless, that the amended complaint fails to state accommodation claims upon which the injunctive "bring up for review the underlying order." "R" Best Produce, Inc. v. DiSapio, 540 F.3d 115, 121 (2d Cir. 2008). Liberally construed, it was an attempt to withdraw a claim for relief pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2). Whether the district court should have granted that application is not at issue on this appeal. 13 1 relief Harris seeks can be granted, even under the liberal 2 standard of review for pro se pleadings. 3 1. Applicable Legal Standards. Title II of the ADA 4 "proscribes discrimination against the disabled in access to 5 public services." 6 79, 84-85 (2d Cir.), corrected, 511 F.3d 238 (2d Cir. 2004). 7 provides that "no qualified individual with a disability shall, 8 by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in 9 or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or Powell v. Nat'l Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 364 F.3d It 10 activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination 11 by any such entity." 12 requirements are met, "reasonable accommodation" may have to be 13 provided to the qualified individual. 14 at 273-74. 15 specified "otherwise qualified" disabled individuals receive 16 reasonable accommodations from programs receiving federal 17 financial assistance. 18 469 U.S. 287, 301 (1985); Henrietta D., 331 F.3d at 273. To assure that those See Henrietta D., 331 F.3d Similarly, the Rehabilitation Act requires that 29 U.S.C. § 794(a); Alexander v. Choate, "[I]n most cases,"5 the standards are the same for 19 20 42 U.S.C. § 12132. actions under both statutes. 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 Powell, 364 F.3d at 85. In order for a plaintiff to establish a prima facie violation under these Acts, she must demonstrate (1) that she is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) that the defendants are subject to one of the Acts; and (3) that she was denied the opportunity to participate in or benefit from defendants' 5 The differences among the cases referred to do not affect the analysis here. 14 1 2 3 4 5 services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by defendants, by reason of her disability. Id. (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). 6 2. The Standards Applied. Harris makes two 7 accommodation claims. 8 wrongly denied him an "understanding of the impact of [his] 9 disabilities." The first is that the Education Department Am. Compl. ¶ 22. Without such understanding, he 10 alleges, the reinstatement hearing was not "fair," id. ¶ 25, in 11 that the Department could undertake no "proper" assessment of his 12 "rehabilitation," id. ¶ 37. 13 complaint does not, however, identify how Harris's disabilities 14 affected the behavior that caused the revocation of his license, 15 nor how those disabilities could be accommodated to reform this 16 behavior. 17 defendants would "understand" the impact of his disabilities, 18 they would be willing to overlook the actions that caused him to 19 lose his license in the first place. 20 allegation amounts only to the contention that Harris's medical 21 licensing qualifications should be relaxed in light of his 22 disability. Even read liberally, Harris's Harris thus alleges, at core, that if only the Generally construed, this 23 This is not a reasonable accommodation claim. Title II 24 of the ADA requires the accommodation of disabled persons who are 25 entitled to a public benefit "whether or not [they are] given an 26 accommodation." 27 § 12131 ("The term 'qualified individual with a disability' means 28 an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable Powell, 364 F.3d at 84-85; see also 42 U.S.C. 15 1 modifications to rules, policies, or practices . . . meets the 2 essential eligibility requirements for [the relevant benefit]." 3 (emphasis added)). 4 use a wheelchair to access the courts -- a citizen is entitled to 5 access the court system irrespective of whether he or she can 6 walk. 7 contrast, Harris would be entitled to a reinstatement of his 8 license only if his disability is accommodated by the state's 9 relaxation of its license qualifications. The paradigmatic example is a person who must See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004). Here, by Title II of the ADA 10 requires no such diminishment of otherwise applicable standards. 11 See Felix v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 324 F.3d 102, 107 (2d Cir. 12 2003) ("The ADA mandates reasonable accommodation of people with 13 disabilities in order to put them on an even playing field with 14 the non-disabled; it does not authorize a preference for disabled 15 people generally."). 16 Similarly with respect to the Rehabilitation Act claim, 17 because Harris does not contest the Board's view that his past 18 acts of fraud and improper practices disentitle him to the 19 license, but asks only for the state's "understanding" of the 20 reasons why he committed those actions, he cannot demonstrate 21 that he is "otherwise qualified" for a medical license. 22 first accommodation claim is therefore legally insufficient under 23 both statutes. 24 Harris's Harris's second accommodation claim arises out of the 25 denial of his request for permission to read to the Committee on 26 the Professions a written explanation so his case "would be more 16 1 organized and clearly presented." 2 court concluded that Harris "did not make clear how this denial 3 related to the final determination not to restore his medical 4 license." 