Unpublished Disposition, 927 F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1991)

MEMORANDUM^*

Randall E. and Christina L. Rollins appeal pro se the district court's dismissal of their Bivens action against Judge Hugh Gibson, Internal Revenue Service agents Tony L. Swindle and John T. Kramer, federal attorney Manuel Porro-Vizcarra, West Columbia National Bank ("WCNB"), and WCNB officer Charles Spencer. The Rollinses also appeal the court's denial of their motions to reinstate their action, for a new trial, to amend the judgment, for change of venue, and for consolidation. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and affirm.

The Rollins's allegations in their first amended complaint do not establish that Judge Gibson acted "in the clear absence of all jurisdiction," or that he "perform [ed] an act that is not judicial in nature." See Schuker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1204 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 995 (1988). Thus, the district court did not err in dismissing Judge Gibson on the ground of judicial immunity. See id.; Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc).

The Rollins's suit against the remaining federal defendants in their official capacity is essentially one against the United States and is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See Gilbert v. DaGrossa, 756 F.2d 1455, 1458-59 (9th Cir. 1985). As a sovereign, the United States "is immune from suit unless it has expressly waived such immunity and consented to be sued." Id. at 1458. The Rollinses failed to allege a proper statutory waiver by the United States, and cannot avoid the bar of sovereign immunity by naming individual officers and employees of the United States as defendants. Id.; see also Arnsberg v. United States, 757 F.2d 971, 980 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1010 (1986).

The Rollins's suit against the federal defendants in their individual capacities and against WCNB and Spencer fails for lack of personal jurisdiction. The California "long-arm" statute provides that California courts may exercise jurisdiction "on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States." Cal.Code Civ.P. Sec. 410.10. The limits of this provision are "coextensive with the outer limits of due process under the state and federal constitutions, as those limits have been defined by the United States Supreme Court." T.M. Hylwa, M.D., Inc. v. Palka, 823 F.2d 310, 313 (9th Cir. 1987). The basic rule enunciated by the Supreme Court is that nonresident defendants "must have certain minimal contacts with the forum such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems Technology Assocs., 557 F.2d 1280, 1286-87 (9th Cir. 1977) (citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).

The Rollinses, who are citizens of California, have maintained throughout this action that all of the defendants reside in and are citizens of Texas. The Rollinses allegations do not show defendants have transacted any business or committed any tortious acts within the state of California; nor have the Rollinses shown that defendants took actions intended to have an effect in California. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Neaves, 912 F.2d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 1990). Because defendants lack the requisite minimum contacts with California, the district court did not err in dismissing the action for lack of personal jurisdiction. See Data Disc, 557 F.2d at 1286-87.

Because we hold on the merits that the district court did not err in dismissing defendants from this action, we also hold that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Rollins's post-judgment motions.

The defendants-appellees are awarded double costs plus attorney fees.

AFFIRMED.¹