Unpublished Disposition, 885 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1984)

MEMORANDUM^** 

Karen Wilson appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of her former employer, Lucky Stores, in her hybrid breach of contract/breach of duty of fair representation action against it. We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, T.W. Elec. Service v. Pacific Elec. Contractors, 809 F.2d 626, 629 (9th Cir. 1987), and we affirm.

Wilson contends that the district court erred in applying the six-month statute of limitations for bringing actions charging unfair labor practices under section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act because there was no final agreement here between Wilson and the union.¹  This contention lacks merit.

Wilson concedes that her claims are a hybrid section 301 and fair representation claim. The six-month statute of limitations for making unfair labor practice charges under the NLRA is applicable to such claims. Stallcop v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 820 F.2d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 169-70). Wilson's claims accrued in May 1984 when she became aware that her union had made a final decision to drop her grievance short of arbitration. See Stallcop, 820 F.2d at 1042 (Stallcop's claims accrued in March 1985 when she received the union's letter notifying her it would pursue her grievance no further); Carter v. Smith Food King, 765 F.2d 916, 919 n. 2 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing McNaughten v. Dillingham Corp., 707 F.2d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 291 (1984)) (The statutory period for a Sec. 301 claim begins to run when the employee knows or has reason to know that the union has quit pursuing his grievance short of arbitration).

Wilson also contends that because she was never notified in writing of the union's decision not to pursue her grievance to arbitration, she cannot be held to the six-month limitation period. This contention lacks merit. She concedes that she did learn about the union's decision, albeit indirectly, either through a phone call from the union or through her employer, who actually received a letter from the union announcing this decision on May 21, 1984. Thus, she knew or had reason to know of the union's decision not to pursue her grievance more than ten months before she actually filed her complaint.

Accordingly, because Wilson's complaint was not filed until March 1985, some ten months later, it is time barred.

AFFIRMED.