Unpublished Disposition, 875 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1989)Annotate this Case
John C. McGINTY, Plaintiff-Appellant,v.Hazel HAYS, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted April 21, 1989.* Decided May 17, 1989.
Before TANG, NELSON, and REINHARDT, Circuit Judges.
John C. McGinty appeals pro se from the district court's
dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint
against six members of the Oregon State
Board of Parole for damages
and declaratory relief.
First, McGinty contends that the district court erred in
holding that the board members were immune from suit. This
contention lacks merit. McGinty seeks damages from the
parole board members based on their failure to provide him
with a timely prison term hearing.1 However,
parole board members are entitled to absolute quasi-judicial
immunity "when they act 'to grant, deny, or revoke parole.'
" Anderson v. Boyd, 714 F.2d 906, 908 (9th Cir. 1983)
(quoting Sellars v. Procunier, 641 F.2d 1295, 1303 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1102 (1981)). Actions
directly related to the execution of parole revocation
procedures are protected by this immunity." Id. at 909.
Moreover, a judge's failure to follow statutory procedures
is insufficient to strip him of his immunity. Beard v.
Udall, 648 F.2d 1264, 1269 (9th Cir. 1981); see also
Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1204 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 561 (1988). Thus, even if the members of
the parole board members failed to follow procedural rules
established by the Oregon statutes, they would still be
entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity. Accordingly,
the district court did not err in dismissing the complaint
insofar as it requested monetary damages on the ground of immunity.
McGinty also contends that the district court erred in concluding that insofar as the complaint requested declaratory relief, it should have been brought as a habeas corpus petition with the attendant allegation of exhaustion of state remedies. However, we need not decide this issue. In his opening brief, the appellate admits that he has, albeit belatedly, received a prison term hearing. Accordingly, his complaint, insofar as it requests declaratory relief, is moot. Lee v. Schmidt-Wenzel, 766 F.2d 1387, 1389-90 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Chinese for Affirmative Action v. Leguennec, 580 F.2d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979).
Finally, McGinty contends that the district court erred in not considering documents he had sent to the court, allegedly showing that he had been denied access to a law library and thus needed time for additional discovery. This contention lacks merit. A district court should not consider matters outside of the pleadings when ruling on a motion to dismiss. Mach v. South Bay Beer Distributors, Inc., 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986).2
The panel unanimously agrees that this case is appropriate for submission without oral argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 9th Cir.R. 34-4
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be dited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir.R. 36-3
In his complaint, McGinty also claimed that he had been denied a parole revocation hearing. However, because McGinty has not raised this issue on appeal, we need not address it. Wilcox v. C.I.R., 848 F.2d 1007, 1008 n. 2 (9th Cir. 1988) (argument not addressed in pro se brief deemed abandoned)
McGinty does not challenge on appeal the district court's denial of his request for an injunction against any retaliatory action by the parole board members against him for filing this complaint. Accordingly, we need not address that issue. Wilcox, 848 F.2d at 1008 n. 2