Unpublished Disposition, 927 F.2d 609 (9th Cir. 1989)
Annotate this CaseHenry D. GUERRA, Plaintiff-Appellant,v.Ruben ORTEGA, Chief of Police, Phoenix Police Dept., PhoenixPolice Department, Law Agency for the City ofPhoenix, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 90-15249.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted Nov. 30, 1990.* Decided March 5, 1991.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, No. CV-89-0672-RCB; Robert C. Broomfield, District Judge, Presiding.
D. Ariz.
AFFIRMED.
Before HUG, WILLIAM A. NORRIS and NOONAN, Circuit Judges.
MEMORANDUM**
Pro se plaintiff-appellant Guerra, an inmate at the Arizona State Prison Complex, challenges the district court's dismissal of his civil rights complaint, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In his complaint, Guerra alleged various constitutional violations which occurred between September 29, 1986 and April 3, 1987. Guerra filed his complaint on April 12, 1989. The district court found that under A.R.S. Secs. 12-542(1) and 12-502(B), Guerra's complaint was time-barred. We affirm.
Guerra claims that, because he is a prisoner, the statute of limitations is tolled under A.R.S. Sec. 12-502(B). It is true that, in the past, the Arizona courts have held the statute of limitations tolled when the complainant is a prisoner. See, e.g., Marks v. Parra, 785 F.2d 1419, 1420 (9th Cir. 1986) (discussing state law). However, these past cases deal with A.R.S. Sec. 12-502(B) before it was amended in 1984. The 1984 amendment limits a prisoner's right to toll the statute of limitations.1 Because Guerra's complaint was filed after 1984, we must apply section 12-502(B) as amended.
In applying the amended version of section 12-502(B), we find the district court properly dismissed Guerra's claim as time-barred. Guerra, with the exercise of due diligence, should have realized his right to bring suit earlier. See DeLuna v. Farris, 841 F.2d 312, 315 (9th Cir. 1988).
Finally, we find Guerra's argument on the continuous tort doctrine unpersuasive. Guerra was unable to cite any case law applying the doctrine to his situation. Moreover, even if the doctrine applied, defendant's last overt act occurred on April 3, 1987. Guerra did not file his complaint until April 12, 1989, more than two years after the last overt act. We conclude that the doctrine does not apply in this case.
AFFIRMED.
The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a) and 9th Cir.R. 34-4
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir.R. 36-3
As amended, Section 12-502(B) states:
If a person entitled to bring an action ... is at the time of the cause of action accrues imprisoned, the period of such disability shall exist only until such time as the person imprisoned discovers the right to bring the action or with the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered the right to bring the action, whichever occurs first, and such person shall have the same time after the disability ceases to exist which is allowed to others.
(Emphasis denotes the words added in 1984.)
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