John P. Sahagian, Plaintiff-appellant, v. the United States of America, et al., Defendants-appellees, 864 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1988)

John Sahagian filed suit alleging that he was arrested and imprisoned in Spain pursuant to an unconstitutional extradition treaty. The district court dismissed his complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We affirm.

On June 24, 1983, an FBI Special Agent filed a criminal complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois charging Sahagian with attempted extortion in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(b). That same day a United States Magistrate issued a warrant for Sahagian's arrest. The arrest warrant was based upon an affidavit submitted under oath by an FBI Special Agent. The affidavit alleged that Sahagian, a United States citizen and resident of Illinois, had taken his four children from the family home in Illinois on June 13, 1983, without his wife's permission. Sahagian had not been heard from, the affidavit stated, until he telephoned his parents in Illinois from Madrid, Spain, on June 23, 1983, and then again on June 24, 1983. According to the affidavit, Sahagian (who had apparently been robbed) threatened to "destroy himself and his children" unless his parents wired him $10,000.

A Department of Justice official soon contacted Spanish authorities to obtain Sahagian's provisional arrest pursuant to Article XI of the Treaty on Extradition Between the United States of America and Spain, May 29, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 737, T.I.A.S. No. 7136, as amended, Jan. 25, 1975, 29 U.S.T. 2283, T.I.A.S. No. 8938 (the "Treaty").¹  Article XI of the Treaty provides that in cases of "urgency" either party to the Treaty may apply for the provisional arrest of a person pending the presentation of a request for extradition through diplomatic channels. An application for a provisional arrest is required to contain a description of the person sought, an indication of intent to extradite, a statement of the existence of an arrest warrant, and such "further information, if any, as may be required by the requested Party." Article XI further provides that a person "shall be set at liberty" if an extradition request and supporting documents are not received within 45 days after the embassy of the country seeking extradition is informed of the arrest of the person sought to be extradited. The Treaty does not set forth any specific procedures by which a person may challenge his provisional arrest or extradition in either the United States or Spain. Rather, Article IX of the Treaty²  provides that the person sought to be extradited is entitled to such "remedies and recourses" as are available by the law of the requested country.

After Sahagian was arrested and imprisoned in Spain on June 22, 1983, the United States filed a formal extradition request. The extradition request was supported by the affidavits of two additional FBI Special Agents and an Assistant United States Attorney. Sahagian was brought back to the United States on August 16, 1983. On August 19, 1983, a United States Magistrate dismissed the charges against him. (The parties do not explain on appeal exactly why the charges were dropped.)

Once the criminal charges against him were dropped, Sahagian turned his attention to the three FBI Special Agents, Assistant United States Attorney, and Department of Justice official who were involved in his arrest and extradition. Sahagian filed a pro se complaint against those officials that sought relief under a variety of legal theories and was peppered with terms such as "malice," "purposeful," and "conspiracy." The thrust of the somewhat confusing factual allegations in the complaint appeared to be that the FBI agents acted negligently by taking sides with Sahagian's relatives in a "great family conflict" and by seeking an arrest "with little known facts about the parties seeking [Sahagian's] detention" and "little and poor investigation in regards to these parties and the complete circumstances." The complaint also alleged that the defendants were guilty of "negligence of their expertise" by allowing Sahagian's relatives to believe that Sahagian would only be in jail for a short time before returning from his Spanish "vacation."

The district court then appointed an attorney for Sahagian. Sahagian's attorney filed an amended complaint that added the United States and Spain as defendants. The complaint contained two claims. First, the complaint alleged that the Treaty was unconstitutional because it allowed him to be arrested and detained in violation of his constitutional rights. Among other reasons, the complaint contended the Treaty was unconstitutional because it "contains no provisions for notice, opportunity to be heard, right to counsel or preliminary hearing for the accused subject to provisional arrest." The complaint further alleged that the federal officials knew or should have known that the Treaty was unconstitutional. Second, Sahagian claimed that the defendant federal officials should be held liable for procuring his arrest and extradition based on unreliable hearsay that they knew or should have known was false. Sahagian sought $1 million in damages from Spain, $1 million in damages from the defendant federal officials, and a judgment declaring the Treaty was unconstitutional.

