Unpublished Disposition, 848 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1988)

MEMORANDUM^** 

Randall Frantz appeals the district court's summary judgment denial of his disability claim. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

From December 1981 to May 1984 Frantz worked in banks, as either a check proof operator or a bank teller. In May 1984 he stopped working because he allegedly suffered from disabling pain; for this reason, he filed a claim for disability benefits and supplemental security income. Frantz's claim was denied by the ALJ. After the Secretary affirmed the ALJ, Frantz sought review in the district court, which also affirmed. He timely appeals.

DISCUSSION

Frantz argues that the ALJ erred because she failed to consider the combined effects of his physical and mental impairments. We disagree. The ALJ did consider the combined impact of Frantz's physical and mental impairments. In her decision, the ALJ found: "The claimant has no exertional or non-exertional impairments or combination of impairments which could be expected to interfere with his work-related activities ..." (emphasis added).

Frantz also claims that the ALJ's finding that no impairment precludes him from performing his past relevant work as a check proof operator is unsupported by substantial evidence and based on two legal errors. We disagree.

Substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision for three reasons. First, no doctor has said he cannot perform his past relevant work as a proof operator for twelve months, the period required to be eligible to obtain benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d) (1) (A). Second, although Frantz claims he suffers from disabling pain, the evidence conflicts as to whether there is any medical source of the pain. Several physicians did indicate that Frantz had a herniated back disc that may cause back pain; however, others suggested that he is either a malingerer or a hypochondriac. For example, one of Frantz's treating physicians stated: "Mr. Frantz's symptom complex is not consistent and is not adequately supported by the physician's examination." Third, Frantz's psychological reports fail to indicate that he has mental impairments which preclude his return to work. Though Frantz's reports suggest that he has some antisocial traits, he worked at several jobs despite these mental problems. Thus, his mental impairments would not prevent him from performing his past relevant work.

The ALJ did not commit a legal error by disregarding Frantz's complaints about pain. The evidence conflicts as to whether Frantz's pain has a medical source; therefore, we must uphold the ALJ's finding of no medical source of pain. See Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1230 (9th Cir. 1987) (when the evidence conflicts the finding of the ALJ usually must be upheld). Because the ALJ found no medical impairment capable of producing pain, she could disregard Frantz's pain complaint without a specific finding. See Howard v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1484, 1488 (9th Cir. 1986).

The ALJ did not commit a legal error by rejecting Frantz's treating physicians' opinions without a specific finding. The ALJ's findings did not contradict the opinions of Frantz's treating physicians. None of Frantz's treating physicians suggest he cannot perform his past relevant work for more than twelve months.

Because the ALJ's finding that Frantz has no impairment that prevents him from performing his past relevant work is supported by substantial evidence and not the product of a legal error, we need not decide whether the ALJ erred when she found that Frantz could perform a full range of medium work.

AFFIRMED.