Unpublished Disposition, 860 F.2d 1089 (9th Cir. 1988)

MEMORANDUM^* 

Plaintiff-appellant, Rodney Jenks, personal representative of Rulon Jenks, appeals the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants, City of Blackfoot and police officer Jay Hill, in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

* Jenks contends that the district court erred in granting the City of Blackfoot's motion for summary judgment. A grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Ashton v. Cory, 780 F.2d 816, 818 (9th Cir. 1986).

Municipal liability under section 1983 can only be imposed for injuries inflicted pursuant to an official government policy or custom. Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Jenks argues that the City of Blackfoot, through its indifference to the use of high speed chases, fostered an official policy or custom of recklessness. In addition, Jenks argues that the City of Blackfoot had a policy or custom of inadequately training its police officers regarding high speed pursuits.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Jenks, the evidence might establish that the police chiefs were negligent in not discouraging high speed pursuits. However, the Supreme Court has held that negligence by a state official does not violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986). Consequently, the City of Blackfoot is not liable for Jenks' section 1983 claim based on his recklessness theory.

Jenks asserts an alternative theory based on inadequate training. Jenks must show an affirmative link between the training inadequacies alleged and the collision. Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823 (1985). Accordingly, Jenks must show a link between any training inadequacies and Hill's conduct. We agree with the district court's conclusion that the evidence introduced by Jenks was insufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact about the adequacy of Hill's training. Consequently, Jenks cannot recover under his inadequate training theory.

Summary judgment on the section 1983 claim against Blackfoot was properly granted.

II

Jenks also contends that the district court erred in granting Officer Hill's motion for summary judgment. Jenks arguably seeks recovery from Hill in both an individual and official capacity. Summary judgment in favor of Hill was proper.

A suit against an official acting in his official capacity is essentially an action against the city. Therefore, Hill would be entitled to the same defenses as the city. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). Jenks' official capacity claims against Hill fail for the same reasons his claims against the City of Blackfoot fail.

This leaves Jenks' individual capacity claims against Hill. The Supreme Court has held that a section 1983 plaintiff challenging a random and unauthorized act by a state employee has not been deprived of due process when the state provides a sufficient post-deprivation procedure to protect the plaintiff's interest. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543-44 (1981). We agree with the district court that Jenks has an adequate post-deprivation remedy through the Idaho Tort Claims Act, Idaho Code Sec. 6-901 et seq.

III

Jenks has conditioned his appeal of the dismissal of his claims against Carpenter on our reversal of at least one of the summary judgments in his section 1983 claims. Because we affirm the summary judgments in favor of the City of Blackfoot and Hill, we do not consider the dismissal of Jenks' claims against Carpenter. See Miller v. Fairchild Industries, 797 F.2d 727, 738 (9th Cir. 1986). Jenks may pursue his claims against Carpenter in state court. The district court dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, exercising its discretion to decline jurisdiction over pendent state claims.

AFFIRMED.