Unpublished Disposition, 855 F.2d 863 (9th Cir. 1988)

Nos. 87-1308, 87-1323.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Before SCHROEDER and WIGGINS, Circuit Judges, and ALBERT LEE STEPHENS^** , Jr., District Judge.

MEMORANDUM^* 

Appellants appeal conditional guilty pleas following the district court's denial of their motions to suppress evidence. Appellants were arrested in a remote area lying near the border between Mexico and the United States. On the day of the arrest, a forest ranger who had lived and worked in the area over thirty years noticed tire tracks turning onto a rarely-used side road heading toward the border. The ranger followed the tracks until he saw a truck belonging to Coulson. After talking briefly with Coulson, the ranger followed the second set of tracks a short distance, turned around and noted the truck's license number on his way back to the main road.

Before reaching the main road, the ranger noticed a car on a ridge across the canyon; the car was parked on a fork of the road on which the ranger had seen Coulson's truck. Based on his knowledge of the inhabitants of the area, and the facts that Coulson did not look like he was camping or sightseeing, the road was not used often, and the area was often used for drug or alien smuggling, the ranger became suspicious and called the county sheriff's department to check the license number on the truck; the license number was not on record as belonging to a registered vehicle. The sheriff's deputy contacted the border patrol.

While the ranger was waiting for the border patrol, he noticed that the occupant of the car, Cole, had opened the trunk of the car and was walking back and forth behind it. Soon afterwards he heard Coulson's truck start and pass him. At the same time the ranger saw Cole's vehicle start down the ridge. Border patrol agents, on their way to the ranger's position, were told that the ranger was suspicious and of the fact that both cars had begun moving at the same time. Agent Truty, who arrived in the area first, knew that the area was desolate and that the side road involved was normally used only by ranchers. Agent Calhoun knew also that the area was often used for smuggling and that smugglers often used two vehicles with radio contact between them.

As Agent Truty traveled toward the ranger's position, the ranger described Coulson's truck and told Truty where the truck would be entering onto the main road. When Truty saw Coulson's truck on the main road, he motioned it to stop. The agent noticed a two-way radio in the truck. After questions about Coulson's identification and citizenship, Agent Truty learned from the ranger that Cole's car had stopped near the ranger and was apparently being unloaded; the agent asked Coulson to remain where he was until the suspicious situation could be cleared up. Agent Truty drove to the ranger's position and approached Cole, who was standing near his car. In response to Truty's questions, Cole indicated that he was bird watching. In the interior of the car Truty was able to see a radio similar to that in Coulson's truck. When Agent Truty checked under a nearby Manzanita bush, he found marijuana. Agent Truty arrested Cole and Agent Calhoun, who had reached Coulson's position by that time, arrested Coulson.

Both appellants argue that Agent Truty did not have reasonable suspicion to stop and question them. Coulson argues that the agent violated his fourth amendment rights by stopping Coulson's truck based only upon Truty's knowledge of the area, the ranger's suspicion and the fact that Coulson's truck and Cole's car had moved in tandem. Cole argues, in addition, that the facts that the ranger believed Cole was unloading his car and that both Coulson's truck and Cole's car had similar radios did not add sufficient information upon which to base founded suspicion supporting Agent Truty's questioning of Cole.

An officer may make a brief investigatory stop of a moving vehicle or person if, "under the totality of the circumstances, the officer is aware of articulable facts leading to a reasonable or founded suspicion that the person stopped is engaged in criminal activity." United States v. Corral-Villavicencio, 753 F.2d 785, 789 (9th Cir. 1985). The totality of the circumstances includes the patterns of certain kinds of lawbreakers, viewed in light of the training of law enforcement officers. Id. However, although reasonable suspicion may be founded on the inferences that a trained police officer may draw from articulable facts, it may not be based solely on an officer's hunch. Nicacio v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Service, 797 F.2d 700, 705 (9th Cir. 1985).

Appellant Coulson argues that Truty's reasonable suspicion had to be based on the agent's personal knowledge. Here the agent did reasonably rely on his own knowledge when he stopped Coulson; he knew the area was remote, that the ranger had seen suspicious movement by two vehicles, and that Coulson's truck was one of those vehicles. The apparently coordinated movements, the remoteness of the area, and the ranger's communicated information were a sufficient basis upon which to base reasonable suspicion. Corral-Villavicencio, 753 F.2d at 789.

In addition, police officers may rely on the reasonable suspicion of other officers who give them the information to stop a vehicle. United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 231-32 (1985); United States v. Robinson, 536 F.2d 1298, 1299 (9th Cir. 1976). In addition to the suspicious movements he observed, the ranger knew the area was often used for smuggling and had been told that the truck's license number was not registered. These additional facts supported the ranger's reasonable suspicion and therefore supported Truty's stop of Coulson. Thus, the district court correctly denied appellant Coulson's motion to suppress the evidence.

Appellant Cole also argues that there was no reasonable suspicion upon which to base the border patrol agent's questioning of him. An officer's mere request for information without any other evidence of seizure does not bring into play fourth amendment rights. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983). In this case, Agent Truty asked Cole for his name and identification and did not in any way restrict Cole's liberty; after the agent asked these questions, he found the marijuana and had probable cause to arrest. Thus, Cole was not seized prior to his arrest based on probable cause. However, even if Cole was seized for the purpose of the fourth amendment, the agent had reasonable suspicion based upon the ranger's observations and his own knowledge that the area was remote and that Cole and Coulson were coordinating their movements and had similar radios in their vehicles. Therefore, the district court's denial of the motion to suppress is AFFIRMED.