Unpublished Disposition, 930 F.2d 29 (9th Cir. 1988)

MEMORANDUM^** 

Raymond J. Caplette appeals pro se his conviction for income tax evasion in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201. Caplette alleges insufficiency of evidence to support a guilty verdict, improper admission of his income statement from a previous civil proceeding, and erroneous exclusion of written materials and testimony to show the basis of his belief that the law did not require him to pay taxes. We AFFIRM.

BACKGROUND

Caplette did not file income tax returns nor pay income taxes for 1981-1984, even though he had done so for the previous six years. Instead, he claimed exempt status when filing W-4 forms for 1981-1984. On March 22, 1988, a federal grand jury indicted Caplette on four counts of income tax evasion in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201. On June 17, 1988, Caplette was convicted by a jury on all four counts. On September 26, 1988, Caplette was sentenced to three months at a community treatment center and consecutive five-year terms of probation.

DISCUSSION

Sufficiency of the Evidence

There is sufficient evidence to support a conviction if " 'a reasonable jury, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, could have found the defendants guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of each essential element of the crime charged.' " United States v. Hernandez, 876 F.2d 774, 777 (9th Cir.) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 179 (1989). The government must prove the following elements to sustain a conviction of tax evasion: 1) an actual deficiency; 2) an affirmative act of evasion or attempted evasion of paying income taxes; and 3) a willful evasion of paying taxes. United States v. Hamilton 620 F.2d 712, 714 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343, 351 (1965)).

To show an actual deficiency, the government focused upon the evidence that Caplette filed IRS W-4 forms claiming exemption and did not pay taxes for 1981-1984. The government showed that Caplette actually owed several thousand dollars in taxes for each of these years. This was calculated using the income Caplette had received during 1981-1984, which was recorded on the pay roll register of his employer, McDonnell-Douglas. The government also presented evidence showing that Caplette himself asserted in a loan application dated August 30, 1982, that he had a gross income of $2,340 a month.

To prove that Caplette committed an affirmative act of tax evasion, the government cited the above evidence. Additionally, it presented evidence of a March, 1986 interview with an IRS agent. Caplette admitted in the interview to filing the W-4 forms, claiming to be exempt. He rationalized that he did so because he was in need of money due to a loan he had made to his daughter, car notes, and campaign expenses.

This evidence also went to Caplette's willful failure to file. Caplette had properly filed income tax returns, paid taxes and did not claim to be exempt for 1974-1980. He signed the W-4 form in which he claimed exemption for 1981 one month prior to filing his 1980 tax return. Caplette therefore had knowledge of income tax requirements and procedure. This refutes a good faith mistake defense, and instead indicates that Caplette knowingly and willfully failed to pay taxes in 1981-1984. Viewing the evidence in a manner most favorable to the government, we find that a reasonable jury could conclude that Caplette owed taxes for 1981-1984, and that he acted affirmatively and willfully.

Admission of Statement From Previous Proceeding

Caplette also argues that under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 16(a) (1) (A) (defendant's right to inspect previous written statement), the district court should not have admitted a certified copy of a written income statement he had made in his 1983 divorce proceeding. Caplette complained that the government first informed him of its intention to use the document on the night before trial. The district court ruled that the government could use the document only to impeach Caplette, but not in its case-in-chief. Evidentiary rulings by the district court are reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Emmert, 829 F.2d 805, 808 (9th Cir. 1987).

A similar ruling was upheld in United States v. Sukumolachan, 610 F.2d 685 (9th Cir. 1980). There, evidence of an inculpatory statement the appellant had made after his arrest was not disclosed to him until the morning of trial. Id. at 687. Like the ruling in Caplette's case, in Sukumolachan the district court allowed the evidence to come in only to impeach the appellant, but not during the government's case-in-chief. Id. We stated that "by denying the government use of the statement until the possible cross-examination of the defendant, the court afforded appellant a reasonable opportunity either to avoid impeachment by not taking the stand or to prepare a rebuttal to the statement." Id. at 688. Likewise, Caplette could have opted not to testify in order to prevent the statement from being admitted. In the alternative, he had a reasonable opportunity to prepare a rebuttal. The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in Caplette's case.

Exclusion of Written Material and Testimony

Caplette further alleges that the court should have allowed him to refer to and introduce as evidence numerous documents relevant to his belief that he did not have to pay taxes. He also claims that the district court should not have restricted testimony of a defense witness relevant to this belief.

Exclusion of similar evidence was deemed to be proper in United States v. Hurd, 549 F.2d 118 (9th Cir. 1977). There, the trial court excluded evidence offered by the defendant to show his belief that he did not owe taxes. Specifically, defendant was seeking to provide information establishing that he had been led, in good faith, to believe that the system of taxation was "based on voluntary compliance" and that Federal Reserve Notes do not actually constitute legal tender. Id. at 120.

Caplette also sought to establish his belief that he did not owe taxes. At trial he testified that income tax applies only to "big business" and that Federal Reserve Notes do not constitute legal tender. He asserted that this position was supported by the Constitution and that he should be allowed to admit new evidence regarding the sixteenth amendment "ratification fraud." Additionally, a defense witness was allowed to testify regarding discussions he had with Caplette regarding taxation, but was not allowed to speculate as to Caplette's state of mind or the law.

We find, as did Hurd, that the exclusion of the documents and testimony was not an abuse of discretion. The district court allowed Caplette wide latitude in explaining the basis of his belief and his state of mind. It found that admitting the large volume of documents would only confuse and mislead the jury.

CONCLUSION

There was sufficient evidence to support a guilty verdict. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in conditionally admitting Caplette's written statement from a previous court proceeding, nor in refusing to admit documents and testimony relevant to the illegality of federal tax law. We AFFIRM.