Unpublished Disposition, 872 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1989)

Annotate this Case
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - 872 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1989)

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,v.Daniel A. WIGGIN, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 88-1129.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Dec. 12, 1988.Decided April 3, 1989.

Before CHAMBERS, CANBY, and WILLIAM A. NORRIS, Circuit Judges.


Wiggin, a civilian, appeals from the district court's order affirming the magistrate's decision denying his motion to suppress his confession to lewd conduct on the Pearl Harbor naval base.

Wiggin contends that his arrest is unlawful because the Pearl Harbor Naval Police had no authority to arrest him. This contention is incorrect. The commanding officer was vested with a power of arrest that he was authorized to delegate. He implicitly delegated this power to the police who arrested Wiggin.

United States navy regulations are issued by the Secretary of the Navy, 10 U.S.C. § 6011 (West Supp.1988), and have the force of law. Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 891 (1961). Under these regulations, " [t]he commanding officer shall keep under restraint or surveillance, as necessary, any person not in the armed services of the United States who is found under incriminating or irregular circumstances within the command, and shall immediately initiate an investigation." 32 C.F.R. Sec. 700.713(a) (1988). The commanding officer "may, at his discretion, and when not contrary to law or regulations, delegate authority to his subordinate for the execution of details...." 32 C.F.R. Sec. 700.702(a) (1988).

There was testimony that the naval station commanding officer appointed at least one of the arresting officers, Quisote, to the Pearl Harbor Naval Base Police Department. Implicit in that appointment, we conclude, was a delegation to exercise the powers normally exercised by police, including the arrest of civilian offenders on the base. The power of individual arrest is one that the commander can scarcely be expected to exercise single-handedly, and he is authorized to delegate the power.

It is apparent from all the circumstances of this case that the commander has delegated by necessity the power of arrest to the police whom he has appointed to act for him. Wiggin's arrest was lawful.



This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Circuit R. 36-3