Unpublished Disposition, 899 F.2d 18 (9th Cir. 1990)

MEMORANDUM^** 

Leroy J. Lehmann appeals pro se the Tax Court's order granting summary judgment against him and affirming the Commissioner of Internal Revenue's (CIR) determination of deficiencies and additions to tax. Lehmann contends that the Tax Court erred in deeming established the facts in the IRS's stipulation and basing its grant of partial summary judgment thereon. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7482. We affirm.

Lehmann failed to timely respond to the Tax Court's Order to Show Cause issued pursuant to Rule 91(f) of the Rules of Practice and Procedure of the United States Tax Court. The court advised Lehmann that his failure to respond to the order would result in information in respondent's motion papers being deemed stipulated for purposes of this case. The court was entitled, therefore, to deem the matters stipulated for the purposes of the case. Rule 91(f) (3); see Miller v. C.I.R., 654 F.2d 519, 521 (8th Cir. 1981). Indeed, the Tax Court possesses the discretion in cases such as this to dismiss the case for failure to prosecute. See Larsen v. C.I.R., 765 F.2d 939, 941 (9th Cir. 1985).

Lehmann had a fair opportunity to present his evidence to the Tax Court. Although we construe a pro se litigant's pleadings liberally, Christensen v. C.I.R., 786 F.2d 1382, 1385 (9th Cir. 1986), a pro se litigant is expected to abide by the Tax Court's rules of procedure, Carter v. C.I.R., 784 F.2d 1006, 1008 (9th Cir. 1986). Nor was the IRS required by the "leads doctrine" to investigate Lehmann's allegations that he was entitled to three deductions. That doctrine applies where the IRS uses inferential accounting methods to reconstruct a taxpayer's income. Edelson v. C.I.R., 829 F.2d 828, 831 (9th Cir. 1987). The IRS used no such methods in the instant case.

AFFIRMED.