5 Am. Compl. ¶ 44. The district Harris III, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 548. The problem with this conclusion is that it assumes 6 that Harris seeks the written-presentation accommodation in order 7 to obtain his license to practice. 8 of the amended complaint, Harris asks only for reasonable access 9 to a hearing in which to make his case for reinstatement. But under a liberal reading The 10 relation of the state's denial and the benefit Harris seeks -- a 11 fair hearing -- is clear under this reading. 12 no dispute that Harris was otherwise entitled to such a hearing. 13 Even so construed, however, Harris's claim is Moreover, there is 14 insufficient. As an initial matter, there is no allegation 15 (beyond ipse dixit) that Harris was denied the opportunity to 16 read from a written statement "by reason" of his disability, let 17 alone "solely by reason" of his disability, as the Rehabilitation 18 Act requires. 19 Doe v. Pfrommer, 148 F.3d 73, 82 (2d Cir. 1998). 20 not clear how such an accommodation would have helped Harris. 21 According to the amended complaint, Harris has "difficulty with 22 comprehending the written word" and "a related problem with 23 written expression." 24 disabilities with which Harris is afflicted, allowing him to 25 prepare and read a written statement would not have accommodated 26 his disabilities; it would have frustrated them. 29 U.S.C. § 794; accord Powell, 364 F.3d at 85; Am. Compl. ¶ 11. 17 Moreover, it is If those are the 1 We reject Harris's remaining arguments. He contends 2 that the Committee failed in its "responsibility" to initiate "an 3 interactive process" with him to discover an accommodation that 4 would help him obtain his medical license. 5 ADA "envisions an 'interactive process' by which employers and 6 employees work together to assess whether an employee's 7 disability can be reasonably accommodated." 8 Dep't of Labor, 205 F.3d 562, 566 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 531 9 U.S. 931 (2000); see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 ("To determine the Pl.'s Br. 20. The Jackan v. N.Y. State 10 appropriate reasonable accommodation it may be necessary for the 11 covered entity to initiate an informal, interactive process with 12 the qualified individual with a disability in need of the 13 accommodation."); accord Lovejoy-Wilson v. NOCO Motor Fuel, Inc., 14 263 F.3d 208, 219 (2d Cir. 2001). 15 Harris; he received hearings in which he was permitted to make 16 his case for reissuance of his license. 17 injunctive relief" if Harris was "already being reasonably 18 accommodated." 19 This, however, does not help "There [is] no need for Henrietta D., 331 F.3d at 282. Harris also argues that the Committee should have 20 considered more documentary evidence on his behalf and wrongly 21 found his claims of disability implausible. 22 explain how these arguments relate to his accommodation claim. But he fails to 23 III. The Due Process Claim 24 The district court dismissed Harris's due process claim 25 on the ground that Article 78 provided an adequate post- 26 deprivation hearing for the denial of his petition to reinstate 18 1 his license. 2 court concluded that "Harris was certainly familiar with Article 3 78 proceedings, having availed himself of that remedy after his 4 medical license was initially revoked," id., and that "[b]ecause 5 New York provides a meaningful post-deprivation remedy and Harris 6 does not indicate that he pursued this remedy, "his due process 7 claim must be dismissed," id. at 549-50. 8 9 Harris III, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 549. The district Harris argues that the defendants' failure to consider evidence of his character and disabilities wrongfully deprived 10 him of a constitutionally protected interest. 11 argues, the defendants baselessly "assumed that Harris was not 12 disabled." 13 arguments as challenges to the "state procedural scheme" as a 14 whole, not merely a discrete set of unauthorized acts, id. at 11, 15 and therefore contends that he was entitled to a pre-deprivation 16 hearing under Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990). 17 not grapple with whether any of the defendants, by virtue of 18 their decision-making authority or role, would be unable to avail 19 themselves of the principle that "[w]hen the state conduct in 20 question is random and unauthorized, the state satisfies 21 procedural due process requirements so long as it provides 22 meaningful post-deprivation remedy." 23 City Bd. of Elections, 470 F.3d 458, 465 (2d Cir. 2006). 24 was given notice and an opportunity to be heard before his 25 petition for reinstatement was denied. Pl.'s Reply Br. 10. In addition, he Harris characterizes these 19 We need Rivera-Powell v. New York Harris That, coupled with the 1 Article 78 post-deprivation remedy, is enough to satisfy due 2 process. 3 See id. at 466-67. Finally, Harris's amended complaint states as a 4 separate cause of action that the defendants' decisions were 5 "[a]rbitrary and capricious" inasmuch as the defendants failed to 6 follow their own procedural rules. 7 this is intended to be a stand-alone legal claim based solely on 8 violations of state regulations, it is not actionable in federal 9 court. Am. Compl. 21. Insofar as See Alfaro Motors, Inc. v. Ward, 814 F.2d 883, 888 (2d 10 Cir. 1987) ("Section 1983 is not a means for litigating in a 11 federal forum whether a state or local administrative decision 12 was arbitrary and capricious."). 13 upon which relief can be granted. CONCLUSION 14 15 16 It therefore states no claim For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed. 20

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.