Unpublished Disposition, 928 F.2d 1137 (9th Cir. 1991)

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U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - 928 F.2d 1137 (9th Cir. 1991)

Robert A. LEITCH, Petitioner-Appellant,v.COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 90-70129.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 20, 1991.* Decided March 25, 1991.

Appeal from the United States Tax Court, No. 21859-88.

U.S.T.C.

AFFIRMED.

Before CYNTHIA HOLCOMB HALL, DAVID R. THOMPSON and RYMER, Circuit Judges.


MEMORANDUM** 

Robert A. Leitch appeals pro se the tax court's decision upholding the Commissioner of Internal Revenue's ("Commissioner") disallowance of Leitch's telephone and miscellaneous business expense deductions, and reversing the Commissioner's disallowance of Leitch's automobile expense deduction. Leitch claimed these deductions for the 1986 tax year. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7482. We review for clear error, see Browning v. Commissioner, 890 F.2d 1084, 1086 (9th Cir. 1989), and affirm.

In general, a taxpayer may deduct from his or her income "all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business." 26 U.S.C. § 162(a). The taxpayer bears the burden of proving entitlement to a deduction. See Smith v. Commissioner, 800 F.2d 930, 933 (9th Cir. 1986); Tax Ct.R. 142(a). In addition, "the Commissioner's decisions are presumed correct and the taxpayer has the burden of proving that the Commissioner's decision was wrong." Browning, 890 F.2d at 1086.

Leitch claimed a deduction equal to fifty percent of his telephone bill as a business expense. Nevertheless, even though the tax court found that Leitch's telephone is a business necessity, Leitch failed to show that fifty percent of his telephone bills were incurred for business purposes. The record indicates Leitch refused to submit logs of his telephone calls to either the Commissioner or the tax court. Leitch thus failed to prove his entitlement to this deduction. See Smith, 800 F.2d at 933; Tax Ct.R. 142(a).

Leitch also claimed a miscellaneous business expense deduction for amounts he spent on equipment and supplies. These expenses, however, were reimbursable by the City of Los Angeles. Because Leitch failed to show he in fact tried but could not obtain reimbursement, he failed to prove his entitlement to this deduction as well. See Orvis v. Commissioner, 788 F.2d 1406, 1408 (9th Cir. 1986); Smith, 800 F.2d at 933; Tax Ct.R. 142(a).

Finally, the tax court correctly determined that Leitch's allowable automobile expense deduction is $5,429, as shown in the parties' stipulation of facts. Leitch's contention that he was coerced into signing the stipulation is unsupported by the record; nor did Leitch raise this issue before the tax court as required by Tax Ct.R. 91(d).1  Leitch also fails to show that the tax court's enforcement of the stipulation resulted in "manifest injustice" to him. See Bail Bonds by Marvin Nelson, Inc. v. Commissioner, 820 F.2d 1543, 1547 (9th Cir. 1987); Tax Ct.R. 91(e).2  As noted above, Leitch did not submit documentation of his telephone usage into evidence even when the tax court itself gave him the opportunity to do so. The only other evidence Leitch sought to introduce is unrelated to whether he is entitled to his claimed deductions. Under these circumstances, the tax court did not err by enforcing the stipulation.

AFFIRMED.

 *

The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for disposition without oral argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 9th Cir.R. 34-4. Accordingly, Leitch's request for oral argument is denied

 **

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir.R. 36-3

 1

Rule 91(d) provides: "Any objection to all or any part of a stipulation should be noted in the stipulation, but the Court will consider any objection to a stipulated matter made at the commencement of the trial or for good cause shown made during the trial."

 2

In pertinent part, Rule 91(e) provides: "The Court will not permit a party to a stipulation to qualify, change, or contradict a stipulation in whole or in part, except that it may do so where justice requires."

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