Daub v. Daniels, et al.
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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
IN AND FOR KENT COUNTY
PAULINE F. DAUB,
)
) C.A. No. 11C-03-037 JTV
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
SAMUEL G. DANIELS, WILLIAM )
BAKER, and BESTFIELD
)
HOMES, LLC.,
)
)
Defendants.
)
Submitted: June 10, 2013
Decided: September 30, 2013
I. Barry Guerke, Esq., Parkowski, Guerke & Swayze, Dover, Delaware. Attorney
for Plaintiff.
Miranda D. Clifton, Esq., Law Office of Cynthia G. Beam, Newark, Delaware.
Attorney for Defendant Daniels.
Mary E. Sherlock, Esq., Weber, Gallagher, Simpson, Stapleton, fires & Newby,
LLP, Dover, Delaware. Attorney for Defendants Baker and Bestfield Homes.
Upon Consideration of Plaintiff’s
Motion for New Trial
DENIED
VAUGHN, President Judge
Daub v. Daniels, et al.
C.A. No. K11C-03-037
September 30, 2103
OPINION
The plaintiff, Pauline Daub, moves for a new trial in this personal injury action
involving a motor vehicle accident after a jury found that the defendants, Samuel
Daniels, William Baker, and Baker’s employer, Bestfield Homes, LLC,1 were not
negligent.
FACTS
The basic facts of this case were stated by this Court in its previous order
denying Mr. Baker’s motion for summary judgement:
On May 6, 2009 at around 6:30 a.m., Samuel Daniels was
driving northbound in the left lane of Route 1 when the
tailgate of his pickup truck fell off of his vehicle. Daniels
testified that after he pulled his vehicle over to retrieve the
tailgate from the road, he saw seven to nine vehicles
swerve into the right lane to avoid hitting the tailgate.
Baker, who was traveling several vehicles behind Daniels,
testified that he was traveling one or two car lengths
behind the vehicle in front of him. When that vehicle
swerved into the right lane, Baker saw the tailgate lying on
the road approximately 30 to 50 feet in front of him. Baker
testified that he could not avoid hitting the tailgate, because
there was traffic in the right hand lane, and he could not
swerve onto the shoulder because he would have lost
control of his vehicle. As a result, Baker ran over the
tailgate, traveling between 60 and 65 miles per hour. The
tailgate flew into the air and struck the plaintiff’s
windshield and then hit a truck operated by Brad
1
I will refer to Mr. Baker and Bestfield Homes, LLC collectively as “Mr. Baker” because
Bestfield Home’s liability was vicarious through its employee, William Baker
2
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C.A. No. K11C-03-037
September 30, 2103
Garthwaite, who were also traveling northbound on Route
1. Daniels and Garthwaite testified that traffic was “light”
that morning, and Garthwaite testified that he did not see
any other vehicles on the road at the time of the incident
other than the four vehicles involved in the accident.2
After a trial, the jury ultimately determined that Mr. Baker was not negligent
because the accident was the result of a sudden emergency caused by Daniels’ fallen
tailgate and that Mr. Daniels was not negligent in a manner proximately causing
injury to the plaintiff.3
The plaintiff now moves for a new trial pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule
59 as to all of the defendants.
DISCUSSION
Superior Court Civil Rule 59(a) states in pertinent part that “[a] new trial may
be granted as to all or any of the parties, and on all or part of the issues in an action
in which there has been a trial for any of the reasons for which new trials have
heretofore been granted in the Superior Court.”4 In considering a motion for a new
trial, there is a presumption that the jury verdict is correct.5 The jury’s verdict should
be set aside only “when the verdict is manifestly and palpably against the weight of
the evidence, or for some reason, justice would miscarry if the verdict were allowed
2
Daub v. Daniels, 2012 WL 6846320, at *1 (Del. Super. Dec. 26, 2012) (footnote omitted).
3
See Jury Verdict Sheet.
4
Super. Ct. Civ. R. 59(a).
5
Mills v. Telenczak, 345 A.2d 424, 426 (Del. 1975).
3
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C.A. No. K11C-03-037
September 30, 2103
to stand.”6 As the Delaware Supreme Court noted, “[t]his standard gives recognition
to the exclusive province of the jury as established by the Delaware Constitution,
while preserving the separate common law function of the motion for a new trial
where all of the evidence can be reviewed from the unique viewpoint of the trial
judge.”7
Mr. Daniels
The plaintiff contends that she is entitled to a new trial as to Mr. Daniels for
two reasons: first, the jury’s verdict was against the great weight of the evidence
because Mr. Daniels violated two motor vehicle statutes, and therefore, he was
negligent as a matter of law; second, the Court erred when it failed to give the jury
a separate instruction that the owner or operator of a vehicle has a common law duty
to inspect his or her vehicle before taking it out on the roadway. For the reasons that
follow, I find that the plaintiff’s claims are without merit.
