Unpublished Disposition, 857 F.2d 1477 (9th Cir. 1988)

MEMORANDUM

Ely appeals pro se the district court's entry of summary judgment in favor of various Arizona state and county officials in his suit for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

We review the entry of summary judgment de novo. Darring v. Kincheloe, 783 F.2d 874, 876 (9th Cir. 1986). Summary judgment is appropriate where the papers before the district court show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

The district court correctly determined that Ely's section 1983 action was barred as a matter of law by the applicable statute of limitations. See Ariz.Rev.Stat. Sec. 12-542 (Arizona's statute of limitations for personal injury actions is two years); Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 280 (1985) (section 1983 actions are characterized as personal injury actions for purposes of determining the appropriate limitations period).

Ely argues that the two-year limitations period was tolled by his imprisonment. Under Ariz.Rev.Stat. Sec. 12-502, imprisonment tolls the statute of limitations if a person entitled to bring an action is imprisoned at the time the cause of action accrues. However, Ely's imprisonment ended when he was paroled in 1978. See Boag v. Chief of Police, City of Portland, 669 F.2d 587, 589 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 849 (1982). Consequently, the limitations period expired in 1980. There is no provision in the Arizona tolling statute identifying parole as a disability. See Ariz.Rev.Stat. Sec. 12-502. Ely's action, which was not filed until 1983, was clearly barred by the statute.

Ely also argues that the district court should have applied the Nevada tolling statute, rather than the Arizona statute, to his section 1983 claim. However, a forum court looks to its own state's law in determining the appropriate limitations period. Forsyth v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 520 F.2d 608, 613 (9th Cir. 1975). The district court did not err in applying Arizona law in this case.

AFFIRMED.