Unpublished Disposition, 862 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1988)

MEMORANDUM

Goulardt appeals challenging his sentence imposed following a guilty plea for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, distribution of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2, and knowingly failing to appear for sentencing, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3146. Goulardt contends that the district court abused its discretion because it failed to individualize his sentence.

We consolidated Goulardt's appeals for conspiracy to distribute and distribution of methamphetamine (No. 87-1085) and for failure to appear for sentencing (No. 87-1086). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.

We review a sentence which falls within the statutory limit for abuse of discretion. United States v. Monaco, 852 F.2d 1143, 1151 (9th Cir. 1988) (Monaco) ; United States v. Benny, 786 F.2d 1410, 1421 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 668 (1986).

Goulardt contends that, by imposing consecutive maximum sentences for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and for distribution of methamphetamine, the district court failed to individualize his sentence and thus abused its discretion. A criminal sentence must reflect an individualized assessment of a particular defendant's culpability rather than a mechanistic application of a given sentence to a given type of crime. United States v. Barker, 771 F.2d 1362, 1365 (9th Cir. 1985) (Barker) . Sentences imposed on a mechanical basis have been vacated as an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Garrett, 680 F.2d 650, 652 & n. 3 (9th Cir. 1982). A court may consider general deterrence in determining a sentence, Barker, 771 F.2d at 1368 (desire to "send a message through sentencing [is not] inappropriate per se"), so long as it strikes a balance between the goal of general deterrence and the imperative of individualized sentencing. See id. at 1369.

Goulardt argues that his sentence was not individualized because: (1) the court based his sentences solely on the nature of the offenses, ignoring "important elements of [his] personal situation"; and (2) the court's sole purpose for imposing the maximum sentence was to deter others from manufacturing and selling methamphetamine. Goulardt alleges that the district court failed to consider the following mitigating circumstances: (1) the absence of weapons or violence in the incidents leading to his conviction and the fact that he had no record of methamphetamine use or sale; and (2) his limited participation in the methamphetamine conspiracy.

As to the absence of weapons and the absence of a record of methamphetamine use, the court was advised that Goulardt did not use weapons or any violence in committing the offenses for which he was convicted and that Goulardt had no record of methamphetamine use or sale. However, the court was also informed that Goulardt was in possession of 51 grams of methamphetamine and $1,900 at the time he was arrested for failure to appear for sentencing. This information indicates that Goulardt felt no remorse for his criminal behavior and possibly lacked potential for rehabilitation.

As to Goulardt's claim of limited involvement in the conspiracy, Goulardt admitted at the sentencing hearing that he was involved in the methamphetamine conspiracy during 1982 and 1983. Moreover, Count I, to which Goulardt pled guilty, tied him to the conspiracy in January 1984. Thus, there was evidence before the court that Goulardt was a party to the conspiracy to manufacture and distribute substantial amounts of methamphetamine over the course of three years. In addition, Goulardt confessed at his sentencing hearing to initiating a meeting with an undercover agent at which he delivered a sample of methamphetamine to the agent. This sample was designed to lead to the sale of a larger quantity of methamphetamine. Finally, when Goulardt sought a reduced offense category because of his alleged limited participation in the conspiracy, the district judge informed Goulardt that he had already reviewed the assigned category with the probation department. Thus, the judge considered Goulardt's individual role in the conspiracy before deciding his sentence. Taken together this evidence indicated that Goulardt's involvement in the conspiracy was not limited, as Goulardt alleged, but substantial. Thus, Goulardt's involvement in a long operating conspiracy to distribute large quantities of methamphetamine and his lack of remorse were individual circumstances warranting the imposition of the maximum term of imprisonment.

Goulardt's claim that the district court was motivated only by general deterrence is not supported by the record. At the sentencing hearing, the district judge stated that it was necessary "to impose a message to people"; however, he clarified that comment and directed a message specifically to Goulardt. The judge told Goulardt that he was "not [sending] a message to people, but a message to you. You can't do this." The judge then expressed his concern about Goulardt's individual involvement and financial interest in the methamphetamine operation.

The record contains other evidence which suggests that the court considered Goulardt's individual circumstances. Two of Goulardt's codefendants received less than the permissible maximum sentence. See Monaco, 852 F.2d at 1151 (defendant's claim that the district court engaged in mechanical sentencing was refuted by the fact that codefendants received less than the maximum sentence). Furthermore, Goulardt was sentenced to only four years imprisonment on his failure to appear charge, although the maximum penalty for the offense was five years' imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. § 3146(b).

We hold that the district court sufficiently individualized Goulardt's sentence. See Barker, 771 F.2d at 1365.

AFFIRMED.