Laura Reagin, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Charles Lawrence Terry, D/b/a Mt. Hope Shell Servicestation, Individually; Troy Virgil Terry, D/b/a Mt. Hopeshell Service Station, Individually; Mt. Hope Shell Servicestation, a Partnership; Edward C. Brasington; Shell Oilcompany; Quality Oil Company I, Limited Partnership; Qualityoil Company Ii, Limited Partnership, Defendants-appellees.laura Reagin, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Shell Oil Company, Defendant-appellant,charles Lawrence Terry, D/b/a Mt. Hope Shell Servicestation, Individually; Troy Virgil Terry, D/b/a Mt. Hopeshell Service Station, Individually; Mt. Hope Shell Servicestation, a Partnership; Edward C. Brasington; Quality Oilcompany I, Limited Partnership; Quality Oil Company Ii,limited Partnership, Defendants, 829 F.2d 36 (4th Cir. 1987)

Plaintiff Laura Reagin appeals the district court's grant of Defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. In granting the motion, the district court held that on the evidence presented the Defendants were not liable for the criminal acts committed by a third person. We affirm.

Reagin departed Atlanta, Georgia on the evening of June 16, 1982 to journey to her brother's wedding in New Jersey. She traveled without incident until approximately 3:30 a.m. when she neared Greensboro, North Carolina. She then exited from the interstate highway at the Mount Hope Shell Station to use the restroom and purchase some refreshments.

Approximately forty-five minutes to one hour earlier, Lorenzo Woodward had arrived at the station on foot. Woodward, released from prison a few days earlier, had been dropped off at the interstate exit by two friends after telling them he wanted to rob something. He entered the Mount Hope station and informed the attendant, Edward Brasington, that he has encountered mechanical problems with his automobile on the interstate.¹  Brasington told Woodward that a tow truck driver would be in at 6:00 a.m., but could be called immediately for an additional charge. Woodward declined the offer of an immediate call and remained in the station, chatting with Brasington.

When a food merchandise salesman arrived and began servicing the station, Woodward twice entered the restroom complaining of stomach pain. Following the departure of the salesman, Woodward approached Brasington from behind with what Brasington testified was a sawed-off .22 caliber rifle. This gun was never located by law enforcement officers. Woodward then removed a .25 caliber handgun from Brasington's pocket.

It was at this time that Reagin drove into the station parking lot. She testified she could only see the men's heads above the merchandise racks against the windows. She entered the station and went directly to the restroom. She stated that Brasington looked at her as she passed through the station, although Brasington denied this. When asked by Woodward if a woman entered, Brasington said no, it was a man, mistakenly believing that a white male accomplice to Woodward had arrived at the station.

While Reagin was in the restroom, Woodward emptied the cash register and marched Brasington at gunpoint to the side of the station parking area. Reagin exited the restroom and, looking over the merchandise racks once again, saw the heads of the two men. She testified that she believed they were going to look at a car.

Woodward took Brasington to a darkened area under a burned out perimeter light and told him to cross a small wooden fence and keep walking. Brasington did as he was told. Woodward returned to the station and approached Reagin from behind as she waited to pay for items she had selected. He robbed her, took her to the same area where he had taken Brasington, and raped her. At one point, Woodward remarked, 'He's going to get himself killed.' Reagin testified she looked up and saw Brasington, from a distance, watching them from a field adjacent to the station lot. Brasington testified he began to return to the station from the field after a few minutes, but a figure in the shadows motioned him away. He then walked across the field, through a forest, crossed a road and attempted to get help at a residence, but was unable to obtain assistance. Meanwhile, Woodward forced Reagin to leave with him in her automobile. Brasington eventually returned and called the police, reporting he had been robbed by a black male and a white male. Woodward subsequently abandoned Reagin and the automobile. He was eventually apprehended.

Reagin brought suit against several Defendants associated with the operation of the station, alleging responsibility for the criminal acts of Woodward. Pursuant to various rulings by the district court, the case was submitted to the jury only as to the two partners who owned and operated the station, the partnership itself, and Shell Oil Company. The jury returned a verdict in Reagin's favor, finding the criminal acts were reasonably foreseeable, the Defendants breached their duty of care, and that Reagin's injuries were caused by the breach.

Subsequently, the district court denied Defendants' motion for a new trial and granted the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. In a written order, the court first held Reagin presented 'just enough' evidence to permit the jury to find it was reasonably foreseeable that criminal acts would occur on the premises. The court went further and ruled that assuming the evidence was sufficient to establish a breach of ordinary care by the failure to take additional security precautions, it was mere speculation for the jury to find the alleged breaches were the cause of Reagin's injuries.²  The court specifically stated ' [i]t cannot be said on the basis of [the] evidence presented at trial that Defendants' conduct actually caused Plaintiff's injuries as a matter of fact; neither can it be said that those injuries would not have been sustained without Defendants' conduct or failure to act.'

In reviewing the grant of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, we must view the evidence and the inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. The inferences drawn by the jury to reach its verdict must be reasonably probable; mere speculation is insufficient. E.g., Lovelace v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 681 F.2d 230, 241-42 (4th Cir. 1982).

In the instant case the district court found the inferences drawn by the jury on the question of causation failed to rise to the level of reasonable probability. While we have the utmost sympathy for Reagin, our careful review of the record conclusively shows that the assessment made by the district court was correct. Accordingly, for the reasons stated by the court below, we affirm the grant of the Defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The remaining issues raised on appeal are mooted by the affirmance of the district court's decision.

AFFIRMED.