Unpublished Disposition, 878 F.2d 387 (9th Cir. 1989)Annotate this Case
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,v.Charles Edward BARR, Defendant-Appellant.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted May 26, 1989.* Decided June 23, 1989.
Philip M. Pro, District Judge, Presiding.
Before MERRILL, WRIGHT and BEEZER, Circuit Judges.
Charles Edward Barr appeals the denial of his motion for a reduction of sentence. We affirm.
* Barr pled guilty in the district of Nevada to the armed robbery of a federally insured credit union, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (Supp. IV 1987). The court sentenced him to the maximum penalty of twenty years imprisonment. Id. Barr filed a motion under Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b)1 requesting a reduction in sentence, on the grounds that his sentence was disproportionate to that given to his codefendant, Joseph Charles Barrett III, in the Central District of California. Barrett's case was transferred to California pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 20. He was sentenced to a fifteen-year term for the credit union robbery, as well as to a concurrent fifteen-year sentence for another bank robbery.
The Nevada district court reviewed the Presentence Investigation Reports of both Barr and Barrett, following a hearing on the motion. The court declined to reduce Barr's sentence, on the grounds that the sentences were not so disparate as to justify a change, in light of Barr's history of violent offenses.
Barr timely appeals the denial of the motion. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b). We have jurisdiction over this appeal of a final order. 28 U.S.C. § 1291; see United States v. Salas, 824 F.2d 751, 752 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 465 (1987). Barr does not appeal his conviction, however. As he timely appeals only the denial of the motion for reduction of sentence, we lack jurisdiction to consider his sixth amendment claim.
A trial judge has wide latitude to impose an appropriate sentence. E.g., United States v. Barker, 771 F.2d 1362, 1364 (9th Cir. 1985). We review a sentence within the statutory guidelines, such as this one, for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Monaco, 852 F.2d 1143, 1151 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 864 (1989). We must review the record to ensure that the district court appropriately considered the individual factors particular to a specific defendant. Id. Here, it is evident that the judge thoroughly considered the individual culpability of this defendant, both at the time of sentencing and in reviewing the motion for reduction of sentence.
A disparity in sentences between codefendants is not in itself grounds for reversal. United States v. Hall, 778 F.2d 1427, 1428 (9th Cir. 1985). Barr suggests, however, that his sentence is unconstitutionally disproportionate to that of Barrett, in violation of the eighth amendment.2 See, e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983). Our consideration of the objective factors set forth in Solem leads us to reject this contention. See id. at 292. A twenty-year sentence for armed bank robbery is not facially unreasonable, or inconsistent with sentences for the same crime in other jurisdictions. See United States v. Kinsey, 843 F.2d 383, 392-93 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2882, 109 S. Ct. 99 (1988). The fact that Barrett received a fifteen-year sentence for the same offense in another district carries little weight in the objective eighth amendment inquiry. Cf. United States v. Taxe, 572 F.2d 216, 218 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 918 (1978).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Barr's motion for a reduction in sentence.
The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); Ninth Circuit Rule 34-4
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Cir.R. 36-3
This case arises under the version of Fed. R. Crim. P. 35 applicable to offenses occurring before November 1, 1987
This contention was tangentially raised before the district court, but not addressed in the order denying the motion. We consider it de novo as a question of law