The federal defendants filed a motion to dismiss which the district court granted. Spain never appeared in district court and, at oral argument on appeal, Sahagian's attorney wisely stated that Sahagian was no longer pressing his claims against Spain for the violation of his rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602 through 1611 (Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act).

Sahagian filed a motion for the district court to reconsider the dismissal of the federal defendants and a motion for leave to amend his complaint. The district court denied both motions and this appeal followed.

There are three issues on appeal: (1) whether Sahagian is entitled to relief against the federal officials based on his claim that the Extradition Treaty is unconstitutional; (2) whether Sahagian is entitled to relief based on his claim that the defendant federal officials acted beyond and abused their official authority in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights; and (3) whether the district court had personal jurisdiction over the defendant federal officials. Sahagian makes no argument on appeal based on any claimed violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.

In addition, Sahagian has implicitly abandoned any claims asserted directly against the United States. Apparently relying on the federal government's sovereign immunity, see United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538, 100 S. Ct. 1349, 1351, 63 L. Ed. 2d 607 (1980), the district court characterized Sahagian's claims as a "constitutional tort" suit brought against the named federal officials in their personal capacities under the rule enunciated in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S. Ct. 1999, 29 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1971). See Clark v. Library of Congress, 750 F.2d 89, 102-03 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (sovereign immunity does not bar Bivens actions brought against federal officials in their personal capacities). The only objection Sahagian has to this characterization of his action is that he claims that he is also entitled to relief against the defendant federal officials in their official capacities. Sahagian cites to Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 69 S. Ct. 1457, 93 L. Ed. 1628 (1949), for the proposition that sovereign immunity does not bar his claims against the federal officials sued in their official capacities. In Larson, the Court held that, in cases where specific relief is sought, a suit against a federal official would not be deemed a suit against the United States if the suit sought relief against a federal official for: (1) actions beyond the official's statutory authority; or (2) actions that are unconstitutional even if the actions are within the official's statutory authority. Id. at 689-90, 69 S. Ct. at 1461-62. See generally Clark v. United States, 691 F.2d 837, 839-40 (7th Cir. 1982). The question of whether the the federal officials could also be sued in their official capacities, however, is one we need not resolve. Either way, Sahagian's complaint was properly dismissed.

According to Sahagian, Article XI of the Treaty is unconstitutional because it allows federal officials to procure the arrest and detention of an American citizen traveling abroad without due process of law or an indictment by a grand jury. Sahagian also claims that the Treaty is unconstitutional because it does not require that Spain grant him notice of the charges against him, the right to counsel, the opportunity to challenge his arrest and extradition in the Spanish courts, and the right to a hearing to determine reasonable bail. These contentions are plainly lacking in merit.³ 

It is well settled that the Bill of Rights limits both the federal government's treaty-making powers as well as actions taken by federal officials pursuant to the federal government's treaties. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-19, 77 S. Ct. 1222, 1230-31, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1148 (1957) (plurality opinion); Matter of Extradition of Burt, 737 F.2d 1477, 1484-87 (7th Cir. 1984); Plaster v. United States, 720 F.2d 340, 348 (4th Cir. 1983). Thus, to the extent Sahagian challenges the procedures under which the federal officials procured his arrest and extradition, those procedures "must be assessed in light of the Constitution." Burt, 737 F.2d at 1485. See also Rosado v. Civiletti, 621 F.2d 1179, 1195-96 (2d Cir.) (stating that while the Constitution does not limit the criminal procedures employed by another country, it does limit the manner in which the United States "may join the effort"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 856, 101 S. Ct. 153, 66 L. Ed. 2d 70 (1980). But the procedures set forth in Article XI did not deprive Sahagian of any constitutional rights. As contemplated by Article XI, the federal officials obtained Sahagian's provisional arrest and detention pending extradition after obtaining an arrest warrant from a magistrate based upon a showing of probable cause. This clearly falls within constitutional bounds. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113-16, 95 S. Ct. 854, 862-64, 43 L. Ed. 2d 54 (1975).⁴ 