The plaintiff’s first contention is that the jury’s verdict was so against the great
weight of the evidence that no reasonable jury could render such a verdict and that
allowing the verdict to stand would amount to a miscarriage of justice. This is so, the
plaintiff contends, because the jury was instructed on two motor vehicle statutes—21
Del. C. § 4355(a) and 21 Del. C. § 2115—that impose a duty on all drivers not to
drive a vehicle that is in such an unsafe condition as to endanger any person. Those
statutes, the plaintiff contends, are strict liability laws which Mr. Daniels violated
6
Burgos v. Hickok, 695 A.2d 1141, 1145 (Del. 1997).
7
Id.
4
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C.A. No. K11C-03-037
September 30, 2103
when his tailgate fell from his truck while driving on Route 1. Thus, the plaintiff
contends, Mr. Daniels was negligent per se and the jury verdict should be set aside
because it was against the great weight of the evidence.
I agree that § 4355(a) and § 2115 are strict liability statutes. In Hoover v.
State,8 the Delaware Supreme Court answered the certified question of whether 21
Del. C. § 4176A, regarding the Operation of a Vehicle Causing Death, was a strict
liability law or whether the state of mind provisions of 11 Del. C. § 251(b) applied
to § 4176A. There, the Court held that § 4176A was a strict liability law because “a
violation of section 4176A is an offense defined by a statute (the Motor Vehicle
Code) other than the Criminal Code and the General Assembly’s intent to impose
strict liability for deaths proximately caused by a moving violation of the Motor
Vehicle Code ‘plainly appears’ in both the unambiguous language of the statute and
its legislative history.”9 Similarly, because the statutes at issue here unambiguously
reflect the intent of the legislature not to otherwise provide a requisite mental state
for committing the offenses, Sections 4355(a) and 2115 are strict liability statutes.
While the plaintiff argued a theory that the tail gate had been tied on with
bailor twine or some such similar twine or rope, there was evidence to rebut that
argument; and apart from the plaintiff’s argument, there was little or no evidence to
explain how it came to be that the tailgate fell off. Under these circumstances, in the
absence of any further evidence explaining the condition of the truck before the
8
958 A.2d 816 (Del. 2008).
9
Id. at 820.
5
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September 30, 2103
tailgate fell off, I am not persuaded that I should disturb the jury’s finding that Mr.
Daniels conduct did not amount to a violation of the statutes or that such negligence
was not a proximate cause of her injuries.
The plaintiff’s second contention as it relates to Mr. Daniels is that the Court
should have, but did not, give the jury a separate instruction that the owner or
operator of a vehicle has a common law duty to inspect his or her vehicle before
taking it out on the roadway. The plaintiff cites a Maine case from 1939 and a
Pennsylvania case from 1936 to support her proposition that such a common law duty
exists.10 She contends that the failure to give such a warning was in error and “could
have confused or mislead [sic] the jury on Defendant Daniels [sic] duties and
liability.”
Mr. Daniels contends that 21 Del. C. § 4355(a) and 21 Del. C. § 2115, which
were read to the jury, “theoretically encompassed, if not exceeded, the purpose that
an additional instruction of the duty to inspect would have accomplished.”
I continue to hold the view that there is no common law duty in this state for
an owner or operator of a vehicle to conduct an inspection of his or her vehicle before
taking it out on the roadway that requires the giving of an instruction on the point.
There is no applicable traffic statute. Because there is no applicable motor vehicle
statute, I continue to hold the view that the plaintiff was not entitled to a specific
instruction on duty to inspect and that the issue was appropriately covered by the
10
Dostie v. Lewiston Crushed Stone Co., 8 A.2d 393 (Me. 1939); Delair v. McAdoo, 188
A. 181 (Pa. 1936).
6
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September 30, 2103
general negligence instruction.
Mr. Baker and Bestfield Homes, LLC
The plaintiff makes four contentions with regard to her motion for new trial as
to Mr. Baker.
First, the plaintiff contends that “the evidence preponderates so heavily against
the verdict in favor of Defendant Baker on the issue of the defense of sudden
emergency a new trial should be ordered to prevent an injustice and as a matter of
fairness.” As she did in her motion for judgment as a matter of law, the plaintiff
contends that Mr. Baker was negligent as a matter of law in following the vehicle in
front of him too closely in violation of 21 Del. C. § 4123(a) and for failing to
maintain proper control of his vehicle. She also contends that “Defendant Baker was
not entitled to an instruction on sudden emergency because of the overwhelming
evidence supporting that his own prior conduct placed him in the situation of peril.”
The Court, however, addressed these claims in its order denying the plaintiff’s motion
for judgment as a matter of law, and it again finds that the plaintiff’s contentions are
not persuasive for the reasons stated in that order.
Next, the plaintiff contends that the Court’s jury instructions were inadequate
because the Court used the pattern sudden emergency jury instruction rather than the
plaintiff’s proposed instruction, which allegedly was “more tailored to the specific
facts of the case, and less of an abstract proposition,” and identified what conduct the
plaintiff believed disentitled Mr. Baker from benefitting from the sudden emergency
defense.
Mr. Baker contends that although the plaintiff did submit a proposed
7
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C.A. No. K11C-03-037
September 30, 2103
instruction with the additional language, she did not object to the Court’s use of the
pattern sudden emergency jury instruction, and that the pattern jury instruction
nonetheless was not improper or erroneous.
