Alvin Tucker v. Sejong Alabama, LLC, et al., No. 12-13685 (11th Cir. 2013)

Annotate this Case
Download PDF
Case: 12-13685 Date Filed: 05/23/2013 Page: 1 of 3 [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________ No. 12-13685 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________ D.C. Docket No. 2:11-cv-00268-MEF-WC ALVIN TUCKER, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus SEJONG ALABAMA, LLC, SEJONG GEORGIA, LLC, Defendants-Appellees. ________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama ________________________ (May 23, 2013) Before MARCUS, WILSON and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Alvin Tucker, an African-American citizen of the United States, appeals pro se the district court s grant of summary judgment in favor of Sejong Alabama, Case: 12-13685 Date Filed: 05/23/2013 Page: 2 of 3 LLC and Sejong Georgia, LLC (collectively Sejong ) in Tucker s employment discrimination action under 42 U.S.C. § 1981; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ( Title VII ), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), 2000e-3(a); and several Alabama torts. On appeal, Tucker argues that the district court erred in granting Sejong s motion for summary judgment on Tucker s discriminatory and retaliatory termination claims under § 1981 and Title VII, as well as on his state law claims. Upon review of the record and consideration of the parties briefs, we affirm. The only federal claims that Tucker has preserved for appeal are his claims of discriminatory and retaliatory termination. Tucker argues that the district court erred in finding that he had offered no direct evidence of discrimination. This argument is without merit. Tucker has failed to identify any statements by Sejong s managers that show a discriminatory intent without inference. See Hinson v. Clinch Cnty., Ga. Bd. of Educ., 231 F.3d 821, 827 (11th Cir. 2000). Tucker has likewise not established sufficient circumstantial evidence of a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation with regard to his termination. Nonetheless, even assuming arguendo that Tucker established a prima facie case for his discrimination and retaliation claims, the district court did not err in granting Sejong s motion for summary judgment because Tucker did not show that Sejong s reason for firing him was pretextual. See Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1024 25 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 2 Case: 12-13685 Date Filed: 05/23/2013 Accordingly, we affirm. AFFIRMED. 3 Page: 3 of 3

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.