Sahagian nonetheless argues that Article XI violates the Fifth Amendment because it allows federal officials to procure the provisional arrest of a person without first obtaining an indictment by a grand jury.⁵  This argument has absolutely no merit. There is no constitutional requirement that a federal official seek an indictment before arresting and detaining a person. See generally Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 113-16, 95 S. Ct. at 862-64; see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 4 through 7; Wright Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal Second Sec. 121 (2d ed. 1982). Sahagian apparently confuses an extradition proceeding with a criminal prosecution. Extradition is simply a procedure by which one sovereign nation turns over custody of a person pursuant to a request from another sovereign nation. As such, the courts have routinely rejected arguments that extradition proceedings are "criminal prosecutions" subject to all the rights attendant to such proceedings. See, e.g., Burt, 737 F.2d at 1486; Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 536 F.2d 478, 484-85 & n. 9 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 833, 97 S. Ct. 97, 50 L. Ed. 2d 98 (1976). The fact that a person's stay in prison pending extradition may be unpleasant does not mean that a person has been "held to answer" for a crime within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. Moreover, there is nothing in the Treaty that deprives a person of any rights afforded criminal defendants once they are placed in the custody of the United States.

Sahagian's remaining challenges to the Treaty are that it is unconstitutional because it does not guarantee that Spain give him notice of the charges, the opportunity to challenge his arrest and extradition in the Spanish courts, the right to counsel, and the right to bail.⁶  These claims are based on the mistaken premise that the United States has either the right or the power to insist that the Spanish courts comply with the United States' laws concerning extradition proceedings or criminal procedure. However, as the Supreme Court noted long ago, "No principle of general law is more universally acknowledged, than the perfect equality of nations.... It results from this equality, that no one can rightfully impose a rule on another." The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat) 66,122, 6 L. Ed. 268 (1825). Stated another way, " [i]t is not the business of our courts to assume the responsibility for supervising the integrity of the judicial system of another sovereign nation. Such an assumption would directly conflict with the principle of comity upon which extradition is based." Jhirad, 536 F.2d at 484-85. This principle is most often applied in cases where the courts have held that a person cannot defeat his extradition to a foreign country on the ground that his trial in the country requesting extradition will not contain all the safeguards guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. See Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 122, 21 S. Ct. 302, 307, 45 L. Ed. 448 (1901); Burt, 737 F.2d at 1487-88; Jhirad, 536 F.2d at 484-85; Holmes v. Laird, 459 F.2d 1211, 1217-18 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 869, 93 S. Ct. 197, 34 L. Ed. 2d 120 (1972). But this principle of comity between nations is equally applicable to cases where a person claims to have been denied constitutional rights in a foreign extradition proceeding. See Hall v. Patterson, 45 F. 352, 356 (C.C.D.N.J. 1891). It is hardly reasonable to expect the courts of Spain (or the United States) to constantly alter the procedures under which it conducts extradition proceedings depending upon the citizenship of the person sought to be extradited. And it is difficult to see how, as a practical matter, any such treaty provisions could be enforced. We recognize that, like most legal principles, the principle of comity is not without exceptions. The Constitution may impose some limitations upon extradition decisions in exceptional cases due to some "particularly atrocious procedures or punishments employed by the foreign jurisdiction...." Burt, 737 F.2d at 1487. But merely detaining an individual pending his extradition to the United States certainly does not present such a case.

Sahagian also alleged in his complaint that his Fifth Amendment rights were violated because "the individual defendants acted beyond and abused their official authority." Complaint at 5. Sahagian, however, does nothing on appeal with this allegation other than repeat it in varying forms in his brief without any discussion of the complaint's factual allegations or citation to any relevant legal authority. This is simply insufficient to raise the argument on appeal. See Ordower v. Feldman, 826 F.2d 1569 (7th Cir. 1987). Moreover, even if properly raised before us, the factual allegations in the complaint, as the district court noted, fail to raise above the level of simple negligence. This is inadequate to demonstrate the violation of a liberty interest such as that involved in this case. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332-36, 106 S. Ct. 662, 665-67, 88 L. Ed. 2d 662 (1986).

Thus, even if the district court had jurisdiction over the defendants, plaintiff could not prevail. The district court chose not to reach the issue of personal jurisdiction because it dismissed the complaint on the merits; we affirm that decision.

AFFIRMED.