Unpublished Disposition, 921 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1990)
Annotate this CaseRichard O. BURGESS, Plaintiff-Appellant,v.WASHINGTON COUNTY, Scott Ryon, Detective, Washington CountySheriff's Office, Marlene Gaskins, Deputy,Washington County Sheriff's Office,Defendants-Appellees.
No. 89-35894.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted Sept. 10, 1990.* Decided Dec. 5, 1990.
MEMORANDUM***
Before CANBY and TROTT, Circuit Judges, and LEGGE, District Judge**
* SUMMARY
Plaintiff Burgess appeals the district court's denial of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims arising out his transportation across state lines while in custody. We affirm the district court.
II
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Burgess was taken into custody in Portland, Oregon, when he attempted to use a stolen credit card. While in custody, he was questioned by Defendants Ryon and Gaskins about an armed robbery during which the credit card had been stolen. The officers drove Burgess across the state line into Washington in order to investigate information obtained from Burgess during questioning. Burgess alleges he was taken to Washington without his consent after being threatened by defendant Ryon. After the investigative trip to Washington, the defendant officers returned Burgess to the Multnomah County Justice Center in Portland.
Burgess brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in the district court, alleging violation of Oregon and federal extradition statutes, the federal kidnapping statute, and the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants.
III
APPLICABILITY OF EXTRADITION STATUTES
Burgess argues that his transportation from Oregon to Washington and back to Oregon violated state and federal extradition statutes. Since the extradition laws do not apply to this situation, failure to comply with the extradition statutes is irrelevant.
The purpose of extradition laws is twofold. The primary purpose of the extradition laws is "to enable each state to bring offenders to trial as swiftly as possible," and to prevent any state from serving as a haven for fugitives. Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 287 (1978); see also Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219, 226-27 (1987). A secondary purpose of the extradition laws is to provide procedural protection to fugitives before they are extradited. Draper v. Coombs, 792 F.2d 915, 919-21 (9th Cir. 1986).
Neither of these purposes is implicated by Burgess' transportation to Washington, because he was already in the custody of the jurisdiction which sought to charge him. He was not transferred to another jurisdiction for trial. He was not seized out-of-state and shanghaied back to Oregon. He remained in the custody of law enforcement officials from Oregon, the jurisdiction in which he was detained and later charged. None of the rights protected by the extradition laws are implicated by these facts. Since the extradition laws were not applicable, Burgess cannot base a section 1983 claim on failure to comply with those laws.
IV
OTHER CLAIMS
Burgess claims his transportation violated the federal kidnapping statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1201, giving rise to liability under section 1983. This claim is meritless. Burgess was properly in the custody of the defendant officers. The officers who initially took Burgess into custody had probable cause to believe that he had attempted the crime of forgery by using a stolen credit card. A suspect in custody may be questioned about a second crime without separate probable cause for that crime. Since he was properly in custody, there was no violation of the kidnapping statute. Additionally, even if there was a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201, that violation cannot form the basis for a section 1983 claim. Giano v. Martino, 673 F. Supp. 92, 95-96 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
Burgess also argues that he was subject to an unreasonable seizure in violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Since he was properly in custody, these rights were not violated. Burgess's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were not violated by denial of counsel and a hearing before he was transported to Washington. Since the extradition laws do not apply, failure to comply with the extradition procedures is not a deprivation of due process.
Accordingly, the appeal is
DISMISSED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir.Rule 36-3
The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a) and 9th Cir.Rule 34-4
The Honorable Charles A. Legge, United States District Judge, Northern District of California, sitting by designation
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