Unpublished Disposition, 928 F.2d 1138 (9th Cir. 1991)

Annotate this Case
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - 928 F.2d 1138 (9th Cir. 1991)

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,v.Mary Ann HOUSTON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 90-50148.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 8, 1991.* Decided March 25, 1991.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California; No. CR-89-555-AWT, A. Wallace Tashima, District Judge, Presiding.

C.D. Cal.

AFFIRMED.

Before PREGERSON, CYNTHIA HOLCOMB HALL and BRUNETTI, Circuit Judges.


MEMORANDUM** 

Mary Ann Houston and her co-defendant Elizabeth Moore were convicted of two counts of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841. Houston argues that the district court erred by instructing the jury on deliberate ignorance, as permitted in certain cases under the holding of United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 951 (1976). She also argues that there was not sufficient evidence for a jury to find her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We affirm.

* Moore and Houston are cousins. Moore is a Los Angeles resident and Houston had been living in Texas for several years. In the weeks before the women were arrested on June 12, 1989, Houston had been staying in various Los Angeles hotels under several different names.

Police were conducting a stake-out of the Federal Express office near the Los Angeles airport when they first noticed Houston and Moore. Moore was driving, and Houston rode in the passenger seat. It was hot outside. Houston got out of the car and obtained two airbills from the office. Instead of filling out the names of the sender and addressee in the air-conditioned office, Houston returned to the car. Moore then drove to an unshaded area of a parking lot of a nearby hotel, the Embassy Suites, which is across the Imperial Highway from the Federal Express office. A plainclothes officer observed Houston filling out one of the airbills. When they returned, Moore entered the Federal Express office and sent a package by the service's fastest, most expensive rate. A police officer then questioned Moore, obtained permission to recover and search the package, and discovered that it contained cocaine. The package was addressed to a fictitious name at a Texas residence for which Houston had ordered a telephone installed. Later, during questioning, Houston told police that there was another package in Moore's trunk. When Moore produced a key and consented to a search, police found a small scale and a second package containing cocaine. The women told varying and conflicting stories to the police but both consistently denied knowing that the packages contained a controlled substance.

The women were both charged with two counts of possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute, one count for each package. At trial, the women persisted in denying that they knew anything about the packages' contents. The remainder of their stories conflicted, however, as each attempted to shift primary responsibility to the other.

Houston explained that a man named "Rico" offered to pay $155 for shipping two packages, which supposedly contained jewelry and beauty supplies, to Texas. According to Houston's testimony, Moore announced that she had to stop to meet Rico. He was waiting at the Embassy Suites parking lot, and he talked to the two women as they sat in the car. Rico claimed that he wanted to send two packages to his sister in Dallas, but could not because his sister's boyfriend was opening her mail. Rico asked Moore if she had inquired yet about sending the packages to the home of her cousin in Texas, who was Houston. When Houston heard that, she agreed, and Rico instructed her to address the packages to Linda Cole. Rico also provided the name of the addressee and the name of the shipper. Rico wanted one package but not the other shipped that day; he asked Moore to put the other in the trunk. Houston saw Rico give Moore some $20 bills but didn't know if he gave her the entire $155. Rico instructed the women to go over to Federal Express, get two airbills, and meet him again. The women followed Rico's instructions, but he disappeared. Afterwards, they returned to the Federal Express office, where Moore mailed the package.

II

Houston contends that the district court erred by instructing the jurors that they may find that Houston acted knowingly if they find beyond a reasonable doubt that she was aware of a high probability that the packages contained a controlled substance and deliberately avoided learning the truth. We recently discussed the circumstances that warrant giving a Jewell instruction in United States v. Sanchez-Robles, 923 F.2d 747, No. 90-50018, slip op. at 482 (9th Cir. Jan. 17, 1991). We conclude that Houston's testimony warranted the district court's decision to give the Jewell instruction.

Under the circumstances as described by Houston, Rico's story was very suspicious. People do not ordinarily pay $155 to ship beauty supplies. If the contents of the packages were truly innocent, why did Rico need to hide their contents from his sister's boyfriend? The testimony indicated that the women met Rico not far from the Federal Express office. Why couldn't Rico ship the packages himself? Why would Rico want the packages shipped on different days? Why did Rico want the sender's name listed as someone other than him or Houston? Why did Rico give the packages to the women but ask them to return with the airbills and then disappear before they could meet him? Under these circumstances, the jury could reasonably conclude that Houston was aware of a high probability that the packages contained contraband.

The jury could also conclude that Houston deliberately avoided learning the truth. She did not ask Rico or Moore for any answers to the questions posed in the preceding paragraph. The jury was properly instructed on deliberate ignorance.

III

Houston contends that there was insufficient evidence to sustain her conviction. In considering her argument, we must review the record in the light most favorable to the government. We must affirm the conviction if a rational factfinder could have found proof of each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Adler, 879 F.2d 473, 495 (9th Cir. 1988). In this case, the government was required to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly possessed a controlled substance with intent to distribute. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1). Houston contends there was not sufficient evidence to show knowledge and possession. We conclude that there was sufficient evidence for convictions on both counts.

Moore's testimony provided sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that Houston was the one who brought the packages. As the police testimony confirmed, Houston kept one of the packages on her lap, and she addressed the airbill. The testimony that Houston handed the other package to Moore, who placed it in the trunk, is sufficient for the jury to conclude that Houston exercised control over the second package.

There was additional testimony that permitted the jury to infer that Houston knew what was in the packages. Moore's evasive conduct, her contradictory explanations of her behavior, her unexplained cash, her unexplained records of apparently large cash transactions, her use of aliases, her use of a fake name and a phony return address on the package she was mailing to a nonexistent person at an address to which she was connected, all permit the jury to conclude that Houston's story, that a mysterious man named Rico offered to pay the women $155 to mail some "beauty supplies," was a lie to cover up the most logical explanation: Houston knew what she was doing. Alternatively, as we have explained, if the jury did believe Houston's story about Rico, it was entitled to find that Houston nevertheless acted knowingly by deliberately closing her eyes to a high probability that the packages contained contraband. See Sanchez-Robles, 923 F.2d 747, ----, slip op. at 482, ----.

AFFIRMED.

 *

The panel unanimously found this case suitable for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a) and Ninth Circuit Rule 34-4

 **

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir.R. 36-3

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.