Unpublished Disposition, 930 F.2d 29 (9th Cir. 1990)

MEMORANDUM^** 

Appellant Arthur Radcliff, a former law student, filed this action against his law school and a former professor, alleging that he was dismissed from the school due to his race and his participation in a black law students' association. The district court dismissed Radcliff's original complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We reversed and remanded, finding that although the complaint alleged jurisdiction only under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Radcliff had cited Title VI of the Civil Rights Act and should be given the opportunity to make out a Title VI claim. Radcliff v. Landau, 883 F.2d 1481, 1483 (9th Cir. 1989). Radcliff subsequently submitted an amended complaint asserting Title VI claims. He now appeals the district court's order denying his motion for summary judgment; granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment; and dismissing his pendent state claims without prejudice. Because we agree with the district court's reasoning as expressed in its order of March 19, 1990, we affirm.

Radcliff first argues that the district court failed to consider our order of November 21, 1989 in dismissing his amended complaint. This contention has no merit. We remanded in order to give Radcliff the opportunity to amend his complaint to state a claim under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. Radcliff was permitted to file an amended complaint asserting Title VI violations.

Radcliff also contends that the district court erred in denying his motion for summary judgment. However, Radcliff presented no tangible evidence in support of his claims of racial discrimination. He attached to his complaint portions of documents, such as the law school's student handbook; however, these documents do not support any of Radcliff's claims, particularly his claims of discriminatory acts. His proffered evidence fell far short of that necessary to prevail on a motion for summary judgment, and the district court properly denied his motion for summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970).

Radcliff next claims that the district court erred in granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment. We agree with the district court's conclusion that the lack of evidence supporting Radcliff's claims and evidence to the contrary offered by the defendants warrant dismissal of Radcliff's claims. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25 (1986).

The district court found that Radcliff's dismissal was mandatory because he had failed two courses. Radcliff failed to allege that students failing more than one course remained in school and presented no evidence that would support such an allegation. The defendants, on the other hand, have presented evidence demonstrating that the law school has a policy of mandatory dismissal upon a student's failure in any first-year course. This evidence consists of the law school student handbook's statement ("A failure in any course will result in dismissal"), and affidavits from various law school administrators to this effect. Given this evidence and the absence of evidence to the contrary, the district court properly entered summary judgment in the defendants' favor.

Because the district court properly disposed of Radcliff's federal claims, it did not err in declining to exercise pendent jurisdiction over his state law claims. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).

AFFIRMED.