Unpublished Disposition, 872 F.2d 430 (9th Cir. 1989)Annotate this Case
Robert F. SNYDER, Plaintiff/Appellant,v.The DEFENSE INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE, an agency of the U.S.government; Office of Personnel Management, an agency ofthe U.S. government; Fred C. Ikle, as Under Secretary ofDefense; Thomas J. O'Brien, individually and as Director ofDefense Investigative Service; Constance Horner, Directorof Office of Personnel Management; M. Arnold Werner,individually; Dolores Webb, individually; Patrick J.Garrett, individually; Bernard J. O'Donnell, individually;John L. Sproul, individually; Richard Roe and Jane Doe,whose true names are unknown, Defendants/Appellees.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted Feb. 17, 1989.Decided March 24, 1989.
Before TANG, SKOPIL and SCHROEDER, Circuit Judges.
Robert Snyder appeals the dismissal of his action against his former employer, the Defense Investigative Service, an agency of the United States, and against the federal Office of Personnal Management and various officers of each organization. The district court granted summary judgment against Snyder on res judicata grounds based on a virtually identical action brought by Snyder in the federal district court of Utah. The Utah court had granted defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed Snyder's complaint without prejudice to allow Snyder to pursue administrative remedies.
We agree with the district court that the Utah court's grant of summary judgment was an adjudication on the merits. The Utah court's express reliance on Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983), indicates that its dismissal was not for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, but rather for failure to state a cause of action. We have interpreted Bush as holding that the existence of a comprehensive administrative remedy available to federal employees is a "special factor" that makes a Bivens-type remedy unavailable for federal employment claims. Schowengerdt v. General Dynamics Corp., 823 F.2d 1328, 1339 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Bush, 462 U.S. at 385). Moreover, recently, we held that the Civil Service Reform Act provides a mechanism for appealing adverse personnel actions and therefore a Bivens remedy is not available to an aggrieved federal employee. Kotarski v. Cooper, 866 F.2d 311, 312 (9th Cir. 1989). Thus, even if Snyder was not precluded by res judicata from pursuing his action, Kotarski nows bars judicial review of his claims. Snyder's complaints about limited discovery rights, an incomplete record in the Nevada district court, and procedural errors in the Utah court are therefore rendered immaterial.
The Nevada district court also refused to exercise pendent jurisdiction over Snyder's nonfederal claims. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the state claims. See Danner v. Himmelfarb, 858 F.2d 515, 524-25 (9th Cir. 1988) (applying abuse of discretion standard). It is appropriate for the district court to dismiss pendent state claims when the federal claims are dismissed before trial. McCarthy v. Mayo, 827 F.2d 1310, 1317 (9th Cir. 1987).
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3