Unpublished Disposition, 872 F.2d 430 (9th Cir. 1982)

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U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - 872 F.2d 430 (9th Cir. 1982)

REMSCO, INC., a Washington Corporation, Plaintiff,v.LEASING SERVICE CORPORATION, a corporation, Defendant-Appellant,Bank of Cushing, an Oklahoma financing institution,Defendant-Appellee.

Nos. 87-4121, 87-4402.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Feb. 8, 1989.Decided March 9, 1989.

Before EUGENE A. WRIGHT, REINHARDT and TROTT, Circuit Judges.


MEMORANDUM* 

In this interpleader action brought by Remsco, Leasing Service Corp. ("LSC") appeals from a summary judgment in favor of the Bank of Cushing. Affirming the district court, we conclude the Bank has a security agreement satisfying UCC Secs. 9-203 and 9-110, although it describes the collateral imprecisely.

FACTS

Under a Stock Purchase Agreement with Loren Schademan, the debtor in this case, Remsco agreed to make ten annual payments. The agreement was signed by Todd McClaskey and Edward Pietz, corporate officers who also guaranteed personally Remsco's obligation.

In April 1984, Schademan gave the Bank a security interest in the Remsco contract proceeds as collateral for a loan. The Bank's security agreement described the collateral as "Contract Rights and Accounts Arising pursuant to: Stock Purchase Agreement Todd E. McClaskey and Edward H. Pietz to Loren Schademan, Sr." In July 1984, the Bank filed a financing statement describing the collateral more accurately as "Unpaid balance owed by Remsco, Inc. to debtor under 'Stock Purchase Agreement' dated March 23, 1978 between debtor and Remsco, Inc."

Schademan also signed as guarantor on a lease with LSC. When the lessee defaulted, LSC sued and obtained judgment against Schademan in November 1984. LSC claims priority as a judgment lien creditor.

LSC alleges the Bank's security agreement misdescribed the Remsco contract and failed to satisfy UCC Secs. 9-203 and 9-110, thus preventing attachment. The Bank responds that the description need only permit a reasonable inquirer to identify the collateral, and that its description satisfies this requirement.

DISCUSSION

We review de novo a grant of summay judgment. Darring v. Kincheloe, 783 F.2d 874, 876 (9th Cir. 1986).

Under the Washington Commercial Code, a security interest is not enforceable and does not attach unless the debtor has signed a security agreement containing a description of the collateral. Wash.Rev.Code Sec. 62A.9-203(1) (a) (Supp.1989, effective June 30, 1982). The description is "sufficient whether or not it is specific if it reasonably identifies what is described." Wash.Rev.Code Sec. 62 A. 9-110 (1977). It satisfies Sec. 9-110 "if it provides such information as would lead a reasonable inquirer to the identity of the collateral." In re Amex-Protein Development Corp., 504 F.2d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir. 1974).

Here, the description of an agreement between Schademan, McClaskey, and Pietz provided information sufficient to lead a reasonable inquirer to the Remsco-Schademan agreement. McClaskey and Pietz signed both as corporate officers and as guarantors. LSC does not claim it was misled by the security agreement, and the court below found specifically that no creditor could have been misled. The financing statement, not the security agreement, must give other creditors notice of the type of collateral that may be subject to a security interest. Northwest Acceptance Corp. v. Lynnwood Equipment, 841 F.2d 918, 921 (9th Cir. 1988). Here, the financing statement identifies the collateral precisely.

Affirmed.

 *

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3

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