Unpublished Disposition, 931 F.2d 60 (9th Cir. 1991)

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U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - 931 F.2d 60 (9th Cir. 1991)

Paul David RUDDY, Petitioner-Appellant,v.UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 89-56309.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 19, 1991.* Decided April 23, 1991.

Before POOLE, D.W. NELSON and NOONAN, Circuit Judges.


MEMORANDUM** 

Paul David Ruddy, a federal prisoner, appeals pro se the district court's dismissal of his U.S.C. § 2255 motion. We review de novo, Iaea v. Sunn, 800 F.2d 861, 864 (9th Cir. 1986), and affirm.

Ruddy contends that he was entitled to a "no benefit hearing" before being sentenced under the provisions of the federal Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C.A. Sec. 5005 et seq. (repealed 1984) ("YCA"). This contention lacks merit.

Under the YCA, before sentencing a youth offender to an adult sentence, the district court must make a finding that the offender would not benefit from treatment under the Act. See 18 U.S.C.A. Sec. 5010(b) (c); Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 442-443 (1974). Thus, youth offenders are entitled to a "no benefit finding" only when the district court imposes an adult sentence. See 18 U.S.C.A. Sec. 5010(d); Dorsyznski, 418 U.S. at 442-443. Here, Ruddy was not sentenced as an adult; he was sentenced under the provisions of the YCA. Accordingly, Ruddy was not entitled to a no benefit finding and the district court properly denied his 2255 motion.

Ruddy also contends that his YCA conviction should have been automatically set aside. As a result of this failure, Ruddy asserts that he has been classified as a greater security risk.1  This contention lacks merit.

In order to have a YCA conviction automatically set aside, a youth offender must meet certain statutory prerequisites. First, the youth offender must be placed on probation or sentenced to the custody of the Attorney General for "treatment and supervision." Second, the youth offender must receive early discharge. Dorszynski, 418 U.S. at 429-30 n. 6, 435; 18 U.S.C.A. Secs. 5010(a) (b) (c), 5021(a) (b).

The record indicates that Ruddy was sentenced to the custody of the Attorney General, thus meeting the first statutory prerequisite. Nevertheless, Ruddy has failed to show that he received early discharge. Without early discharge, a youth offender is not entitled to have his conviction automatically set aside. Id. Furthermore, the record indicates that Ruddy's security classification would not change even if his YCA conviction was not considered. Accordingly, the district court properly denied Ruddy's section 2255 motion.

Ruddy also contends that the district court erred in denying his claim for credit for time served for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies.2  This contention lacks merit.

Federal prisoners must exhaust their administrative remedies before bringing a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal court.3  Martinez v. Roberts, 804 F.2d 570, 571 (9th Cir. 1986). The Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") has a three step procedure by which an inmate may challenge any aspect of his sentence. 28 C.F.R. Sec. 542.10 (1989); Martinez, 804 F.2d at 571.

Here, although Ruddy filed a "Request for Administrative Remedy," he failed to appeal its denial, as required by the BOP's administrative remedy process. Accordingly, since Ruddy failed to fully invoke the procedure made available by the BOP, the district court properly dismissed his claim.

AFFIRMED.

 *

The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for disposition without oral argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 9th Cir.R. 34-4

 **

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Circuit R. 36-3

 1

Ruddy is currently serving a twenty year sentence for an unrelated crime

 2

In his complaint, he alleges that he should receive credit against his twenty year sentence for the time served on his YCA conviction

 3

We note that the first two claims raised by Ruddy relate to the legality of his sentence and therefore were properly brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See United States v. Giddings, 740 F.2d 770, 772 (9th Cir. 1984). Ruddy's third claim however, challenges the manner of execution of his sentence and thus is properly brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Id. (habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is the proper vehicle to attack a denial of sentence credits)

Before bringing an action under section 2241, an inmate must exhaust his administrative remedies. Martinez v. Roberts, 804 F.2d 570, 571 (9th Cir. 1986). Thus, the district court's dismissal of Ruddy's third claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies was appropriate. Under section 2255 however, exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Thus, it was not appropriate for the district court to dismiss Ruddy's first two claims for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. See id. Nevertheless, we may affirm on any ground supported by the record. Lakeview Dev. v. South Lake Tahoe, 915 F.2d 1290, 1299 (9th Cir. 1990).