Unpublished Disposition, 895 F.2d 1416 (9th Cir. 1990)Annotate this Case
ESTATE of Silme G. DOMINGO, deceased, by personalrepresentative Terri J. Mast, et al., Plaintiff-Appellee,v.Ferdinand E. MARCOS and Imelda Marcos, et al., Defendants-Appellants.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted Oct. 3, 1989.Decided Feb. 8, 1990.
Before WILLIAM A. NORRIS, DAVID R. THOMPSON, and O'SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judges.
In this interlocutory appeal, appellants first seek review of a district court order denying their motion for reconsideration of a previous order in which Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos were reinstated as defendants pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Earlier in the litigation, at a time when Mr. Marcos was still president of the Philippines, the district court dismissed the action against the Marcoses on the ground of head-of-state immunity. After Mr. Marcos was deposed as president of the Philippines, he and his wife were reinstated as defendants in the suit.
Appellants invoke the collateral order doctrine articulated in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949) as a jurisdictional basis for their interlocutory appeal of the denial of their motion for reconsideration. Appellants' invocation of the collateral order doctrine, however, is to no avail.
The practical effect of appellants' interlocutory appeal of the order denying reconsideration is to try to extend the time under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a) for filing an appeal from the original Rule 54(b) order reinstating the Marcoses as defendants. Whether or not the order of reinstatement could have been timely appealed under the collateral order doctrine is a question we need not reach. The time for filing an interlocutory appeal of the order of reinstatement cannot be extended simply by filing a motion for reconsideration months later and then seeking interlocutory review of the order denying reconsideration.
Appellants also seek review of a district court order refusing to dismiss pendent state claims, after having dismissed federal claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.1
The collateral order doctrine also fails to provide a basis for appellants' interlocutory appeal of the district court's decision to exercise jurisdiction over pendent state claims. The district court's decision to exercise pendent jurisdiction does not fall within the collateral order doctrine because it is effectively reviewable on appeal from a final judgment. See Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 265 (1984); United States v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 846 F.2d 43, 44 (9th Cir. 1988).
For the reasons stated above, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3
The gravamen of the action is that appellants and others were responsible for the murder of two Filipino union leaders in Seattle. The deaths were alleged to have violated 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(3) and 1986