The Delaware Supreme Court has held that “jury instructions must give a
correct statement of the substance of the law and must be ‘reasonably informative and
not misleading.’” 11 However, the jury instructions do not need to be perfect, and “a
party does not have a right to a particular instruction in a particular form.”12 “In
evaluating the propriety of a jury charge, the jury instructions must be viewed as a
whole.”13
The plaintiff’s proposed sudden emergency jury instruction included the
following language: “Plaintiff asserts that Defendants Baker and Bestfield Homes,
LLC are not entitled to the protection of the emergency doctrine because the
emergency was of Defendant Baker’s own making and created by his own negligence,
primarily following too closely, failing to allow an assured clear distance between the
front of his vehicle and the vehicle he was following and not maintain sufficient
control of his vehicle to guide it safely y objects on the highway.”
The Court finds that the pattern sudden emergency jury instruction is an
accurate statement of law and that the plaintiff’s proposed instruction that included
11
Corbitt v. Tatagari, 804 A.2d 1057, 1062 (Del. 2002) (quoting Cabrera v. State, 747 A.2d
543, 544 (Del. 2000)).
12
Id.
13
Culver v. Bennett, 588 A.2d 1094, 1096 (Del. 1991).
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C.A. No. K11C-03-037
September 30, 2103
her assertions about why Mr. Baker was not entitled to the sudden emergency defense
was not appropriate. “The primary purpose of jury instructions is to define with
substantial particularity the factual issues, and clearly to instruct the jury as to the
principles of law which they are to apply in deciding the factual issues involved in the
case before them.”14 The jury instructions in this case described the basic facts of the
case15 and the contentions of the parties.16 The instructions then instructed the jury
on the law to be applied to the facts, including the sudden emergency defense. I find
that it is not necessary to tailor every particular legal instruction with the parties’
contentions. The jury, after hearing the evidence and the closing arguments of the
parties, was capable of applying the law to the facts in this case. Considering the jury
instructions as a whole, the Court finds that the sudden emergency instruction was a
correct statement of law and it was not misleading.
The plaintiff’s third contention is that the Court erred in not using her verdict
form, which asked the jury to determine whether Mr. Baker was negligent in a manner
proximately causing the injury to the plaintiff before asking the jury to determine
whether he was excused from liability under the sudden emergency defense. The
plaintiff contends that making the sudden emergency defense the first question on the
jury verdict form “unduly emphasized that defense,” and thus, the plaintiff is entitled
to a new trial.
14
Zimmerman v. State, 565 A.2d 887, 890 (Del. 1989).
15
See Jury Instructions, at 5.
16
Id. at 6-9.
9
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C.A. No. K11C-03-037
September 30, 2103
Mr. Baker contends that there is no legal basis to order a new trial based on the
order of the jury verdict form, and the verdict form given to the jury in this case was
logical and sensible. He also contends that the plaintiff failed to offer her own
proposed verdict form and failed to renew her objection after the jury retired to
consider its verdict, and thus, waived her right to challenge the order of the jury
verdict form at this time.
I find that the order of the jury verdict form in this case did not unduly
emphasize the sudden emergency defense and was not otherwise misleading or
confusing. The jury was presented the evidence and arguments of the parties at trial
and was given legally accurate jury instructions and interrogatories. The jury was
free to determine that the accident did not result from a sudden emergency, but rather,
was caused by the negligence of Mr. Baker. To the contrary, however, the jury
clearly determined that Mr. Baker was not negligent because the accident resulted
from a sudden emergency and he acted reasonably under the circumstances.
Therefore, I find that the plaintiff’s claim is unpersuasive.
Lastly, the plaintiff contends that it was in error for the Court not to instruct the
jury on the “assured clear distance rule.” Under that rule, the operator of a motor
vehicle is required to drive at a speed that would allow a stop within the assured clear
distance ahead.17 The assured clear distance rule, however, “has no application where
an emergency has been created.”18 As mentioned, the jury clearly indicated that the
17
Staker v. McSweeney, 185 A.2d 892, 893 (Del. Super. 1962).
18
Id. at 894 (citing Panaro v. Cullen, 185 A.2d 889 (Del. 1962)).
10
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C.A. No. K11C-03-037
September 30, 2103
“accident was the result of a sudden emergency as to Defendant Baker.”19
Accordingly, I find that all of the plaintiff’s contentions are persuasive.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, I find that the plaintiff’s motion for new trial as to
all defendants is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/
oc:
cc:
James T. Vaughn, Jr.
Prothonotary
Order Distribution
File
19
Jury Verdict Sheet, Question 1. See also Fernandez v. Davis, 1991 WL 113607, at *3
(Del. Super. June 4, 1991), aff'd, 608 A.2d 726 (Del. 1991) (“It is clear from the verdict that the jury
believed the plaintiff was so obscured by darkness, bad weather and his dark clothing to have been
invisible to a motorist operating his vehicle with due care.”).
11
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