Unpublished Disposition, 880 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1988)

MEMORANDUM^* 

The Searles appeal from the district court's grant of a writ of assistance to enforce their eviction from the property described in the caption and denial of their petition for judicial review of the Farmers Home Administration decision denying them a leaseback. We affirm.

As security for loans, Jack and Dolores Searles gave the Federal Land Bank a first mortgage and the Farmers Home Administration a second mortgage on their dairy farm. FLB foreclosed on the property, which was sold at a public auction in July 1984 to FLB. One year later, FmHA redeemed the property by paying FLB $120,390.23. A Marshal's Deed in favor of the United States was executed in February 1986. In May 1986, FmHA gave the Searles the opportunity to lease back the property. In July 1986, the FmHA denied the leaseback and various appeals by the Searles. In December 1987, the United States applied to the district court for a writ of assistance to enforce an eviction notice that had been sent to the Searles. The court granted the writ on March 31, 1988.

The district court may issue a writ of assistance to enforce a final judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a); Hamilton v. Nakai, 453 F.2d 152, 157 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 945 (1972). The Searles argue that the district court abused its discretion in issuing the writ. After redemption, title to the property vested in the United States. The Searles no longer held legal title. In the absence of any right of the Searles to remain on the land, the district court was within its discretion in issuing the writ to enforce the title of the United States.

We review de novo the question of jurisdiction to conduct judicial review. Love v. Thomas, 858 F.2d 1347, 1352 n. 9 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1932 (1989). We may affirm a correct result on an alternate basis. Golden Nugget, Inc. v. American Stock Exchange, Inc., 828 F.2d 586, 590 (9th Cir. 1987).

The United States argues that the district court properly refused to review the FmHA decision, because "the statute is drawn so that a court would have no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency's exercise of discretion." Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985). The government's argument makes sense if the Searles were arguing that the FmHA should have decided that they qualified for a leaseback under 7 U.S.C. § 1985(e) (3). That decision is solely within the agency's discretion, but the Searles do not directly challenge that decision. Instead, the Searles raise two related issues. They claim that the FmHA solicited the foreclosure of the property and violated the nationwide injunction affecting FmHA foreclosures established by Coleman v. Block, 580 F. Supp. 192 (D.N.D. 1983) (modified by Agricultural Credit Act of 1987, P.L. No. 100-233, 101 Stat. 1568, discussed in Coleman v. Lyng, 864 F.2d 604 (8th Cir. 1988)). They also argue that FmHA denied them due process by failing to abide by the FmHA regulations concerning appeals and Freedom of Information Act requests. The district court failed to address these claims. We need not reach the former because the Searles were not in title.

We reject the argument that the FmHA violated the time limitation on appeals contained in 7 C.F.R. Sec. 1900.56(d). The regulation sets out the time period in which the applicant must appeal, and does not mandate issuance of a leaseback if a decision is delayed. The "appeal rights" which the regulation terminates are those of the applicant. Cf. Brock v. Pierce County, 476 U.S. 253, 260 (1986) (failure to meet statutory deadline does not remove agency power to act after deadline).

The record reflects that the FmHA ultimately provided the information and gave the Searles additional time during the appeal process to allow them to obtain and use it. The Searles cite no authority for the proposition that an agency's failure to follow Freedom of Information Act guidelines is grounds for challenging a substantive decision of the agency in which the information may be relevant. The remedy for violations of the Freedom of Information Act is a court order awarding production of the records, an award of attorney fees, or contempt (or some combination of those remedies). 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (4).

AFFIRMED.